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This dissertation explores how informal social institutions and social networks affect 
investment and consumption decisions in Ghanaian villages. While informal institutions create 
opportunities for risk sharing, they may distort individuals’ incentives to invest in public and 
private goods. I examine this issue using data from a year-long household survey and two field 
experiments conducted in 2009 in four small communities in Akwapim South District, a rural 
area in southern Ghana. 
The first paper presents the results of a field experiment measuring the willingness of 
individuals in rural communities to contribute to the financing of local public projects. The 
experiment tested two techniques to encourage contributions: a matching grant, and a provision 
point mechanism, both of which were found to be effective. Using detailed survey data on 
participants and their social networks, I examine what characteristics explain individuals’ 
contribution decisions. I find that individuals who are more trusted by their peers contributed 
significantly more, but this result is not explained by status alone. On the contrary, new migrants 
to the community and individuals from minority ethnic groups donated more than individuals 
from the local ethnic group and those with a longer history in the community.  
Unlike its formal counterpart, informal insurance may actually limit individual initiative.  
Like an income tax, social obligations erode an individual’s enjoyment of the returns from an 
investment, and may thereby distort their incentives to invest. The extent to which this taxation 
discourages risk-taking, entrepreneurship and investment is hitherto not well understood. In the 
second paper I use a field experiment to measure how social obligations to share resources affect 
the consumption, transfer and investment behavior of individuals in rural Ghana. I develop a 
theoretical model linking the characteristics of a household’s social network to its decisions 
 about investment and consumption. I then test the model using the results of a field experiment 
in which large prizes of cash and animals were allocated by lottery to randomly selected 
respondents. The results suggest the presence of an ‘investment trap’, whereby richer individuals 
are discouraged from making profitable investments because of the likely social taxation of gains 
from those investments.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Risk Coping and Social Institutions in the Developing World 
 
The New Institutional Economics emphasizes the importance of institutions to 
development. Many of the failures of development initiatives can be traced to weak or missing 
formal institutions, a weak state and legal system, and high transaction costs (Lin and Nugent, 
1995). In light of these failures, people in developing countries rely to a great extent on others in 
their family and community for services such as investment loans, insurance against negative 
shocks, and old age support. These informal institutions bridge the gaps in the formal economic 
system. In this dissertation I explore the ways in which informal social institutions and social 
networks affect investment and consumption decisions in rural Ghanaian villages. I make use of 
data from a year-long household survey and two field experiments conducted in four small 
communities in Akwapim South District, a rural area in southern Ghana. 
Informal institutions can both enable and impede the process of investment and innovation 
necessary for development. In rural communities, informal institutions create opportunities for 
exchange, commercial transactions and risk sharing. Being more receptive to the interests of 
local communities, and having more influence over them, local councils, chieftaincies, secular 
and religious groups can make valuable contributions to the design and implementation of public 
investment projects, even in the presence of a well-functioning central state. The concept of 
community-driven development recognizes these advantages of local information and interest. 
During 2009, we conducted an experiment in the survey villages to elicit contributions from 
community members toward the cost of a real public good. In the first paper of the dissertation, I 
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examine how individuals’ positions in the social network, and other characteristics, affect the 
amount they were willing to contribute. I also test two mechanisms designed to help overcome 
the free-rider effect, whereby individual contributions to a public good are typically lower than 
individual private valuations of that good. 
Empirical evidence suggests that informal institutions provide extensive support to the 
poor and are central to the economic life of traditional rural communities. However, these 
institutions do not fully replace formal government and market-based services. Researchers have 
begun to explore how the structure of social networks may shape individual and group outcomes, 
introducing asymmetries and inequalities within and among groups. Informal institutions are 
limited in scope by geography, since diversification of risk and diffusion of credit can only 
spread as far as the network that carries it. In addition, their benefits are limited to network 
members, potentially excluding community members of different ethnicity, gender or other 
attributes. 
Unlike its formal counterpart, informal insurance may actually limit individual initiative. 
Similar to an income tax, social obligations erode an individual’s enjoyment of the returns from 
investment, and may thereby distort their incentives to invest time, effort and capital in 
productive activities. Thus the social support provided by the community may be a double-edged 
sword, protecting individuals against shocks in bad times, but taxing them in good times. The 
extent to which this taxation discourages risk-taking, entrepreneurship and investment is hitherto 
not well understood. The second paper of the dissertation presents, and then tests, a model of the 
social taxation of investment in a social network context, showing how incentives to invest may 
vary across the network depending on individuals’ relative wealth. 
In the remainder of the introduction, I outline in detail the extant literature on individual 
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risk coping strategies. The ways in which individuals deal with shocks to their own consumption 
and income, and share resources with others to mutually insure each other, are at the heart of an 
exchange system that binds rural communities and defines the social network. That discussion 
provides the intellectual basis from which individual obligations to the community can be 
understood, and from which individual decisions to invest – in both public and private goods – 
can be examined. 
 
1.1 The rationale for risk coping mechanisms in developing countries 
Individuals in developing countries face a variety of risks and shocks. Fluctuations in 
climatic conditions, pest infestations and disease outbreaks affect the income derived from 
commercial farming, the prices of food and business inputs, and the quality of food available. 
Geopolitical risks threaten individuals’ lives, and also the viability of their businesses and 
farms.1 Individuals who own or work in small business are also prone to price shocks and 
changes in government policy. Given the cyclical nature of agricultural production, people in 
rural areas are particularly exposed to fluctuations in income and living standards. During the 
sowing season, when expenditure on farm inputs and labor is at its highest, the agricultural 
income stream is typically at its ebb. Stocks of stored food and cash are at their lowest, and 
individuals are therefore at greatest risk of being unable to cope should they be hit by a negative 
shock such as illness, death or bad weather. 
Market failures endemic in developing countries tend to increase the prevalence of shocks 
and magnify their effect. The products offered by formal institutions such as banks and insurers 
are inaccessible to many in developing countries. Programs directed at those excluded from the 
                                                
! The risks to life and property posed by civil unrest or conflict are of particular concern in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
are the subject of a distinct literature. They will not be explored in detail in this summary. For a recent review of the 
literature on this topic, see Blattman and Miguel (2010). 
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formal system (mainly rural households and the urban poor) are typically limited in scope and 
may themselves be affected by widespread regional shocks. Meanwhile, the absence or poor 
enforcement of legal contracts creates opportunities for deception and misconduct in business 
relationships, resulting in high rates of default on contractual obligations (Fafchamps, 2003, p. 
10). This reduces the general level of trust in exchange and social interactions. Geographical 
limitations imposed by poor road, rail, sea and air infrastructure cause transaction costs to rise 
steeply with distance and isolation, excluding people in remote areas from economic 
opportunities elsewhere and creating large disparities in prices across space. These disparities 
cause segmentation in markets for products like livestock, enhancing the price fluctuations 
resulting from negative events such as droughts, and thereby removing one potential means of 
mitigating shocks: the sale of productive assets. 
Individuals who live in or near extreme poverty are at particular risk from such shocks, 
facing a real possibility of starvation or serious illness as a result of a fall in consumption. The 
short-term consequences of severe shocks to survival are clear, yet periods of extremely low 
consumption also pose significant threats to individuals’ welfare in the medium and long term. 
Extended periods of malnutrition can have a long-lasting impact on the physical and mental 
ability of individuals, affecting their future income earnings capacity and productivity 
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999). They also have significant implications for the survival and 
human capital accumulation of children (Jensen, 2000). Economic shocks affecting pregnant 
women have been found to reduce babies’ birthweights, and in turn their chances of survival to 
adulthood (Rose, 1999). Hunger during infancy and childhood can lead to stunting, wasting and 
cognitive impairment, diminishing life expectancy and earnings capacity. Alderman et al. (2006) 
found that malnutrition among children in Zimbabwe delayed subsequent school entry and 
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reduced grade attainment. There is also evidence that children may be taken out of school in 
response to negative shocks like parental illness or death, either for short periods (Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1997) or permanently (Thomas et al., 2004; Glick et al., 2011). Individuals with lower 
levels of human capital are more likely to remain in poverty, increasing their vulnerability to 
future shocks and thereby imperiling the lifetime earnings trajectory of their own children. There 
is also evidence that the health impact of shocks in some parts of the world is disparately borne 
by women, which in turn has implications for their children’s health. Rose (1999) found in India 
that young girls were more likely than young boys to die during periods of drought, and 
Hoddinott (2006) observed in Zimbabwe that women’s body mass indices – but not men’s – fell 
during a drought in 1994-95. While shocks lead directly to diminished income and capital in the 
short run, even the risk of shocks can have a negative impact on development, by inducing 
individuals to adopt less profitable (and more risk-averse) investment strategies. Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger (1993) found that the uninsurable component of weather risk decreased the 
efficiency of investment and level of income among Indian farmers. The effect of this risk 
aversion on income can be substantial: farm profits were 35 percent lower among farmers in the 
lowest income quartile. 
For these reasons, individuals in developing countries have good reason to seek ways in 
which to manage risk, both by reducing the frequency and magnitude of shocks, and by 
insulating themselves from the effects of such shocks on their welfare. Given the importance of 
shocks to outcomes among the poor, and as a consequence their survival, health and future 
income earnings capacity, risk coping is also of significant importance to development 
economics. 
In what follows, I will make a distinction between two types of strategy taken to cope with 
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risk and uncertainty in rural communities. Strategies designed to reduce the prevalence and size 
of shocks will be referred to as risk reduction strategies, and include behavior such as 
diversifying income sources, avoiding risky investments or crops, and migrating. This literature 
is broad but not directly related to this dissertation, and therefore is not discussed further in this 
chapter. Strategies aimed at mitigating shocks once they occur are often referred to as risk coping 
strategies, and include a wide range of methods of smoothing income, assets and consumption, 
through the use of savings, inter-household transfers and the sale of assets. While it has been 
common in the past for researchers to focus on the ability of the poor to smooth consumption 
(that being the best proxy of individuals’ welfare), consumption smoothing is not always the 
primary objective of the poor. Some shocks, such as health expenses, affect non-discretionary 
spending (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). Thus the poor may wish (or be compelled) explicitly to 
destabilize their consumption at times, in order to maintain their health and standard of living. 
The literature on risk coping strategies discussed below is therefore necessarily broader than 
simply that on consumption smoothing.2 
 
1.2 The theory of risk coping strategies 
The theoretical and empirical literature identifies two broad categories of risk coping 
strategy. The first is a strategy of self-reliance: using stocks of assets (liquid or illiquid) and 
credit (if available) to cope with unexpected drops in income or rises in nondiscretionary 
consumption. The second is a strategy of mutual reliance: sharing risk between households 
through unrequited transfers, flexible loans or remittances. This is often referred to as ‘informal 
                                                
" Fafchamps (2003), pp. 12-13, likewise balks at the use of the term ‘smoothing’, but is even more agnostic about 
the labels applied to these two types of strategy. That said, he does not definitively label them. The issue is semantic 
and debated, but Fafchamps is correct in noting that the over-use of terms like ‘smoothing’ can be misleading and 
unnecessarily restrictive. 
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insurance’. In this section, I will describe the theoretical literature related to each strategy in turn. 
 
1.2.1 Strategies of self-reliance: Buffer stock savings 
It is well known that households in rural areas of developing countries are often at least 
partially credit constrained, able at most to borrow money at an interest rate many times higher 
than the interbank rate. In practice, therefore, economists have tended to assume these 
households are fully credit constrained, capable of spending only as much as they hold at any 
point in time. Deaton (1991) presents a dynamic programming model of the problem faced by a 
risk-averse individual who is credit constrained. In keeping with the permanent income 
hypothesis, the individual seeks to smooth consumption over time by equating her expected 
marginal utilities of consumption in every period over the planning horizon. However, she is 
subject to a nonnegative cash-on-hand (assets plus income) constraint, so that when the stock of 
cash-on-hand falls below a certain level, her only recourse is to consume it all. Deaton’s model 
describes the use of asset holdings as a ‘buffer stock’, whereby surplus resources are stored to 
buffer consumption against anticipated shocks in the future. This framework was extended by 
Carroll (1997), who showed that such a strategy was optimal even when abstracting from credit 
constraints, provided individuals are sufficiently impatient and sufficiently prudent (that is, 
inclined to hold precautionary savings). A more detailed discussion of Deaton’s buffer stock 
model is provided in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
While the buffer stock savings strategy is equally effective in smoothing both idiosyncratic 
and locally covariate shocks to income (the latter being instances in which nearby friends and 
relatives may be unable to provide help), its main drawback is that the buffer stock is finite. A 
sufficiently long sequence of negative income draws depletes savings and leaves the individual 
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with no alternative but to fully absorb a negative income shock through reduced consumption. It 
is thus a strategy that exposes individuals to potentially catastrophic risk, especially where 
income is serially correlated over time. 
The success of a buffer stock savings strategy relies in part on the form in which savings 
are held. The rural poor may not have access to reliable bank accounts, and may not be able to 
convert their wealth into cash, gold or jewelry. These assets may also be perceived as too risky in 
areas where theft, violence or spousal control is prevalent. Liquid, non-cash assets like grain and 
foodstuffs are subject to a high rate of depreciation, because of pests, weathering and aging, and 
thereby bear a negative rate of return. Such assets may also be visible, and therefore prone to 
claims from others, further diminishing the stock over time. A buffer stock saving strategy based 
on these forms of wealth may accordingly be less effective in the medium-to-long term. The 
most popular non-cash store of liquid wealth in India is livestock, given its durability and 
potential positive rate of return (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Rosenzweig, 2001). Livestock 
also accounts for more than half of the value of assets held by farmers in Burkina Faso 
(Fafchamps et al., 1998), and comprises almost all of the assets held by pastoralists in southern 
Ethiopia (Lybbert et al., 2004). This asset is also more easily ‘titled’, and consumption is lumpy 
and irreversible, so claims on the asset by others can be evaded more easily than those on 
divisible goods like grain. However, livestock are prone to heavy losses from drought and 
disease (McPeak and Barrett, 2001), and to adverse price fluctuations caused by covariate 
shocks, eroding the real value of buffer stock assets at the point when they are most needed 
(Fafchamps et al., 1998). 
Zimmerman and Carter (2003) show how the procyclicality of asset prices can lead 
individuals to prefer to smooth their asset stocks at the cost of greater consumption volatility. 
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They illustrate how a buffer stock savings strategy, coupled with endogenous prices, can thereby 
cause asset allocations across individuals to bifurcate, resulting in the evolution of large wealth 
disparities over time. The poor cannot afford to hold illiquid, productive assets, because of their 
need for a liquid buffer stock. The rich can buffer their consumption sufficiently with income to 
be able to hold less liquid and more productive assets like land. Ironically, the poor cannot even 
‘afford’ to sell their assets in the event of a common shock, because such shocks generally drive 
down asset prices. As a result, they adopt a less remunerative asset accumulation strategy but 
suffer greater volatility in their consumption (relative to the mean) as a result of common 
shocks. 
As opposed to systems of mutual assistance (discussed in the next section), buffer stock 
savings allow individuals to be self-sufficient, and have the potential to smooth common shocks 
where mutual assistance cannot. However, because of the typically high rates of depreciation of 
non-cash liquid assets, the strategy cannot be relied upon for savings over long periods of time. 
Repeated negative shocks deplete the buffer stock and leave households completely exposed to 
further negative shocks, and asset price movements in response to common shocks may 
drastically reduce the real value of a buffer stock for coping with income shortfalls. For these 
reasons, a buffer stock savings strategy cannot alone suffice as a complete risk coping system. 
 
1.2.2 Strategies of mutual reliance: Informal insurance 
Individuals can cope with unanticipated shocks by seeking assistance from others.3 To the 
extent that shocks are not perfectly correlated across individuals, it is ex-ante welfare 
maximizing for individuals to contract among themselves to smooth consumption across states 
                                                
# Assistance can take the form of gifts of cash or goods in kind, but in some settings arrangements involving loans 
with flexible repayment or debt forgiveness are more common, as discussed below. 
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by making transfers of cash or goods in kind. A prerequisite of such arrangements is that 
participants must expect to receive assistance with sufficient frequency to offset the cost of 
helping others. Other considerations, such as coercion, altruism or status display, may defray the 
cost of assisting others and thereby relax this constraint. 
At the heart of the informal insurance arrangement is a tension between diversification of 
the insurance pool and enforceability of the contract. As in all insurance arrangements, the 
system works best when the pool of participants is well distributed across space, or derives 
income from diverse sources. If the insurance pool is concentrated, the shocks faced by 
individuals will be highly correlated and shocks will more frequently be common to all 
individuals. Concentration thus diminishes the effectiveness of informal insurance. On the other 
hand, greater geographic concentration of participants increases the chance of repeated 
interactions between parties, providing the leverage necessary to oblige members to give. 
Counterparties in small communities are more capable of observing each other and gathering 
information to verify the needs of claimants. The effectiveness of informal insurance 
arrangements is therefore intrinsically bound to the structure of the social network, the cohesion 
of the insurance group and its geographic distribution. Enforcement of obligations, through 
norms, economic interdependence, or the prospect of future interactions, is central to the 
sustainability of informal insurance. 
Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) characterize the Pareto optimal transfer 
arrangement between two or more parties seeking to smooth their consumption. The precise 
model is described in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. Given the informality of the contract, these 
arrangements rely on the repeated nature of the game to deter defection. Both Kimball (1988) 
and Coate and Ravallion (1993) identify the importance of the participation constraint to the 
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sustainability of informal insurance arrangements. Individuals must always expect to gain more 
in future expected utility from being part of the arrangement than they would from ‘defecting’. 
There may be states in which an obligation to transfer would trigger defection; such states will be 
excluded from any feasible ex-ante contract. This provides a theoretical basis to expect that 
informal insurance will not be complete in any real-world society; there will always be a 
‘deductible’ to guard against moral hazard and guarantee participation.4 
Subsequent refinements of the Coate–Ravallion model have gone further in stressing the 
imperfections of informal insurance in the real world. Mirroring the literature on finance (see, for 
example, Hosios and Peters, 1989), researchers have in particular focused on the problem of 
limited commitment: payments are staggered across time, so that a donor now is only 
compensated by the prospect of being a beneficiary in the future. He is therefore exposed to the 
risk that the current beneficiary defaults on her obligation at an intermediate date. The standard 
solution to this problem in finance is to provide collateral for the loan, but in rural villages 
individuals are often credit constrained precisely because they lack collateral. Instead, as Ligon 
et al. (2002) observe, individuals pledge their reputations and future economic wellbeing in the 
community as collateral. Social sanctions are threatened, and possibly imposed, in response to a 
breach of the informal insurance contract. This serves to broaden the set of states in which the 
contract applies, and thereby expand the scope for insurance. The risk of moral hazard also 
serves to undermine the effectiveness of informal insurance. Default may be caused by genuine 
misfortune, but given the inability of agents to fully observe each other’s financial state and 
effort, there are substantial incentives for individuals to falsely understate their incomes or invest 
a lower level of effort. Ligon (1998) shows that in order to discourage this behavior, contracts 
                                                
$ Indeed, as will be discussed in Section 1.3.2, the empirical evidence shows almost unequivocally that gifts and 
loans cannot fully insure individuals even against idiosyncratic shocks to income; typically, the degree of insurance 
is very limited. 
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must offer a higher level of utility for good outcomes than for bad ones. Accordingly, insurance 
cannot be complete even for the set of insurable states. 
The emphasis hitherto on enforcement should not suggest that the decision to assist others 
is always made grudgingly. Transfers are most often observed between family and friends, in 
part because of a feeling of affinity and kinship. Even unrelated individuals may assist each other 
because of altruism or a ‘warm glow’ feeling from helping (referred to as ‘impure altruism’ by 
Andreoni, 1990). Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) present and test a model in which individuals 
can be either altruistic or selfish, but face limited commitment in a risk-sharing contract. They 
find that limited commitment constrains transfers, but altruism relaxes these constraints and thus 
increases the gains from income pooling. 
Since the collateral value of social capital is likely to be higher, ceteris paribus, among 
individuals in a small community or common social network, the literature has made an effort to 
examine how the structure of the social network defines the scope for informal insurance, and 
how social exclusion can translate into underinsurance (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007a; Krishnan 
and Sciubba, 2009). The empirical evidence discussed below suggests that the degree of support 
does vary widely even within small communities, and can be segmented along ethnic lines 
(Grimard, 1997). 
On a related note, Platteau (1997, 2009) has described in detail the role of social norms – 
and the threat of social sanctions – in governing informal insurance arrangements across a range 
of developing countries. Obligations are enforced within the network, sustaining informal 
insurance contracts across a broader range of states than would be feasible without them. Since 
families sometimes have difficulty enforcing punishments (particularly where bargaining power 
is asymmetric), village-wide social norms institutionalize and coordinate punishment for 
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deviations (Platteau, 2006). Punishment by the community as a whole is more damaging (and 
therefore more effective) than punishment simply by the wronged party. However, social norms 
are a blunt instrument that may have unintended consequences. Platteau (2009) identifies how 
obligations to share windfalls with others may discourage investment and initiative, with 
emigration and separation possibly the only means by which the successful and ambitious can 
escape these obligations and accumulate significant wealth. This echoes the hypothesis of 
Banerjee and Newman (1998) that only the very poor and the very rich in developing countries 
can ‘afford’ to migrate to urban areas; those in the middle rely on support from the informal 
village network and are to some extent ‘trapped’ there by it (Morduch, 1999, p.10). 
 
1.3 Empirical evidence on risk coping strategies 
Reflecting its importance to development, an expansive body of empirical research has 
studied the ability of individuals in developing countries to cope with risk. In this section I will 
describe the evidence on buffer stock savings and informal insurance, before discussing the 
evidence on the role of the social network and the crowding out hypothesis. A detailed survey of 
the literature on buffer stock savings is given by Rosenzweig (2001). For surveys of the literature 
on informal insurance, see Alderman and Paxson (1994), Besley (1995), Morduch (1999) and 
Platteau (2006). For a general summary of community-based risk management, see Bhattamishra 
and Barrett (2010). 
 
1.3.1 Buffer stock savings and consumption smoothing 
Individuals in developing countries face the combination of low mean income, higher 
income volatility, and a lack of formal credit markets (Rosenzweig, 2001). In addition to the high 
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intra-year fluctuations in income experienced by individuals dependent on agriculture, 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that over a ten-year period, the coefficient of variation 
of income was 2.5 times higher among Indian households than among comparable households in 
the United States. Accordingly, risk-averse individuals in developing countries have a strong 
incentive to use assets to smooth short-term shocks to income. Studies using the ICRISAT data 
from semiarid India have found that land and buildings account for approximately 85 percent of 
the total assets held by farming households, but land and buildings are rarely liquidated and 
cannot be considered a buffer stock. Indeed, in many communities land sales are prohibited or 
discouraged, since distress selling induces self-reinforcing inequalities in the society (Fafchamps, 
2003, p. 22; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Platteau, 2006). Livestock is the most commonly-
held productive asset that can be liquidated (Rosenzweig, 2001, p. 46). As discussed below, 
however, individuals often prefer to destabilize consumption rather than sacrifice these 
productive assets, a behavior referred to as ‘asset smoothing’. For this reason, individuals engage 
in precautionary saving by holding stocks of liquid assets such as jewelry, cloth and food, and 
bank accounts if they are available (Behrman et al., 1997; Lim and Townsend, 1998), that can be 
liquidated to offset income shortfalls. Other methods include switching labor between different 
employments (Kochar, 1999; Imai, 2003), debt peonage (selling future labor for credit) and 
voluntary enslavement (Fafchamps, 2003, p. 23-4). 
Early studies attempted to gauge individuals’ ability to smooth consumption in response to 
shocks to income. This was achieved by regressing consumption on income, suitably 
decomposed into permanent and transitory components using instrumental variables techniques. 
By the permanent income hypothesis (Hall, 1978), it is rational for a risk-averse individual to 
adjust consumption only in response to innovations in permanent income, and to save or dissave 
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to offset transitory shocks to income. Early tests of this hypothesis used rainfall or similar 
instruments to proxy for transitory income shocks. Wolpin (1982), Paxson (1992) and Townsend 
(1994) could not reject the hypothesis that individuals were able to fully insulate consumption 
from idiosyncratic shocks using savings or transfers. However, these studies were unable to 
identify how consumption was smoothed. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) attempted to address 
this deficiency by estimating a structural model of buffer stock saving on data from semi-arid 
India, treating bullocks as the storage asset. They noted that bullock sales increased during times 
of low rainfall and that purchases increased during times of high rainfall. 
A second wave of studies challenged the accuracy of Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s estimates, 
given the difficulty of accurately separating permanent from transitory shocks, and the 
prevalence of measurement error in income data from household surveys. Using different 
techniques, they found that the ability of individuals to smooth income shocks was not perfect. 
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) revisited the ICRISAT data used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1993) and were able to reject the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing. Morduch (1991), 
Lim and Townsend (1998) and Ligon et al. (2002) also found little evidence of consumption 
smoothing in the ICRISAT data. Meanwhile, Deaton (1997) and Grimard (1997) were able to 
reject the null hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing in data from Côte d’Ivoire. 
Townsend (1995) found mixed evidence of risk sharing in data from Thai villages. Jalan and 
Ravallion (1999) estimated that Chinese households could insure consumption against 60 percent 
of an income shock, but that this ability varied with wealth (such that wealthier households were 
able to fully insure consumption against shocks). Dercon and Krishnan (2000) found similar 
evidence in Ethiopia, and Morduch (2005) found that individuals in south India with more land 
were more capable of smoothing consumption. 
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As discussed in Section 1.2.1, buffer stock savings strategies are more effective at 
smoothing volatilities in income over the short run than over the long run. The most severe 
shocks in rural areas are those related to weather, and extremes (such as drought and flood) 
commonly persist for more than one growing season. Under these conditions, individuals may 
deplete their buffer stock quickly and be fully exposed to shocks in subsequent periods. Deaton 
(1992) uses simulations to show that the usefulness of buffer stocks depends critically on the 
degree to which income innovations are correlated over time. Alderman (1996) finds supporting 
evidence of this in data from Pakistan. Shocks that are highly correlated across space may also 
undermine the effectiveness of the buffer stock savings strategy. During extreme weather events, 
a spate of distress selling will drive down the price of assets relative to the price of consumables, 
thereby eroding the real value of the buffer stock. Lim and Townsend (1998) argue that a 
strategy of selling bullocks during drought actually adds volatility to consumption, and find little 
evidence to support the claims of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) that households in semiarid 
India sell bullocks to offset the effects of common shocks. Fafchamps et al. (1998) found that 
among households in Burkina Faso, selling livestock offset only 15-30 percent of the income 
shortfalls associated with drought. The geographic extent of the shock, and the segmentation or 
rigidity of markets (for example, due to high transaction costs) diminish the attractiveness of 
asset sales as a consumption smoothing method. Kazianga and Udry (2006) studied a prolonged 
and severe drought in Burkina Faso in the early 1980s. They found little evidence of distress 
selling of livestock among affected households, and almost no risk sharing. Similarly, 
Verpoorten (2009) found that households in Rwanda refrained from selling livestock during that 
country’s civil war in 1994 because of plummeting prices. Indeed, there is evidence that 
households afflicted by covariate shocks of this type actually choose to destabilize consumption 
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in order to conserve their productive asset stocks (Barrett et al., 2006; Kazianga and Udry, 2006).  
Individuals’ efforts to cope with risk may also have long-run costs and distort their 
incentives to take risks and make investments that would otherwise be optimal. Using data from 
India, Walker and Ryan (1990) estimated that individuals sacrificed 25 percent of their income in 
order to offset risk. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) found that farmers in India were discouraged 
from holding the optimal number of bullocks because of risk aversion and high income volatility. 
A nascent literature has begun to examine the effect of risk on individuals’ capacity to take risks 
in adopting new technologies and growing new crops (Goldstein, 2000; Goldstein and Udry, 
2008; Conley and Udry, 2010). Accordingly, safety nets can on average increase people’s 
welfare (Platteau, 1991), and may also free them to invest their limited assets in more productive 
uses than precautionary savings. 
 
1.3.2 Informal insurance 
A number of studies have established that idiosyncratic risk dominates covariate risk in 
developing countries (Townsend, 1995; Deaton, 1997; Lybbert et al., 2004; Kazianga and Udry, 
2006). Thus there appears to be substantial scope for informal insurance to reduce the impact of 
shocks. Indeed, risk-sharing arrangements are prevalent in traditional societies. The exact nature 
of arrangements varies across societies, and sometimes even across villages (Townsend, 1995), 
depending on local economic circumstances, village size, religion and political situation. 
Transfers of wealth can take forms as diverse as gifts, remittances, loans with flexible repayment 
schemes, and bridewealth payments. Typically the arrangement is heavily embedded in local 
tradition and social norms, enforced by notions of mutual solidarity (Scott, 1976; Fafchamps, 
2003) and subject to sanction and other enforcement techniques (Platteau, 2006). The norms 
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sustaining these arrangements have been linked to the precariousness of life in traditional 
societies (Scott, 1976; Posner, 1980; Kimball, 1988; Platteau, 1991; Coate and Ravallion, 1993), 
and the concept of the village as intrinsically linked to its environment and at the whim of nature 
(Platteau, 2006, pp. 194-5). Some arrangements are completely informal and uncontracted, 
taking the form simply of a norm to be generous, while others (such as the fishing co-operatives 
studied by Platteau and Abraham, 1987) are formal arrangements subject to strict codes. 
Arrangements may be based on an expectation of mutual exchange, whereby each party 
expects to be assisted at some point in the foreseeable future, or take a patron–client form, 
whereby a risk-neutral benefactor provides assistance in virtually all states. In the latter sort of 
arrangement, the patron extracts compensation from the client in some alternative form, such as 
political support or labor, possibly on exploitative terms (Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps, 2003, 
pp. 47-51). Arrangements between individuals with different levels of wealth or ability may be 
sustained by benefits deriving from social esteem (Platteau and Seki, 2007). Another possibility 
is that transfers are selfishly motivated by members of a group who depend on each other for 
security against an external threat. According to this view, the survival of one’s neighbors is 
essentially a public good. In their study of pastoralists in the east African rangelands, 
Huysentruyt et al. (2009) argue that the threat of encroachment by, or conflict with, neighboring 
tribes encourages nomadic herders to invest in each other’s welfare as a means of sustaining 
‘safety in numbers’. This redistribution may also be progressive, to the extent that the poor are 
more likely to leave the group if they cannot sustain themselves. 
Some of the earliest evidence on the effectiveness of transfers to offset shocks came from 
Lucas and Stark (1985), who found that remittances from friends and relatives overseas 
responded to shocks to the recipient’s income. However, access to remittances (which are 
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uncorrelated with almost all shocks faced by a rural household) varies greatly across individuals 
even within one village, and is typically increasing in wealth and education. Migration may be 
induced specifically with a view to diversifying income sources (Paulson, 1994; Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 2002). The majority of studies have thus since focused on intra-village transfers as 
well, and concluded that transfers in general do not fully insure households against shocks to 
income. In the Philippines, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find that transfers among villagers fail to 
efficiently share risk at the village level. They argue that since transfers are observed to flow 
between friends and family members, the nonuniformity of the social network is to blame for the 
inability of transfers to fully offset idiosyncratic shocks. However, they also find that total gifts 
(including remittances) are insufficient to offset expenses associated with healthcare, 
unemployment and funerals. De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) reach similar findings in their study 
in Tanzania. A number of studies find that gifts are relatively small compared to total income 
volatility in rural India (Reardon et al., 1988; Rosenzweig, 1988; Lim and Townsend, 1998; 
Imai, 2003). In their study of pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, Lybbert et al. (2004) find that 
reciprocal transfers are surprisingly small considering most shocks in the sample are 
idiosyncratic. McPeak (2006) finds similar results among livestock producers in northern Kenya. 
While gifts are often seen as distinct from loans in studies of developing countries, and the 
latter as being less common due to a lack of legal structures required to enforce loan agreements, 
some researchers have found evidence of assistance more akin to flexible loans than to outright 
gifts. Udry (1990, 1994) observes that assistance in northern Nigeria is given ostensibly as an 
interest-free loan, with an expected future repayment, but that the repayment schedule can be 
altered – or repayment even abandoned – if the borrower suffers subsequent shocks. Similar 
results have been found in the Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 
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2007b). In a sense, the flexible loan arrangement is just a more codified version of the model of 
gift exchange presented by Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993), acknowledging the 
possible path dependence of innovations to income. A variation on the theme is to make 
bridewealth payments contingent on events, evidence of which was found in Zimbabwe by 
Dekker and Hoogeveen (2002). 
As discussed above, the voluntary nature of transfers may be partly to blame for their 
inability to fully smooth idiosyncratic shocks. Platteau (2006) argues that societies go to great 
lengths to create severe punishments and disincentives to coerce individuals to assist others in 
times of need. As Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) show, these punishments work 
better when interactions are an infinitely repeated game, and are more likely to take place among 
individuals with greater leverage and common identity, such as family members, religious 
groups and tight-knit villages. However, this creates a concentration in the insurance network 
that can undermine the system’s effectiveness and induce inequality. 
 
1.3.3 Implications of the social network for informal insurance 
The structure and evolution of the social network, and the extent to which these 
characteristics define the effectiveness of informal insurance, are the focus of a flourishing 
literature.5 There is evidence that the structure of the social network conditions the flow of 
transfers in developing countries. While not particularly surprising in light of the theoretical 
benefits (in terms of monitoring and enforcement) of risk sharing with close friends and family, 
this result has profound implications for the effectiveness and inclusiveness of informal 
insurance. In Ghana, Goldstein et al. (2002) found that whether an individual received assistance 
in times of need depended on characteristics such as membership in the major lineage, 
                                                
5 See, for example, Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008) and Krishnan and Sciubba (2009). 
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participation in secular organizations, the individual’s fostering history, and anticipated land 
inheritance. Using a later dataset from the same villages, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett (2009) 
found that a set of ‘socially invisible’ individuals within the village (who were less well-known 
by their neighbors) received effectively no insurance against shocks, while others in the village 
who were well known were fully insured. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a) found that network 
links were more likely among geographically proximate households in the Philippines, possibly 
reflecting kin ties. They found no evidence that ties were made to households with uncorrelated 
or negatively correlated incomes in preference to those with positively correlated incomes. 
Assistance has also been found to flow along ethnic lines (Fafchamps, 1992; Grimard, 1997 and 
La Ferrara, 2007), and gender lines (Goldstein, 2000). This implies that networks are formed 
based on locality, kinship and other metrics of common identity, rather than explicitly for 
insurance purposes, and not specifically to maximize gains from mutual insurance.  
As with asset-based consumption smoothing techniques, informal insurance methods carry 
the risk of propagating and reinforcing inequality among individuals over time. (Fafchamps, 
2003, Ch. 5, presents a rigorous exposition of this result.) First, theory suggests the rich are more 
capable of opting out of informal insurance schemes (Ligon et al., 2002; Sen and Hoff, 2005; 
Platteau, 2009). Empirical evidence of wealthy or more fortunate individuals unilaterally exiting 
such schemes has been found by Platteau and Abraham (1987) in Kerala fishing villages, and by 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) in the rural Philippines. The rich may also be more capable than 
others of migrating, because they are not dependent on informal insurance; Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2009) find evidence of low mobility among individuals in higher-income caste 
networks in India. Second, as discussed above there is evidence that the poor may be explicitly 
excluded from transfer networks if they are not well known or are from a minority ethnic group 
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(Santos and Barrett, forthcoming; Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett, 2009). Finally, transaction 
costs associated with forming and sustaining informal insurance networks imply that links are 
more likely to form between proximate neighbors and kin; evidence in support of this hypothesis 
has been found by Murgai (2002) in rural Pakistan, and by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a) in the 
rural Philippines. Accordingly, richer households tend to be better insured than poorer 
households, since their close family and friends are more likely to also be rich. 
 
1.3.4 Crowding out 
An early link drawn between informal insurance and public policy was the hypothesis of 
crowding out. According to the crowding out hypothesis, to the extent that informal insurance is 
contingent on need and resources fungible, a formal transfer program to needy individuals would 
provide almost no additional benefit to their welfare. The new income would simply displace 
previously-received assistance from friends and relatives and thus be a transfer to the latter 
moreso than to the needy individual. Using household data from the Philippines, Cox and 
Jimenez (1995) estimated that transfers were very sensitive to the loss of income induced by 
unemployment – large enough that if an unemployment insurance scheme were introduced, 
transfers would fall by 92 percent. On balance, then, the unemployed would gain a net benefit of 
only 8 pesos from every 100 pesos paid to them in unemployment insurance. Subsequent studies 
have found statistically significant (but smaller) effects elsewhere. Jensen (2004) studied the 
introduction of a pension scheme in South Africa and estimated that for every rand given in 
pension payments, there was a reduction of around 0.25 rand of transfers received by the elderly 
from relatives. Studies of pension schemes in Peru and the Philippines find effects of similar 
magnitudes (Cox and Jimenez, 1992; Cox and Jimenez, 1995). Crowding out may be a greater 
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problem in villages where the variance of income is smaller; Albarran and Attanasio (2003) find 
supporting evidence of this from a randomized public transfer program in Mexico. However, 
even if crowding out does occur, it is not clear that public transfer schemes are less effective: 
first, since the funds implicitly spill over to other potentially vulnerable households; second, 
since public transfers may be more efficiently targeted than private transfers; and third, since 
displacement may be the price of reaching all households, including those not receiving private 
transfers (Morduch, 1999, p. 193). The hypothesis of crowding out is also predicated on a static 
coinsurance network. As Chantarat and Barrett (forthcoming) show, if public transfers alter the 
structure of the social network, they may induce crowding in, rather than crowding out. 
 
1.4 Conclusions 
The literature to date has highlighted the substantial riskiness of life in developing 
countries, whence the need for individuals to find ways to cope with risk in order to sustain their 
livelihoods in both the short and long run. Failure to do so imperils not only their lives, but also 
their future income earnings capacities and those of their children. Because of the failure of 
markets to provide adequate formal means of dealing with risk, individuals in developing 
countries are forced to rely on informal methods. Impoverished individuals who cannot do so 
risk being trapped, generation after generation, in a state of deprivation. 
In this chapter I have reviewed the theoretical and empirical evidence on risk coping 
methods in developing countries. In studies from countries across the world, the general 
conclusion is that individuals cope only partially with the risks facing them – both from volatile 
income, and from events necessitating increased consumption. Their objective is not always to 
smooth consumption. Occasionally, individuals prefer to sacrifice consumption in order to 
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preserve their productive assets. The two primary methods of risk coping – buffer stock savings 
and informal insurance – have been found to provide only partial insurance against fluctuations 
in income and consumption. However, these methods endure because they are of some benefit in 
providing insurance against extreme shocks and redistributing resources from the rich to the 
poor, imperfectly fulfilling the roles of missing formal markets. 
Recent research has identified the importance of the community context and the structure 
of the social network in conditioning informal insurance arrangements. Coverage may vary 
across individuals in the same community, and may not necessarily minimize income volatility. 
The difficulty of enforcing mutual insurance arrangements has led societies to develop strong 
redistributive and cooperative norms that bind communities together, discourage the sale of fixed 
assets such as land, and force individuals to contribute to the general good and provide assistance 
when requested to do so (Platteau 1994a, 1994b, 1997, 2006). Platteau argues that these 
‘solidarity norms’ serve to discourage individuals from accumulating wealth, taking risks and 
migrating away from the community. These effects are both explicit (in the form of rules and 
sanctions against transgressors) and implicit (in the sense that the insurance provides protection 
that might be sacrificed by leaving the village). The objective of the following two chapters is to 
shed light on how the structure of the social networks, along with the social norms and 
institutions, of four small villages in rural Ghana, affect the incentives of individuals in these 
communities to invest in both public goods and productive assets. There is little empirical 
evidence on these points. The objective of this dissertation is to add to our knowledge on how 
social norms and obligations affect investment decisions. Understanding the true nature of this 
relationship is a necessary step in designing policies to promote investment, and thereby growth 
and development.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Community Involvement in Public Goods Provision 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the past two decades, economists have increasingly embraced the concept of 
community-driven development, a process by which public goods in developing countries are 
provided in consultation and collaboration with members of the recipient communities.6 Relative 
to centralized provision by a government or foreign agency, community-driven development 
promises greater accountability, increased involvement by minorities, better targeting and quality 
of projects, and diminished potential for corruption and waste. Community involvement in the 
development of local infrastructure has become popular in the form of ‘social funds’, which have 
been set up and supported by external agencies such as the World Bank. Mansuri and Rao (2004, 
pp. 15–17) cite evidence from a range of studies suggesting that while community involvement 
in development projects can be beneficial, it does not always improve their success. 
This study is concerned with the process of community fundraising for local infrastructure 
projects. Evaluative studies have found that infrastructure is better targeted, lasts longer and 
works better if community members are required to contribute to its cost (Jimenez and Paqueo, 
1996; Kleemeier, 2000). There are a number of arguments in favor of seeking financial 
contributions from community members. First, community members should be willing to pay 
something for facilities that they use and value. Provided private contributions approximately 
reflect individuals’ true social valuations, a community fund-raising initiative serves as an ex-
                                                
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the history of community-driven development and its outcomes, see Mansuri 
and Rao (2004). 
  34 
ante test of the community’s need for the proposed infrastructure.7 This should improve targeting 
and reduce wastage of funds on facilities that are not wanted by community members. Second, 
making a financial contribution to infrastructure encourages community members to become 
involved in other aspects of the project, and supports maintenance of the facility once built.8 
Third, funds raised from community contributions augment those provided by central 
government and donors, increasing the number of projects which can be completed with a given 
government or external donor budget. Community contributions thus reinforce the objectives of 
decentralized public goods provision, promoting local ownership and improving the targeting 
and mobilization of resources. 
In this chapter I report the results of a field experiment in four small communities in 
southern Ghana that tests the willingness of individuals to contribute to local public goods. The 
experiment was conducted in five sequential rounds during 2009, in conjunction with a 
household survey. Before the study began, we held public meetings in each community and 
asked residents to nominate a small infrastructure project. We then visited participants five times 
during 2009, gave them a small endowment and invited them to donate to the project. I focus on 
two aspects of the contributions behavior of these individuals: the effectiveness of two 
commonly used mechanisms to encourage greater donations; and the effect of individual and 
social network characteristics on the amount contributed. 
If individuals are expected to contribute towards the cost of local infrastructure, it would be 
useful to elicit contributions in a way that reflects their true valuation of the project. Projects that 
                                                
7 The notion of seeking community opinion on which projects to pursue is referred to in the literature as preference 
targeting. Evidence on its effectiveness is scarce. In a study of Jamaican Social Funds, Rao and Ibanez (2005) find 
that better-networked and elite members of the community tended to dominate the choice of projects, though in the 
long run there were high degrees of satisfaction with the projects among all community members. 
8 For instance, in her study of piped water schemes in Malawi, Kleemeier (2000) concludes that the infrastructure 
might have lasted longer had community members been charged user fees to fund maintenance.  
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are not sufficiently valued by the community might thereby be reconsidered or redesigned. 
However, because of the free-rider problem, private contributions may understate private 
demand. Individuals will tend to contribute less to a public good than their expected private 
benefit, expecting their neighbors to contribute the difference. This implies that the funds raised 
will fall short of the socially optimal level, leading to underprovision of public goods. Various 
mechanisms have been proposed which to some extent alleviate the free-rider problem. In this 
study, I test the effectiveness of two of these mechanisms: the matching grant and the provision 
point mechanism. These mechanisms have been tested experimentally in developed country 
contexts, but to my knowledge there have been no field experiments testing their performance in 
a developing country. It is therefore an open question whether they would be as effective in 
raising funds for community public goods. 
Since all of the respondents in the household survey were participants in the experiment, I 
have detailed data on their individual and household characteristics and their social network. I 
use these data to describe who in the community donates the most, and whether high-status 
individuals can be relied on to contribute more. Previous studies have identified social capital as 
crucial to the success of community-driven development projects (Isham and Käkhönen, 2002). 
The theoretical literature on social networks and trust suggests that in the confined social setting 
of a small village, individuals’ economic interdependence and susceptibility to social sanction 
should make them more willing to contribute to public goods (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Since 
this interdependence is greater the smaller and more ethnically concentrated the community, we 
would expect contributions to be greater in such communities. There is suggestive empirical 
evidence that this is so. In their study of western Kenyan villages, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) 
found that the quality of public goods was worse in villages with greater ethnic diversity. 
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Akramov and Asante (2009) reach similar conclusions using data from Ghana. In a study of 
water and sanitation projects in Ghana, Sun et al. (2010) find that ethnically diverse communities 
are less likely to have functioning committees to manage provision at the local level, and 
accordingly a lower standard of water and sanitation facilities. This suggests that the observed 
connection between ethnic heterogeneity and diminished success of community-driven 
development projects may be due to the ineffectiveness of political systems in such communities. 
With a sample of four villages I cannot draw conclusions about the effects of ethnic 
heterogeneity or village size on aggregate behavior. However, using a unique dataset on the 
social networks of the study communities I focus on how social attitudes, position in the social 
network, ethnicity and social status affect individual behavior. 
This study makes a number of novel contributions. To my knowledge it is the first field 
experiment to assess the public goods contributions behavior of individuals in a developing 
country, and the first to test the matching grant and provision point mechanism in this context. 
Furthermore, it is the first experiment to compare the two mechanisms to each other, yielding 
valuable information on their relative effectiveness. I provide the first experimental evidence on 
which individuals contribute the most to public goods, an important factor in understanding the 
relationship between status, the social network and development in rural communities. More 
broadly, the results of this study have implications for the design of effective development 
policy, and for our overall understanding of economic behavior. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the existing literature on the 
matching grant and provision point mechanism. I introduce the study communities and discuss 
their economic circumstances in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, I describe the sampling procedure 
used to select participants, and the household survey in which they took part. Section 2.5 
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presents the design of the public goods experiment, describing the process by which public 
projects were selected in each community and how individuals were invited to contribute to the 
projects. In Section 2.6, I discuss the qualitative results of the experiment. In Section 2.7, I then 
look more closely at the results using econometric models. Section 2.8 presents a discussion of 
the policy implications stemming from my findings, and Section 2.9 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Previous research on incentive mechanisms 
It is well known that public goods provision is hampered by the free-rider problem. Where 
individuals bear the cost of funding public projects through individual voluntary contributions (a 
scheme hereafter referred to as a voluntary contributions mechanism, or VCM), individuals’ 
donations typically fall short of their true private valuation of the project (Bagnoli et al., 1992; 
Fischbacher et al., 2001). Various mechanisms have been proposed in which the Nash 
equilibrium is for individuals to reveal their true private valuations (Clarke, 1971; Groves and 
Ledyard, 1977; Smith, 1979). But these mechanisms are too complex to be employed in most 
real-world applications. Accordingly, a number of second-best mechanisms have been tested 
experimentally in the laboratory and in the field.9 The two mechanisms I test in this paper are the 
matching grant and the provision point mechanism.  
A matching grant is a promise made by some authority or major donor to match private 
contributions in some fixed proportion. For instance, a philanthropic benefactor might pledge to 
match public contributions, or the government might offer an income tax deduction for donations 
to registered charities. Matching grants should in theory boost contributions relative to the VCM, 
since they effectively reduce the ‘price’ of a given contribution to a public good. Laboratory 
                                                
9 There are many such mechanisms, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. List (2007) provides a 
recent summary of the experimental evidence on the effectiveness of these mechanisms. 
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experiments have confirmed this hypothesis (Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Baker et al., 2009). 
However, evidence from field experiments suggests that the effect of the match ratio is not large. 
Rondeau and List (2008) found that the matching donation did not have a positive effect at all, 
while Meier (2007) found that while a matching grant boosted contributions initially, its 
subsequent removal actually caused contributions to fall. Using data from a fund-raising 
campaign in the U.S., Karlan and List (2007) found that a match offer boosted response rates and 
the average amount donated, but changing the match ratio had little effect on the amount 
donated. In other words, to the extent that the matching ratio has any effect at all, the price 
elasticity of donations appears to decay rapidly as the match offer increases. 
A provision point mechanism (PPM) consists of a fund-raising target and a money-back 
guarantee. The planner announces the fund-raising target to the community, and guarantees to 
refund all contributions if the target is not met. The PPM is well suited to the provision of lumpy 
goods, where the target is binding as the minimum amount of money for which the good can 
plausibly be delivered. It is also simple to explain and implement. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) 
showed that, given full information, all perfect equilibria from such a game are Pareto optimal 
(that is, individual contributions reflect true private valuations).10 This hypothesis has been tested 
in the laboratory using an induced value framework, with varying results. Rondeau et al. (1999) 
found that the PPM elicited contributions equal to private valuations. In similar studies by Isaac 
et al. (1989), Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and Poe et al. (2002), contributions under the PPM 
were higher than under the VCM – and provision of the public good more likely – but the 
mechanism fell short of being fully demand revealing. Rondeau et al. (2005) compared the VCM 
with the PPM in the laboratory and in a small field experiment, and found that the PPM induced 
                                                
10 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) provided an earlier proof of optimality for a more restrictive game, in which 
contributions were fixed. 
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generally higher contributions. However, the main effect of the PPM was felt at the top of the 
distribution (increasing the largest donations). One constraint on the real-world effectiveness of 
the PPM, relative to the theoretical predictions, might be that Bagnoli and Lipman’s (1989) 
assumption of full information does not hold in practice. However, Marks and Croson (1999) 
conducted experiments to test the effect of limited information and found that it did not 
substantially change the impact of the PPM relative to a full-information treatment. There is only 
limited evidence on the effectiveness of the PPM in real-world applications. Rose et al. (2002) 
found that the PPM increased the rate of participation in a green energy program substantially 
above that of a treatment group. 
There are various methods for dealing with contributions above the threshold. The nature 
of this rebate rule matters to the optimality of equilibria. Marks and Croson (1998) tested three 
such methods in the laboratory: a no-rebate policy, where excess donations are discarded; a 
proportional rebate, in which the excess funds are divided among the donors in proportion to 
their contributions; and a utilization policy, in which excess funds are spent on the public good. 
They found that average contributions were significantly higher under the utilization policy than 
under the no-rebate and proportional rebate policies. In this study I adopt the utilization policy. 
This is to my knowledge the first field experiment to test the effectiveness of the matching 
grant and PPM in a developing country. Moreover, these two mechanisms are tested in such a 
way that I can assess not only their effectiveness relative to a simple voluntary contributions 
mechanism (VCM), but also relative to each other. Such a comparison has not hitherto been 
performed in the literature. 
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2.3 Introducing the study area 
The field experiments were conducted between March and December 2009 in conjunction 
with a year-long household survey in four communities in Akwapim South district, Eastern 
Region. The survey was part of a three-wave panel, the first two waves having been conducted in 
1997-98 (Udry and Goldstein, 1999) and 2004 (Vanderpuye-Orgle, 2008). The original 1997-98 
study was concerned with the welfare of farmers in Ghana’s export pineapple industry, and the 
survey area was chosen because of that district’s significant involvement in the industry.  
 The Akwapim South district has historically been a center of fruit farming – initially 
cocoa, and more recently pineapple and pawpaw. The district lies immediately to the north of 
Accra, Ghana’s capital city. The growth of the commercial centers of Aburi and Nsawam, which 
lie on the two main roads heading north from Accra, has changed the pattern of employment in 
the survey communities. Two of the communities (Konkonuru and Darmang) lie close to these 
towns, and a significant number of survey respondents in these communities derive their primary 
income from non-farm business or waged work. In the other two communities (Oboadaka and 
Pokrom), which lie in a valley a long way from Aburi and Nsawam, the majority of the 
respondents are still primarily farmers who travel to the towns weekly to trade. All four 
communities are quite poor. During 2009, mean per capita consumption (averaged over all five 
rounds) ranged from GH¢54.42 to GH¢75.58 per month across the four communities.11 
 All of the communities lack some basic public services. None has piped water, all relying 
primarily on boreholes for water. Each has at least one primary school and one junior secondary 
school, but some are in states of disrepair or were never completed. Less than half of households 
have their own toilet, and none of the communities has sufficient public toilets given its 
                                                
11 During 2009, one Ghana cedi (GH¢) averaged about 69 US cents. Converting without PPP adjustment, this 
equates to a mean per capita consumption level of between $1.24 and $1.72 per day. 
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population. Each community has a health clinic, and there is a major hospital at Nsawam. 
Konkonuru and Darmang are accessible by a paved road, while Oboadaka and Pokrom are only 
reachable by dirt road. All of the communities except Oboadaka have electricity. Public goods 
are provided by a number of entities: the national government, the district assembly (the local 
government body), private donors, NGOs and foreign governments. In 2009 the Government of 
Ghana’s Millennium Development Agency (MiDA) commenced an extensive support program 
throughout the country, which so far has resulted in the refurbishment of a primary school in one 
of the survey communities, the training and equipping of farmers, and will soon fund the 
rehabilitation of a feeder road connecting the two more remote communities to Nsawam. 
Usually, however, projects are not well coordinated and sometimes left incomplete, resulting in 
infrastructure which is defective or unusable, and which often decays faster than intended. In one 
community, the junior secondary school had no doors or windows for one classroom; in another, 
the school’s toilets were not connected to running water and could therefore not be used. In 
informal discussions community members stated that the poor state of public infrastructure in 
part reflects a lack of accountability of the providers and a lack of ownership of the projects by 
the local community. Contractors have an incentive to cut costs in order to boost profits, 
especially where there is little auditing or follow-up of projects by government to assess quality 
and durability. If community members were responsible for part of the cost of these projects, 
they might be more inclined to report defects in the work and take responsibility for the 
maintenance of the facilities. 
 
2.4 Sample and household survey  
The sample consisted of approximately 70 households in each of the four communities. 
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According to our initial listing in January 2009, the four communities had between 180 and 580 
households, so that our sample covers between 12 and 40 percent of households.12 Around half 
of these households were part of the initial 1997-98 sample, and the rest were recruited in 
January 2009 using stratified random sampling.13 In the original sample, and in the 2009 re-
sampling, we selected only from the pool of households headed by a resident married couple.14 
However, we retained households from the 1997-98 sample even if only one of the spouses 
remained. These ‘single-headed households’ account for between 7 and 15 of the sample 
households in each community. Thus around 150 individuals participated in the experiment in 
each of the four communities (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1.  Sample size by community and respondent type 
 Community  
  Darmang Pokrom Oboadaka Konkonuru Total 
Husbands 70 67 69 68 274 
Wives 77 71 73 68 289 
Single males 4 3 1 4 12 
Single females 7 5 6 11 29 
Total 158 146 149 151 604 
 
The household survey covered a wide range of subjects, including personal income, 
farming and non-farm business activities, gifts, transfers and loans, and household consumption 
expenditure. Each individual was interviewed five times during 2009, once every two months. In 
addition, we conducted a detailed survey of respondents’ in-sample social networks. The social 
                                                
12 Including children, my rough estimates of the populations are 706 in Oboadaka, 1,270 in Konkonuru, 1,768 in 
Darmang and 2,283 in Pokrom. 
13 New sample members were selected randomly from the subset of households in the community headed by a 
married couple. The sample was stratified by age of the head into three categories: 18-29, 30-64 and 65+, so that the 
shares of households whose head was in each of these age categories corresponded to the population shares. The 
stratification was designed to reinstate representativeness given that households with heads under 30 did not exist in 
1997-98, and those with heads over 65 had suffered greater natural attrition. 
14 Some men in the sample had two or three wives, all of whom were included in the sample. 
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network survey was conducted in the first round. Each respondent was asked in turn about every 
other respondent in the sample from his or her community. We asked whether they knew the 
person, by name or personally, how often they saw them, whether they were related, how strong 
they perceived the friendship to be, whether they had given or received anything of value from 
the person, and whether they would trust the person to look after a valuable item for them. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in this study are given in Table 2.2. 
 
2.5 Experimental design  
Two weeks prior to the start of each survey round, we visited each community and 
conducted one round of the public goods experiment. In all, we conducted five rounds of the 
experiment. The first round was conducted prior to the second round of the survey, and the fifth 
followed the final round of the survey. 
Before the experiments began, we held an open meeting in each community. We did not 
provide details of the experiment, but explained that participants would be given money for their 
time in the survey, and would be invited to donate to a public good. Supposing the community 
could raise around GH¢1,000, what would they most like to spend that money on? We gave only 
a few guidelines: it had to be a self-contained project, affordable with that amount of money. The 
community members suggested a number of projects, which were then categorized as feasible or 
infeasible depending on their cost. Those at the meeting then voted on which of the feasible 
projects to pursue.15 The final choices were: renovation of primary school toilets in Konkonuru; 
construction of a maternity ward for an existing health clinic in Oboadaka; a second public toilet 
block in Pokrom; and renovation of the junior secondary school (JSS) in Darmang.  
                                                
15 A number of studies have considered the effect of voting itself as a contextual mechanism for enhancing 
contributions (see, for example, Messer et al. 2007). In a study of four communities I could not test this claim, but 
considered voting the fairest way of establishing community consensus on a single project. 
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Table 2.2  Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
      Donation (GH¢) 2,070 0.70 0.60 0 6 
Match ratio 2,070 1.03 0.71 0 2 
Household wealth (GH¢) 2,070 2,878.22 14,411.10 8.70 ^ 
Monthly per capita expenditure (GH¢) 2,070 104.99 87.76 4.01 1,481.35 
Household size 2,070 5.22 2.22 1 15 
Age (years) 2,070 43.61 13.72 19 85 
Sex (male=1) 2,070 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Could trust neighbor 
     Strongly agree 2,070 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Agree 2,070 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Neutral 2,070 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Disagree 2,070 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Strongly disagree 2,070 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Social network variables * 
     Number known by respondent 2,070 99.72 30.92 4 151 
Number who know respondent 2,070 92.78 28.45 15 151 
Number trusted by respondent 2,070 27.50 29.89 0 145 
Number who trust respondent 2,070 26.55 14.17 3 82 
Share trusted by respondent 2,070 0.30 0.31 0 1 
Share who trust respondent 2,070 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.55 
Status and migration variables 
     Holds office 2,070 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Akwapim 2,070 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Fostered as child 2,070 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Lived in village less than 5 years 2,070 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Years in village 2,070 26.07 16.08 0 75.42 
Share of life spent in village 2,070 0.59 0.31 0 1 
Notes:  ^ Omitted for privacy reasons. Median wealth was GH¢1,099.50. * From census of the in-sample social 
network. Numbers reported are from the sample of survey respondents in that community. 
 
We informed the community members that their choice could be changed later on, provided 
there was majority community support for the change. 
An assistant and I conducted the experiments with support from the survey enumerators.16 
Respondents were called on a given day to report to the local primary school, where they signed 
                                                
16 A copy of the full script for the experiment is provided in the Appendix. 
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in and took a ticket with their individual ID number written on it. One by one, they were invited 
into a closed classroom to receive their endowment and make a donation if they wished. Care 
was taken to keep these solicitations private, and the amounts each individual donated were not 
disclosed to any other community member or participant. Only an interviewer and a record 
keeper (who took a written note of the donation) were witness to the respondent’s decision.17 
Upon entering the room, the respondent was seated at a desk facing the interviewer and 
record keeper. The interviewer explained (in Twi, the local language, as most of the respondents 
did not speak English) that the respondent was to receive a small amount of money (endowment) 
for their time and co-operation in the previous round’s survey.18 Since most respondents were 
poor and often short of cash, the endowment was designed to ‘even the playing field’ of cash-on-
hand across respondents, removing potentially contaminating differences in ability to contribute 
among respondents. The endowment varied by round. In round 1, we gave GH¢1 to each 
respondent; in rounds 2 and 3 we gave GH¢2, in round 4 we gave GH¢4, and in round 5 we gave 
GH¢6. This variation allows me to measure the income elasticity of demand for donations, and 
test whether the size of the endowment is a binding constraint on larger donations. 
 The interviewer then explained that we were raising money for a public project, and 
briefly described the project chosen by that community. The respondent was invited to donate to 
the project, but was not compelled to. Any donation they made would be kept confidential, and 
their choice would not affect their ongoing participation in the survey. 
The respondent was then invited to draw a token from a bag to determine the matching 
                                                
17 It was impossible in this context for donations to be anonymous to the researchers and still be individually 
matched and linked to individual characteristics. The key objective was to remove the effect of coercion, common 
knowledge and peer pressure on participants’ donation decisions. 
18 The endowment was deliberately framed as payment for the survey to reduce any ‘endowment effect’ in the 
experiment. To this end, respondents were told during the survey rounds how much they would be paid for their 
interview, and given a small ticket to ‘redeem’ their payment. 
  46 
ratio. There were five tokens in the bag, each a different color, representing matching ratios of 0, 
!, 1, 1! and 2. We took great care to ensure the draw was blind and random. A table relating the 
colors to the matching ratios was displayed on a sheet in front of the respondent. (A copy of this 
table is also included in the Appendix.) The interviewer explained what matching ratio the 
respondent had drawn, and what that meant. For any matching ratio m, we would add m times the 
respondent’s donation to the total funds raised. If the token representing zero were drawn, no 
matching grant would be given. We gave the respondent various examples, and quizzed them to 
check they understood the concept. The respondent was then given their endowment in cash and 
invited to make a donation if desired. To minimize rounding issues, we gave the first GH¢2 of 
the endowment in 20p coins and the remainder in GH¢1 notes. 19 Respondents were able to ask 
for change, so that any donation was feasible. Once they had made their donation, the match was 
added. We checked that the respondent was satisfied with their choice, and then the total amount 
was put in the donation box. Once the respondent had left the room, the match ratio and donation 
were recorded on a sheet against their name. 
 In the final two rounds, the procedure was modified slightly to include a provision point 
mechanism (PPM).20 After mentioning the project, the interviewer pointed to a sheet in front of 
the respondent that showed the amount raised and a fund-raising target (including a graphical 
depiction of the proportion of funds raised).21 Based on donations from the first three rounds and 
the realistic minimum cost of the projects, we set targets of GH¢750 in three communities and 
GH¢1,000 in Pokrom (which had at that point raised substantially more than the other three). 
The interviewer explained that the project could not go ahead unless the target was reached, and 
that if the target was not reached, all donations from the fourth and fifth rounds would be 
                                                
19 There are 100 pesewas (p) in a Ghana cedi. 
20 We continued to give respondents a matching grant, in exactly the same manner as described above. 
21 Refer to the Appendix for an example of this sheet. 
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refunded. The funds raised in the first three rounds would be spent on maintenance of existing 
public buildings. The interviewer explained that the respondent would receive a receipt for their 
donation, and that they could use this receipt to claim reimbursement if the project did not go 
ahead. The rest of the experiment proceeded as in the first three rounds, except that at the end a 
receipt was given to the respondent for the amount donated.  
Once all respondents present had been interviewed, we counted the amount raised and 
crosschecked against the total from the record sheets. The amount was announced to the 
assemblyman, who in turn informed the community members.22 We also announced the 
progressive total amount raised at subsequent meetings with the respondents. At the end of the 
five rounds, the amounts raised were to be spent on the designated project, provided the target 
had been reached. Respondents who did not attend the experiment for a given round could claim 
their endowment in the next round in addition to that round’s endowment; therefore, some 
respondents received larger endowments in later rounds.23 Funds not claimed at the end of the 
fifth round were counted as full donations and added (without a matching grant) to the funds 
raised for the community. Those amounts are excluded from the analysis below. 
 
2.6 Initial observations 
All four communities reached their targets, though Konkonuru did so by only a small 
margin. Overall, only 5 percent of respondents did not donate (Table 2.3). The incidence of non-
contribution was much higher in Konkonuru, where 32 percent of respondents made no 
contribution in round 1. In the other three communities non-contribution rates ranged from zero 
to 6 percent. In all communities, non-contribution dropped off sharply in rounds 4 and 5 with the 
                                                
22 The assemblyman is the community’s organizer and ‘secretary’. 
23 About 10 percent of the sample received ‘extra endowments’ in this manner. 
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increase in endowments and the introduction of the provision point mechanism.  
Table 2.3:  Non-contribution rates (percentage of participants who donated nothing) 
 Community  
Round Darmang Pokrom Oboadaka Konkonuru Total 
1 5.2 3.2 2.6 32.1 10.7 
2 3.4 0 2.4 17.1 5.7 
3 7.8 0 6.1 17.5 7.9 
4 0 0 0 2.4 0.6 
5 0 2.3 0 2.8 1.3 
Total 3.2 1.1 2.3 13.5 5.1 
 
Even in Konkonuru, however, the rate of non-contribution was much lower than in 
similar studies in Western countries, where it is common for more than half of the sample to 
refuse to donate.24 In part, this may have been due to the presence of the interviewers. Since 
Ghanaian social norms dictate that people should not refuse a request for money from a friend in 
need, they may have felt obliged to give something in response to a request from researchers. For 
example, in the first round a donation of 20p was the mode in some communities; since the 
endowment was given in 20p coins, this might have been a ‘token donation’ by individuals 
reluctant to give. It could also be due to the fact that the individuals were given an endowment, 
and could not use the excuse ‘I don’t have any money’. These considerations were unavoidable 
given the experimental design, but should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
However, their presence was constant throughout the year, and should not affect comparisons 
between individuals or across rounds.  
Table 2.4 presents the mean donations in each round. It is apparent that some 
                                                
24 For example, Karlan and List (2007) reported response rates of around 2 percent in their study, and List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2002) reported response rates of 3.4 to 8.4 percent. Both studies relied on mail-out solicitations, so 
there are clearly other explanations for these low figures (such as wrong addresses, absenteeism and the lack of face-
to-face interaction). However, they illustrate how difficult it can be to solicit donations from individuals. 
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communities donated substantially more than others. In part this reflects different characteristics 
of the respondents (such as differences in wealth), which I will explore in the regression analysis. 
Even after taking those factors into account, however, there is a residual difference which 
reflects characteristics of the community and of the project. First, comments by some 
respondents in the interviews made it clear that the renovation of the school toilet and JSS 
buildings were markedly less popular for a number of reasons. Some respondents said they were 
reluctant to donate because their children didn’t attend that school, or because they didn’t have 
school-age children. In Konkonuru (raising money for a school toilet), respondents argued that 
the teachers locked the toilet even when it was working, and that their children therefore would 
not benefit from it. Second, there was a distinct difference in the degree of support provided by 
the community leaders. The leaders of Darmang and Oboadaka tried significantly harder to 
garner support and attendance from respondents. However, this appears to have affected 
attendance more than donations, since Darmang raised the least money despite being the 
wealthiest of the four communities. 
Table 2.4:  Mean donations by round and community (in Ghana pesewas) 
 Community  
Round Darmang Pokrom Oboadaka Konkonuru Total 
1 29.9 52.8 37.4 34.5 37.6 
2 34.7 69.9 36.7 39.7 45.2 
3 41.0 65.4 39.8 33.5 44.4 
4 76.1 109.7 144.7 66.1 97.8 
5 106.4 117.9 145.4 97.2 115.6 
Total 58.7 85.1 79.6 56.3 69.5 
 
The matching ratio varied randomly across individuals and rounds. Table 2.5 provides a 
summary of the mean ratios in each village and round, along with standard errors and t-statistics. 
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These are generally around 1 on average, and not significantly larger than 1 at the 10 percent 
level in any one experimental session.25 Looking at a simple bubble graph (Figure 2.1), the 
matching ratio appears to have had a slightly positive impact on donations, primarily by lifting 
donations at the top of the distribution. 
Table 2.5:  Summary statistics on match offers 
  Community  
Round Darmang Pokrom Oboadaka Konkonuru 
All 
communities 
      
1 0.931 1.018 1.010 0.984 0.981 
 
(0.717) (0.683) (0.704) (0.670) (0.695) 
 
[-1.096] [0.241] [0.140] [-0.230] [-0.567] 
 
131 83 103 95 412 
2 1.097 1.082 1.136 1.057 1.094 
 
(0.707) (0.744) (0.748) (0.718) (0.727) 
 
[1.464] [1.120] [1.874]* [0.778] [2.648]*** 
 
113 104 107 97 421 
3 1.009 1.005 1.083 1.099 1.050 
 
(0.691) (0.689) (0.704) (0.724) (0.701) 
 
[0.138] [0.076] [1.264] [1.339] [1.442] 
 
110 92 114 96 412 
4 0.961 1.057 1.062 1.123 1.049 
 
(0.741) (0.707) (0.682) (0.696) (0.708) 
 
[-0.566] [0.794] [0.930] [1.813]* [1.410] 
 
115 96 105 106 422 
5 1.035 1.026 0.947 1.009 1.006 
 
(0.721) (0.728) (0.703) (0.669) (0.705) 
 
[0.547] [0.384] [-0.771] [0.139] [0.198] 
 
130 115 103 115 463 
All rounds 1.005 1.039 1.049 1.054 1.035 
 
(0.716) (0.710) (0.709) (0.694) (0.707) 
 
[0.171] [1.208] [1.590] [1.756]* [2.312]** 
 
599 490 532 509 2,130 
           
Notes: Table reports mean match ratio offered in each experimental session. Sample standard deviations 
are reported in parentheses, and t-statistics (against the null that the mean ratio is 1) in square brackets. The 
last row of numbers is the sample size. In a test of the hypothesis that the mean ratio is 1, *** denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
                                                
25 In aggregate the ratios offered in round 2 and in village 4, and thereby overall, are statistically different from 1 at 
the 5 percent level. This should not be of concern as long as the ratio offers are random across individuals. I tested 
whether this affected the results by excluding round 2 and village 4, but there were no substantial differences. 
Results of these tests are available on request. 
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Figure 2.2 presents the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of donations for each 
community. Since donations were almost all in multiples of 10p, the CDFs in Figure 2.2 are 
smoothed: uniform random variation of up to 5p was added to each donation in order to separate 
the lines and make them easier to read. The CDFs show significant clustering of donations at 
points like 20p, 50p and GH¢1, perhaps reflecting people’s reluctance to ask for change and 
donate their true valuation. It might even be a manifestation of ‘coherent arbitrariness’ due to 
uncertainty over the true valuation.26 The 20p mode is apparent in Figure 2.1, but a number of 
individuals donated substantially more, a few even adding to the endowment with their own 
money. It is also worth noting that the distribution of donations in rounds 2 and 3, in which we 
Figure 2.1:  Effect of matching ratio on donations 
 
Note: Bubble area proportional to frequency. 
 
                                                
26 ‘Coherent arbitrariness’ describes the tendency of individuals to be influenced by arbitrary anchors in determining 
their willingness to pay for goods without a well-defined reference price (Ariely et al., 2003). 
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doubled the endowment to GH¢2, is very similar to the distribution for round 1. For the majority 
of individuals, therefore, doubling the endowment had no effect on the amount donated. The 
only visible difference is in the second-top decile of donors, whose donations rose from around 
50p to around 80p. Only a handful of people gave more than GH¢1 in rounds 2 and 3, suggesting 
that the GH¢1 endowment in round 1 was not a significant constraint on donations. 
The effect of the provision point mechanism (PPM) on donations in rounds 4 and 5 is 
readily apparent. As discussed in Section 2.2, this mechanism is designed to alleviate the free-
rider problem by providing prospective donors with a guarantee that, should the project be 
underfunded, it will not go ahead and they will get their money back. This assuages concerns that 
insufficient funds will be raised and the project will be of poor quality, thereby encouraging  
Figure 2.2:  Cumulative distribution of donations (all communities) 
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those who are hesitant to donate. One would accordingly expect the PPM to increase 
contributions, lifting each person’s donation towards their true private valuation of the project. 
The size of contributions indeed rose in the last two rounds, both in absolute terms and in 
proportion to the endowment (Table 2.4). The increase was substantial and affected the entire 
distribution. 
After including uncollected monies, all four communities passed their targets. We met 
with each community and, in consultation with experts from the Akwapim South District 
Assembly, costed each of the projects. The community that had chosen to build a public toilet 
(Pokrom) changed its choice of public good, because the money raised would only build a small 
toilet which was considered inadequate for the town’s population. Instead, they chose to spend 
the money on a new kindergarten. Each community elected a committee to oversee the project 
work, and also volunteered resources like sand, water, stones and artisanal labor. All four of the 
projects have now been completed. 
 
2.7 Econometric analysis 
One strength of the experiment’s design is the wealth of survey data available on each 
respondent, which allows me to relate donations to individual characteristics. We collected data 
on wealth and consumption five times during the year, giving a dynamic picture of the 
respondents’ financial situation over the course of the experiment. In order to measure the effect 
of characteristics on contributions, I estimate a regression model of the amount donated by each 
respondent in each round. 
The first objective of this analysis is to measure the impact of the matching grant and 
provision point mechanism (PPM) on donations. The theoretical literature on these mechanisms 
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does not provide much guidance on specification. If the matching ratio has an influence on 
donations by altering the price of contribution, the relationship between the ratio and donations 
may be nonlinear depending on the functional form of individual preferences for the public good. 
Furthermore, we might expect to see threshold effects in behavior when the match offer takes 
effect – that is, a discrete difference between the zero and non-zero match offers. I therefore 
consider a specification in which the match ratio is included as a set of dummies for the five 
possible ratios. A linear specification yielded equivalent results; the coefficient estimate is 
reported in Footnote 30. The PPM was introduced in the last two rounds, therefore its impact can 
be observed by including a set of round effects. Figure 2.2 suggests the effect of the PPM on 
donations should be substantial. However, the round effects will also pick up other seasonal 
effects and the variation in the endowment. I control for seasonality in individual income by 
including log household wealth in the specification.27 I estimate the effect of the endowment by 
looking at the marginal increase in donations among those individuals who were absent in a 
round and subsequently collected a larger endowment. By subtracting this from the round effect 
estimate, we can derive an indirect measure of the impact of the PPM. An alternative approach I 
then consider is to drop the round effects and make use of the variation in endowment among 
absentees to measure its effect directly. This isolates the effect of the PPM on contributions in 
the last two rounds. 
The second objective of the regression analysis is to measure the effect of individual 
characteristics on donations. In addition to log wealth, which is a household-level variable, I add 
controls for the respondent’s age and sex. I also include a measure of trust, since individuals 
might be concerned about the likelihood of their donations being misappropriated by community 
                                                
27 I also tried log per capita consumption, which is a more effective indicator of seasonality; its coefficient was small 
and insignificant. In any case, wealth gives a better sense of an individual’s means and therefore willingness to 
contribute. Income would have been a better measure theoretically, but was too volatile to be significant. 
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leaders (or the survey team) and about the way the public good will be managed once built. To 
account for this, I use information from a survey module on social attitudes. The module 
obtained Likert scale responses measuring the respondent’s agreement with five statements about 
trust in neighbors, government and officials. I tested each in the specification; the only one that 
was significant was ‘I feel I could trust my neighbors to look after my house while I am away’. 
This was measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing ‘strongly agree’ and 5 ‘strongly 
disagree’. I include this variable as a set of four dummies called social (excluding ‘strongly 
disagree’). 
The social networks survey collected detailed data on the nature of relationships between 
the respondent and every other sample member from their community. I test various measures of 
the size and quality of an individual’s social network, including the number of sample members 
known by the respondent, the number of these the respondent trusts, the number of respondents 
who report knowing the individual, and the number of these who trust the individual. These 
variables are represented generically in the specification below by the variable socnetwork. 
Because of the likelihood of individual heterogeneity in contributions over the five rounds, 
I estimate a model with individual-level fixed effects. For comparison, I also present estimates 
from OLS and random effects specifications. However, a Hausman test rejects the hypothesis 
that the random effects specification is analogous to the fixed effects specification, therefore the 
random effects results (and, by extension, the OLS results) are inconsistent. In order to obtain 
consistent estimates of the key time-invariant characteristics of respondents that are washed out 
by the fixed effects estimator, I estimate the fixed effects model in two stages. First, I estimate 
the model: 
 !"#$%&"#!" ! ! ! !!!"#$%!"
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where !it is a white noise disturbance. The dependent variable is individual i’s donation in Ghana 
cedis in round t. The variable ratio represents a set of four dummies for the match ratio offered 
(0.5, 1, 1.5 or 2), excluding zero. The variable extracash is the additional endowment given to 
those respondents not collecting money in previous rounds; the remainder is captured by the 
round fixed effect. Household wealth in the month just prior to the round is captured by 
logwealth, specified in logs because the variable is approximately lognormal across the 
population. This measure varies across rounds, capturing seasonal effects and economic shocks 
to individuals during the year that might affect donations. The "m are round controls, and !! are 
individual fixed effects.28 
To obtain consistent estimates of the marginal effect of time-invariant individual 
characteristics on donations, I then regress the estimated fixed effects, !!, on these variables in an 
auxiliary OLS regression: 
!! ! !!!"#! ! !!!"#! ! !!!"#$%&'"(!! ! !!!"#$%&!
!!
!!!
! !!"   (2.2) 
The respondent’s age is measured in years, and sex takes the value one if the respondent is 
male, zero otherwise. As described above, socnetwork is a measure of the individual’s social 
network and trustworthiness, and social captures the respondent’s degree of trust in her 
community in general. 
 The estimates for Equation 2.1 (along with OLS and random effects results) are presented 
in Table 2.6a, and the estimates for Equation 2.2 are presented in Table 2.6b. The latter results 
are presented with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. Individual wealth and 
consumption were not available in the survey data, so I use household wealth.29 
                                                
28 Since extracash is zero for all individuals in round 1, I omit the round 1 fixed effect. 
29 Household wealth includes stocks of food, farm output, livestock, business assets, goods for sale, durables, net 
balances owed by others, bank balances, and the value of jewelry and investments. It does not include land or 
building wealth. 
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Table 2.6a:  Estimates of Equation 2.1 
  Fixed Effects OLS Random Effects 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
      Match ratio (0 omitted)   
    0.5 0.025 0.032 0.018 0.029 0.021 0.030 
1 0.071** 0.032 0.035 0.030 0.052* 0.030 
1.5 0.080** 0.032 0.100*** 0.032 0.093*** 0.030 
2 0.063** 0.031 0.095*** 0.031 0.081*** 0.029 
       Extra GH¢ endowment 0.160*** 0.012 0.156*** 0.020 0.160*** 0.009 
Log household wealth -0.024 0.025 0.020* 0.010 0.015 0.013 
       Round (1 omitted)   
    2 0.062** 0.029 0.052** 0.024 0.055* 0.028 
3 0.014 0.029 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.029 
4 0.557*** 0.029 0.558*** 0.029 0.556*** 0.028 
5 0.661*** 0.029 0.661*** 0.032 0.660*** 0.028 
       Constant 0.503*** 0.178 -0.338*** 0.099 -0.338*** 0.113 
              
N 2,070 2,070 2,070 
Groups 515 -- 515 
(Adjusted) R2 0.369 0.444 0.439 
Breusch-Pagan "2(1) -- 854.4*** -- 
Hausman "2(10) 22.00** -- -- 
Notes: Dependent variable is donation in GH¢. Random and fixed effects are at the individual level. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors 
reported for OLS regression. 
 
The coefficient on gender is significant and positive, indicating that males donated 8-9p more 
than females on average. However, since we only collected data on household wealth, any 
differences in the spending power of men relative to women in the same household are captured 
only by the gender variable. It is common in Ghana for the husband to earn a large share of the 
household’s cash income, so this may explain the gender difference in donations. Having said 
that, household wealth has almost no effect on donations after controlling for household fixed 
effects (or individual characteristics). I find that older individuals donated more. The greater an 
individual’s reported trust of their neighbors, the higher their contribution. This might reflect the 
importance of an individual’s confidence about the way in which the public good would be built 
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or managed by their community, and potentially also about whether the survey team would act as 
promised in spending the raised funds. 
 
Table 2.6b: Estimates of Equation 2.2 
  Fixed Effects OLS^ Random Effects^ 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
      Age (years) 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Male 0.083*** 0.013 0.090*** 0.020 0.083*** 0.027 
       Could trust neighbor with valuable item ('Strongly disagree' omitted)   
Strongly agree 0.159*** 0.034 0.165*** 0.056 0.162** 0.067 
Agree 0.088*** 0.027 0.080* 0.046 0.081 0.056 
Neutral 0.038 0.027 0.025 0.047 0.031 0.061 
Disagree 0.049* 0.027 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.058 
       Share trusting respondent 0.757*** 0.093 0.671*** 0.142 0.730*** 0.175 
       Village (Darmang omitted)      
Pokrom 0.354*** 0.024 0.322*** 0.034 0.332*** 0.045 
Oboadaka 0.325*** 0.020 0.304*** 0.034 0.314*** 0.043 
Konkonuru -0.018 0.019 -0.011 0.028 -0.010 0.038 
       
N 2,070 2,070 2,070 
Groups 515 -- 515 
R2 0.248 -- -- 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors reported for OLS regression. ^ Reported coefficients estimated jointly with model in Table 2.6a. 
 
2.7.1 Effect of the match ratio and endowment 
The coefficients relating to match ratios of 1, 1.5 and 2 are all statistically significant at the 
5 percent level, adding an estimated 7-10p to donations relative to the no-match case. This effect 
compares to a mean donation of 37.6p in round 1 and 69.5p over all five rounds, thus it is quite 
significant in economic terms. The implied price elasticity of donations is -0.26, therefore 
inelastic, and not substantially different from the elasticity of -0.38 implied by the results of 
Karlan and List’s (2007) study.30,31 However, in Karlan and List’s study the response rate was 
                                                
30 In order to calculate this elasticity, I re-estimated the model with ratio included as a linear term. The coefficient 
estimate was 0.054 (standard error 0.014). 
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very low, so that there was a large difference between the mean overall donation and the mean 
donation by existing contributors. In contrast, in this experiment there was a small difference 
between the two due to very high rates of participation. The implied price elasticity for existing 
contributors in Karlan and List’s study was effectively zero.32 Similar to the results found by 
Karlan and List, increasing the match ratio does not seem to increase donations; rather, it is the 
presence of the match offer that affects the amount donated. 
Receiving additional endowment money (from previous rounds) raises donations by 
around 16p per additional cedi, which is substantially lower than the overall mean donation. It is 
difficult to infer what donations would have been had the endowment been zero. However, one 
can use the additional endowment variable to construct an estimate of the income elasticity of 
donations with respect to the endowment. The mean estimate across all communities and rounds 
is 0.53, implying that increases in the endowment induce roughly a one-to-two proportional 
increase in the donation. This is about 10 times larger than the elasticity of donations with 
respect to wealth, suggesting that the propensity to give out of cash-in-hand is much higher than 
the propensity to give out of overall wealth. 
 
2.7.2 Provision point mechanism 
The introduction of the PPM in round 4 had a dramatic positive effect on donations. The 
round coefficients jumped from between 0.06 and 0.01 in the second and third rounds 
respectively (relative to round 1) to 0.56 and 0.66 in rounds 4 and 5. It appears that the PPM was 
much more effective than the matching ratio in eliciting contributions from community 
                                                                                                                                                       
31 This figure is not drawn from Karlan and List’s paper, but rather from my calculations based on their reported 
results and summary statistics. The two estimates are not perfectly comparable, since the elasticity from Karlan and 
List’s study is a single elasticity at the mean donation, while the elasticity for my results is the mean of the 
individual elasticity estimates. 
32 Specifically, my calculations make it +0.07, but the coefficient estimate is not significantly different from zero. 
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members. The increase in donations in rounds 4 and 5 cannot be explained solely by the increase 
in the endowment, which doubled from round 1 to 2 with little effect on donations. The 
estimated coefficient for extracash suggests that only part of the two Ghana cedi increase in the 
endowment going from round 3 to round 4 (roughly 32p) could have been due to the additional 
endowment, leaving a net increase in donations of about 24p attributable to the PPM. This 
estimate is supported by the CDFs in Figure 2.2; whereas there was almost no change in the 
distribution of donations over the first three rounds of the experiment, donations in the last two 
rounds are stochastically dominant and significantly larger across the distribution. Increasing the 
endowment by 50 percent from round 4 to round 5 had only a small positive impact on 
donations. 
As a robustness check, and in order to better isolate the impact of the PPM itself, I re-
estimated the model without round effects and individual characteristics, but including the full 
endowment (which varied across rounds and within rounds, for those who missed an earlier 
payment) and a dummy for the PPM rounds. I experimented with first-, second- and third-order 
polynomials for the endowment, and found a quadratic specification worked best. This modified 
specification is as follows: 
!"#$%&"#!" ! ! ! !!!"#$%!"
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where endowment is the full endowment in Ghana cedis, and ppm is a dummy taking the value 
one in rounds 4 and 5 and zero otherwise. In addition to the fixed effects results, I report OLS 
and random effects estimates as well. The results are presented in Table 2.7. Donations are 
increasing in the square of the endowment, which suggests the marginal propensity to consume 
out of the endowment is increasing. The introduction of the PPM leads to an increase of between 
29p and 33p in contributions, roughly 50 percent of the mean overall contribution and almost 
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100 percent of the mean contribution in rounds 2 and 3. The effect of the PPM is about three 
times that of the matching grant with a ratio of 2.33 
Table 2.7:  Estimates of Equation 2.3 
  Fixed Effects OLS Random Effects 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
       Match ratio (0 omitted) 
      0.5 0.025 0.032 0.017 0.033 0.021 0.030 
1 0.078** 0.033 0.057* 0.034 0.068** 0.031 
1.5 0.081** 0.032 0.099*** 0.034 0.093*** 0.031 
2 0.066** 0.032 0.106*** 0.033 0.086*** 0.030 
       Endowment 0.064*** 0.021 0.040* 0.021 0.046** 0.019 
Endowment squared 0.004** 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 
Log wealth -0.027 0.025 0.058*** 0.011 0.045*** 0.013 
       PPM (Rounds 4 & 5) 0.290*** 0.041 0.334*** 0.045 0.315*** 0.040 
       Constant 0.445** 0.181 -0.133 0.086 -0.043 0.101 
        
N 2,070 2,070 2,070 
Groups -- 515 515 
R2 0.353 0.372 0.374 
Notes: Dependent variable is donation in GH¢. Fixed and random effects are at the individual level. Robust 
standard errors reported for OLS. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at 
the 10 percent level. 
 
2.7.3 Social network characteristics 
Table 2.8 reports coefficient estimates for a range of different social network measures, 
each included individually in an OLS estimation of Equation 2.2. The measures considered are 
the number of individuals in the sample whom the respondent knows personally, the number 
who report knowing the respondent personally, the number of the respondent’s contacts she 
reports being able to trust with a valuable item, and the number of contacts who report being able 
to trust the respondent. Finally, I try the share of the respondent’s contacts she trusts, and the 
                                                
33 As discussed earlier, the true effect of the match ratio may be greater than that estimated here if the act of offering 
a match is itself an incentive to contribute. All participants were aware that we were matching at least some 
contributions. 
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share who trust her. Trust is clearly an important correlate of donations. While the respondent’s 
trust for her friends is positively related to donations, the coefficient estimate is only a fraction of 
the size of the coefficient on the number of friends who trust the respondent. Both the number of 
friends who trust the respondent, and the share, are significant at 5 percent. But since the number 
of friends varies a lot across individuals, is not normally distributed, and is not itself a predictor 
of donations, I choose to use the share of friends trusting the respondent in the other regressions 
in this paper. 
Table 2.8:  Coefficient estimates for social network variables 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
Number of sample members respondent knows -0.000 0.000 
Number of sample members who know respondent 0.000 0.000 
Number of sample members respondent trusts 0.000** 0.000 
Number of sample members who trust respondent 0.004*** 0.001 
Share of known sample members respondent trusts 0.048** 0.023 
Sample members who trust respondent, as share of those 
who know respondent 
0.757*** 0.093 
Notes: Each row reports the estimated coefficient on the respective social network variable when included 
individually as the variable socnetwork in Equation 2.2. Dependent variable is the estimated individual fixed 
effect from Equation 2.1. Other regressors in Table 2.6b were included, but are omitted here for parsimony. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
 
It is interesting that trustworthiness is the most significant predictor of an individual’s 
contribution. An individual in the top decile in terms of trustworthiness (trusted by 45 percent of 
those who know her) would donate around 26p more than an individual in the bottom decile 
(trusted by only 11 percent of those who know her). This is more than one third of the mean 
overall donation. The number of friends is not significant, suggesting that it is not an individual’s 
popularity alone that determines her donation.34 
                                                
34 This is true even if I use an intensity-weighted measure of friendship. 
  63 
Is trustworthiness related to higher status in the village? If trustworthy people tend to be 
leaders, they may feel a duty to donate more because of their position. Such individuals might 
also have expected to lead the management of the public goods project, or felt responsible for the 
‘success’ of their community’s project, and therefore had the greatest interest in seeing it 
completed. On the other hand, trustworthiness may capture unobservable characteristics such as 
generosity, which has already been recognized by the respondent’s friends. To address these 
questions, I include a number of measures of status in the regression: dummy variables for 
holding a village or family office, coming from the local ethnic group, having been fostered as a 
child, being a new migrant (defined as having lived in the community for five years or less), and 
the share of the individual’s life spent in the community. If it is true that the effect of 
trustworthiness simply reflects the contributions behavior of higher-status individuals, one would 
expect village office-bearers to contribute significantly more. Ethnicity is a significant theme in 
research on community-driven development, thus we might expect people from the local ethnic 
group (Akwapim) to have a greater say (and possibly stake) in public projects and thereby 
contribute more. Conversely, new migrants to the community are likely to have less status. 
Previous research in these communities also suggests that individuals who were fostered (that is, 
lived a substantial part of their childhood with individuals other than their parents) are more 
likely to be socially isolated within the community (Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett, 2009) and 
therefore of lower status. These hypotheses are supported by simple regressions of trust on 
indicator variables of these three characteristics: office-bearers and Akwapim individuals are 
significantly more trusted, while new migrants and fostered individuals are significantly less 
trusted (as a share of those who know them). Both the number of individuals who know the 
respondent, and the number who trust the respondent, are higher the longer the respondent has 
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lived in the community.35 
Coefficient estimates for these status variables are reported in Table 2.9. Office-bearers 
donate significantly more, but including this variable in the regression does not detract from the 
magnitude or significance of the coefficient on trustworthiness. Those who were fostered as 
children (presumably therefore of lower status) did not contribute significantly less. Individuals 
from the local ethnic group actually donated 7-8p less on average than others. New migrants 
donated around 7p more than others. Another measure of migrant status, the share of life spent in 
the village, also suggests that newer arrivals are more willing to contribute. 
These are counterintuitive results. Perhaps they reflect a desire among new migrants to 
build their new community, or to gain acceptance by other residents.36 It is also possible 
Table 2.9:  Coefficient estimates for status variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Share trusting respondent 0.808*** 
(0.094) 
0.836*** 
(0.096) 
0.896*** 
(0.100) 
Status variables    
Holds village/family office 0.095*** 
(0.032) 
0.097*** 
(0.032) 
0.100*** 
(0.032) 
Member of Akwapim group -0.078*** 
(0.019) 
-0.077*** 
(0.019) 
-0.070*** 
(0.018) 
Fostered as child 0.004 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
New migrant (# 5 years in village) 
-- 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
-- 
Share of life spent in village 
-- -- 
-0.096*** 
(0.022) 
    
N 2,016 2,016 2,011 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.258 0.261 
Notes: Dependent variable is the estimated individual fixed effect from Equation 2.1. Other 
regressors in Table 2.6b were included, but are omitted here for parsimony. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level 
and * at the 10 percent level. 
 
                                                
35 Results are available from the author on request. 
36 Around one quarter of respondents are first in their family to live in the community, reflecting quite high levels of 
geographic mobility. 
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that new migrants donate more because they have greater spending power; indeed, new migrants 
have higher per capita consumption on average. However, when I replace log wealth with log per 
capita consumption, the above results are unchanged. In conclusion, it appears that contributions 
to community-level public goods are strongly related to the social network, with more trusted 
individuals donating more. However, this does not appear to be due to status per se. The results 
from this analysis suggest that the relationship between ethnicity and community-level altruism 
is far from clear, and needs to be explored further in future work. 
 
2.8 Policy implications  
The mechanisms tested here – the matching grant and PPM – both helped to encourage 
donations and could be used in a full-scale local fund-raising initiative. With a PPM, unpopular 
projects that do not garner enough support to reach the fund-raising threshold would not go 
ahead, saving money and ensuring that scarce funds flow instead toward more desirable projects. 
I found that the PPM was between two and three times more effective than the matching grant in 
boosting donations, and has the added benefit of being easy to understand. However, the PPM 
requires fund-raisers to set a realistic target, which may be difficult if potential demand cannot be 
estimated ex ante. Setting too high a target and consequently aborting a project because the target 
is not reached could diminish goodwill within a community. One would also need to consider the 
administrative costs associated with recording donations and returning funds if the target is not 
met. In a developed country, a fund raiser could take credit card pledges and deduct the funds 
only if the target is met, but that is not feasible in poor rural communities. 
The matching grant could be implemented indirectly if communities were required to 
contribute only a fraction – perhaps one-fifth – of the cost of the project. This would have the 
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same effect as a matching ratio of 4, reducing the effective price of donation but without needing 
to explain and co-ordinate the matching offer. The amount a community is required to raise 
could be varied depending on the standard of living of the community, with poorer communities 
required to raise a smaller fraction of the full project cost. 
The practice of raising additional funds for local development from community members 
has a number of advantages. First, these individuals are rarely subject to income tax and 
therefore shoulder a very small tax burden. Some form of voluntary co-payment seems justified 
for public projects that offer direct benefits to the local community. The additional funds raised 
would allow district assemblies to do more with existing funds, and reduce their reliance on 
central government disbursements and irregular NGO and donor initiatives. Requiring local 
community members to bear part of the project cost could also increase their sense of ownership 
of the project and encourage them to take responsibility for its care and maintenance.  
Some caveats apply to this analysis. The field experiment was designed to measure 
individuals’ willingness to contribute to a public project. The focus on individual behavior, and 
the particular requirements of an experimental setting, means the design of the experiment is 
somewhat different from the process a district assembly might use to raise funds for a larger 
public project.  
First, donations might have been lower had we not presented respondents with a cash 
endowment before soliciting contributions. Absent these endowments, more individuals may 
have refused to contribute because they were short of cash. They may also have been more 
inclined to contribute because of an ‘endowment effect’, feeling richer because of their 
endowment. We tried to offset this by framing the endowment as compensation for their 
participation in the household survey, and mentioning the payment again during the survey 
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interviews. 
Second, the importance of status and social norms in these communities suggests that 
donations may have been significantly higher had the solicitations been public, subject to the 
influence of community leaders. Indeed, fundraising efforts in Ghanaian communities (such as 
church ‘harvests’) frequently raise amounts of money many times higher than those raised in this 
experiment. One important factor in such efforts is the involvement of outsiders connected to the 
community, such as family members overseas. If these sources could be harnessed, much more 
money could likely be raised.  
Third, from our interactions with the respondents it was clear that contributions were 
strongly related to the popularity of the projects. We were limited by our budget and sample size 
to offering small projects. It is likely that contributions would have been much higher for more 
desirable and broadly beneficial projects like electrification and road building. However, it is 
hard to know whether one could raise a similar proportion of the total cost for such a project.  
Finally, the results of this study relate to only four communities in one district of Ghana. It 
is possible that behavior might be qualitatively different in other parts of the country, let alone in 
other countries. Further research or trials need to be conducted before broadly implementing 
such a scheme as policy. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
This chapter presented the results of an experiment designed to measure individuals’ 
willingness to contribute to a local public good. I identified factors that explain why some 
individuals to give more than others, and tested two incentive mechanisms often used in 
fundraising activities. The study makes a number of novel contributions to the literature. It offers 
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evidence on the actual public goods contributions of individuals in a real-world developing 
country setting, relating to the financing of an actual public project. This is to my knowledge the 
first evidence on the effectiveness of the matching grant and PPM in a developing country, and 
the first comparison of the relative strengths of the two mechanisms in the field. By relating the 
results of the experiment to a rich dataset on individual characteristics and social networks, the 
study also sheds light on which individuals in the community are willing to contribute the most 
to public goods.  
In these communities, the rate of contribution was high, but the size of the donations was 
small relative to the endowment. Older and male respondents donated more, but household 
wealth had only a small effect on donations. The strong effect of trustworthiness on donations is 
an interesting finding. Trusted members of the community were more inclined to give, even after 
controlling for wealth. But somewhat surprisingly, this result was not driven by status alone. 
Indeed, I found that new migrants to the community donated significantly more than non-
migrants. Individuals from the dominant ethnic group actually contributed less than others. These 
results highlight the importance of the social network in determining individuals’ willingness to 
contribute to their communities, reinforcing findings from previous research that social cohesion 
within communities is conducive to the success of community-led development projects. 
However, they also bring into question the notion that elites in the community have the most to 
gain (or capture) from public projects, and the assumption that ethnic homogeneity implies 
greater participation and success in such endeavors. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in 
between: that there is a willingness on the part of minority ethnic groups to contribute to public 
goods, but generally poorer outcomes in the management of projects resulting from the effect of 
ethnic fractionalization on local political co-ordination. 
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I found that the provision point mechanism (PPM) had a significant impact on the size of 
donations, while the matching grant had a smaller but also significant effect. That these 
mechanisms are effective in boosting donations reinforces results from developed country field 
and laboratory experiments. However, I find that the match ratio has a greater effect in Ghanaian 
rural communities than has been measured in other places. The broad willingness of individuals 
to contribute to community projects suggests policy makers may be able to use such 
contributions to augment funding for community construction projects. The results from the 
experiment indicate that the PPM and matching ratio could both be very effective in encouraging 
donations for such a program. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Consumption, Investment and Transfers in Village Social Networks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An extensive literature documents the prevalence and effectiveness of informal insurance 
arrangements in traditional communities. These arrangements, governed by long-standing social 
norms about sharing and mutual support, are relied upon to fill gaps in the formal safety net and 
substitute for missing insurance and credit markets. The overwhelming conclusion from the 
literature is that informal insurance arrangements provide some support to individuals in times of 
need, but fall short of providing full insurance against idiosyncratic shocks to income 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Fafchamps et al., 1997; Kazianga and Udry, 
2006). The laudable benefits of informal sharing norms may come at a cost, however. 
Individuals may be discouraged from becoming ‘too successful’, or be constrained in their 
income mobility by a social obligation to share their wealth with others. These pressures may 
affect economic incentives in a number of ways, yet there is scant empirical evidence on this 
point. In particular, it is unclear from existing research how sharing obligations affect 
individuals’ incentives to save and invest. This is of great importance to development, given that 
investment is commonly seen as one of the primary vehicles, along with technical change and 
market exchange, by which individuals can transition into higher-return activities and thereby 
permanently escape from poverty. 
The sharing norms underpinning informal insurance arrangements could plausibly result in 
either underinvestment or overinvestment. There is no clear-cut empirical evidence as to which 
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view is correct. Platteau (2009) argues that informal insurance arrangements and social norms in 
developing countries can hinder entrepreneurial activity and investment if individuals expect 
their gains to be expropriated by the claims of friends or family. Central to his thesis is the 
observation that 
“..lineage-based societies such as those found in [sub-Saharan Africa] have adopted 
strong redistributive norms that enjoin economically rising individuals to share their 
surplus with their kith and kin. These norms are backed by the belief that success is due 
to ‘luck’ rather than to personal effort, risk-taking and talent.” (Platteau, 2009, p. 679). 
Platteau goes on to say that one-off success is generally accepted by others as part of the normal 
course of events, but that runs of good luck can be interpreted negatively. In such cases, refusing 
to share one’s gains with the community can spark accusations of witchcraft, resulting in social 
sanction and sometimes longer lasting social exclusion. If individuals bear the full marginal cost 
of investment but only reap part of the marginal benefit, they will maximize their utility by 
investing at a suboptimal level. Thus such norms impose a ‘social rate of taxation’ on investment 
and risk-taking, discouraging entrepreneurs from investing and building their businesses. 
Furthermore, these obligations may distort other behavior such as intertemporal consumption 
decisions. Goldberg (2010) argues that individuals may be inclined to spend publicly observed 
windfall gains faster than those which are not publicly observed, if the knowledge of a windfall 
causes others to demand that the recipient share his gains. 
Recent empirical research provides circumstantial evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007) find that members of savings co-operatives in Cameroon are 
prepared to take out unneeded loans in order to maintain a façade of poverty and thereby evade 
requests for assistance. Comola and Fafchamps (2010) model link formation in Tanzanian 
villages and find evidence consistent with gift exchange links being unilaterally rather than 
bilaterally initiated; in other words, gift exchange for these individuals is an obligation rather 
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than the outcome of a voluntary contract. In a lab experiment in rural Kenya, Jakiela and Ozier 
(2011) found that individuals were 22 percent less likely to make a profitable investment if the 
returns from that investment were to be announced publicly, and were willing to forgo 15 percent 
of the investment’s returns in order to keep the outcome private. However, these results were 
significant only for women in their sample, and may be capturing women’s desire to conceal 
their earnings from their husbands rather than from others in their social network. It is unclear 
whether the same results would also hold at the household level. Goldberg (2010) finds 
experimental evidence from Malawi that winners of publicly received prizes spent their windfall 
faster than winners of privately received prizes, although in the long run the amount spent by 
both types of prize-winners was the same. However, her conclusions relate to the amount spent 
in the week following the experiment, using recall data from a follow-up survey conducted three 
months later, and administered to only a subset of her original sample. It seems likely that 
respondents would have had difficulty recalling the exact timing of expenditures three months in 
the past. 
On the other hand, individuals may be inclined to invest more than the optimal amount in 
illiquid assets if doing so helps them avoid honoring claims from others in their social network 
(Besley, 1995). For example, in many developing countries individuals will invest in housing 
even if they cannot complete the building, preferring to hold their assets in the form of an 
uncompleted house (with little or no real return) rather than in cash or liquid investments. Udry 
(1990, 1994) observed that individuals in northern Nigeria preferred to give assistance to others 
in the form of flexible, interest-free loans rather than cash gifts, since the former can be claimed 
back later in a time of need – once again, a somewhat illiquid investment that maintains assets in 
a form that is out of the reach of others. If illiquid assets are truly difficult for kin and neighbors 
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to expropriate, they may be a relatively more attractive store of wealth for individuals who are 
subject to sharing obligations. 
In this paper we test these competing predictions about the effect of windfall gains on 
investment and consumption using data from a field experiment that was designed to generate 
precisely the ‘luck-induced’ windfalls Platteau (2009) describes. In the first section of the paper, 
we develop a model that captures the effect of social obligations on individual consumption and 
investment decisions. This formalizes the predictions of the social pressures identified by 
Platteau and others, and renders them testable using our experimental data. Our model unites two 
strands of literature that have hitherto remained reasonably distinct: the literature stemming from 
Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) on buffer stock and precautionary savings; and the literature 
on informal insurance arrangements. Both provide partial insurance against income shocks, but 
against shocks that are partly orthogonal. Informal insurance arrangements within a small 
community can in theory fully smooth consumption against idiosyncratic (i.e., individual- or 
household-specific) shocks, while buffer stock savings partly smooth consumption against both 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. A vast literature on the subject presents evidence that both 
approaches are used (to varying extents) by rural households in developing countries. 
In order to understand the investment and savings behavior of such individuals, it is 
appropriate to start with a framework that combines the buffer stock and coinsurance models. 
The only paper we have found that even tangentially attempts to do so is that of Ligon, Thomas 
and Worrall (2000), who discuss the impact of a ‘storage possibility’ on the welfare of 
individuals engaging in coinsurance with limited commitment. However, their focus is on the 
general sustainability of coinsurance contracts in light of savings, rather than the impact of 
coinsurance obligations on savings behavior. The model we develop here shows how an 
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individual’s marginal propensities to consume, save and invest out of income may depend on the 
degree to which they are involved in coinsurance with their neighbors, and also on initial 
conditions such as wealth. Our model demonstrates how individuals’ coinsurance obligations 
may distort their incentives to invest, but goes further in explaining how these distortions are 
magnified as an individual’s coinsurance network expands, and moreover how these distortions 
may vary depending on an individual’s relative wealth in their social network. From the model 
we develop a set of testable hypotheses about the effect of unanticipated positive income and 
asset shocks on consumption, savings in liquid assets, and investment in illiquid assets. 
In the second part of the paper we test these hypotheses using data from a unique, year-
long field experiment conducted in conjunction with a longitudinal household survey in four 
villages in southern Ghana. Four times during 2009, we held a lottery in each of the four villages 
and allocated 20 cash and livestock prizes at random among the household survey respondents. 
Half of the prizes were awarded in a public draw, the other half in private draws. We model the 
impact of these idiosyncratic, unanticipated shocks on consumption, savings and investment, and 
test the predictions of our theoretical model. Our findings speak to the relative efficacy of 
competing aid philosophies: is it better to give the poor a goat to breed, or cash with which to 
buy one? How well are untargeted transfers redistributed through the village social network to 
those who need them most? Our experiment improves on those conducted previously by 
Goldberg (2010) and Jakiela and Ozier (2011), because of our larger sample, multiple 
experimental rounds and longitudinal household survey data collected in tandem with the 
experiment. With richer data, we are also able to examine the effects of prize winning in more 
detail, by varying the size and types of prize given, and relating consumption, investment and 
transfer responses to the characteristics of individuals’ social networks. 
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We find that much of the prize money was spent or invested within the month following 
the lottery. Animal prizes were treated very differently from their cash counterparts, highlighting 
the inapplicability of a strict notion of fungibility in this rural setting. We use the distinction 
between public and private prizes to test whether sharing of prizes was voluntary or coerced. In 
contrast to the predictions of a model of social coercion, we find little evidence of sharing of 
prizes, public or private. There was no statistically significant difference in the amount of sharing 
from public versus private prizes. We also find compelling evidence of an ‘investment trap’, 
wherein relatively rich individuals face a higher social rate of taxation on their income and are 
thereby discouraged from making productive investments. Both cash and livestock prizes 
induced significant increases in households’ illiquid asset stocks, but none of these increases 
were observed among households whose members were relatively richer than the median 
household in their social network. This suggests that relatively rich households are discouraged 
from investing because they predict the likely returns will be eroded by future claims from others 
in their social network. As our model predicts, this effect is more pronounced as the size of a 
household’s social network increases. Households with a larger social network invest more if 
they are relatively poorer than their peers, and less if they are relatively richer. 
In the next section, we develop a theoretical model of buffer stock savings and coinsurance 
in a social network setting, and discuss the model’s predictions for consumption and investment 
decisions. In Section 3.3 we describe the household survey and social network data used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 3.4 describes the experiment we designed to allocate income and 
asset shocks randomly among survey respondents. As a background to the formal econometric 
analysis, we provide a brief qualitative overview of the results of the experiment in Section 3.5. 
In Section 3.6, we present an econometric analysis of the results. We discuss the policy 
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implications of the results in Section 3.7, and Section 3.8 offers concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 A model of buffer stock savings and coinsurance 
We motivate our analysis with a stochastic dynamic programming model of investment 
and consumption for an individual facing borrowing constraints. This model captures the 
pervasive lack of access to credit facing rural Ghanaian households. We adapt the buffer stock 
model developed by Deaton (1991). In Deaton’s framework, an individual who can save but 
cannot borrow chooses how to allocate her wealth between consumption and savings in a liquid 
(one-period) asset with a fixed yield. Deaton showed that in such a case the individual will save 
an increasing fraction of her income above some threshold as a buffer against future shocks. We 
first extend Deaton’s model to allow for two assets – one liquid, and one illiquid. We solve this 
autarkic case and discuss how an individual’s marginal propensities to consume, save and invest 
vary as wealth increases. We then examine the effects on these propensities of introducing a 
coinsurance obligation, and explore how the structure of the social network modifies behavior. 
 
3.2.1 The autarkic case 
We consider the decision problem for a risk-averse, expected-utility maximizing individual 
with a concave utility function U(c) defined over composite consumption, c, and a discount 
parameter # < 1. The individual has the ability to store wealth in assets between periods, but does 
not have the ability to borrow. (One can alternatively read ‘household’ for ‘individual’ in what 
follows, provided one assumes that the household acts as a unitary decision maker.) The 
individual can allocate her wealth to two distinct assets: a liquid asset, S, with a per-period yield 
of rs, and an illiquid asset A, with a per-period yield of ra. The liquid asset is essentially a one-
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period security; it can be converted into consumption at any time. In contrast, the illiquid asset is 
held indefinitely, and must be sold in order to be consumed. 
We impose illiquidity by assuming that the sale of the illiquid asset incurs transaction 
costs, namely that the money raised by selling A is only qA, where q < 1. Furthermore, the 
illiquid asset depreciates at rate % < 1 each period. We will distinguish between the stock of the 
illiquid asset, A, and the flow of funds into or out of the asset, a. Thus !!!! ! !! ! !! ! !!. 
In order to clearly distinguish the acts of storage in the liquid and illiquid assets, we shall refer to 
purchases of the liquid asset as ‘saving’ and purchases of the illiquid asset as ‘investing’. 
The individual’s cash on hand in period t+1 is therefore: 
 !!!! ! !! !! !! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!, (3.1) 
where !!!! represents the period-specific exogenous income flow. It is assumed in the first 
section of Deaton’s paper (and here throughout), that income draws are normally distributed with 
mean µ and constant standard deviation !, and are independent over time.37  Since the individual 
must consume, save or invest all cash on hand, we must have 
 !! ! !! ! !! ! !!!!!,    where  !!!!! !
!!!!!if!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!
!!!!!if  !!! ! !! ! !
 (3.2) 
Note that at (which captures flows into or out of the stock of illiquid assets) may be positive or 
negative (provided !! ! !). The function $(a) captures the discontinuity in buying and selling 
the illiquid asset. The individual must pay full price to buy the asset, but incurs transaction costs 
by selling it. Using (3.2) we can eliminate St from (3.1), so that 
 !!!! ! !! !! !! ! !! ! !!!!! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!. (3.3) 
                                                
37 This is a somewhat extreme assumption in the case of farmers in Ghana, whose incomes are probably highly 
correlated over time. Deaton (1991, pp. 1231-35) also considers the case in which income streams are serially 
correlated. He shows that the ability to smooth consumption is diminished when incomes are serially correlated, and 
that in such a situation individuals will consume more in high-income states and less in low-income states. Since our 
econometric analysis relates to experimentally random income shocks, however, we maintain the assumption of 
independent shocks here. 
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The consumer’s decision problem is thus to choose the optimal consumption and investment 
profiles c* and a
* (and, implicitly, S* as the residual) to maximize discounted expected utility 
over the planning horizon: 
!"#
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!!!! !!!!
!
!!!
 
s.t.   !!!! ! !!!! ! ! !!!!  
        !!!! ! !!!! !!!!!!. 
Without borrowing constraints (and assuming no asset investment), Deaton (1991) shows 
that the interior solution to the optimization problem satisfies a standard Euler equation: 
 ! !!
!
! !!!!!!!!!
! !, 
where ! !! ! !
!
!! . However, in the presence of a borrowing constraint liquid assets cannot 
be negative, so the marginal utility of consumption must be bounded from above at ! !! . Thus, 
the constrained solution is 
 ! !!
!
! !"# ! !! !!!!!!!!!!
! ! . 
Deaton then defines !!
!
! !!!!! and ! !! ! ! ! !! , and eliminates c from the above result, 
yielding the optimality condition: 
 ! !! ! !"#! ! !! !!!!! !!!!  
! !"# ! !! !!!!! !! !! !! ! !
!!! !! ! !!!!  
! !"#! ! !! !! ! !! !! !! ! !
!!! !! ! !!!! !" !
!
!
. 
He then solves iteratively for the functional p(x) that satisfies this condition. 
With a second, illiquid asset, the problem becomes more complex. First, we must modify 
the mapping from xt into ct
*
 to also depend on the asset stock at time t, 
 !!
!
! !!!! !!!!, 
and define the function ! !! !!! ! ! ! !! !!! . Analogous to Deaton’s result, it must be the 
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case that 
 ! !! !!! ! !"# ! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! , 
where ! !! !!! ! !!!!! ! !!!!, since the agent will sell all of her assets in a time of need. 
Substituting for xt+1 from (3.3), we then have 
! !! !!! ! !"# ! !! !!! !!!!! ! ! !! !! ! !
!! ! !! !!! ! ! !! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!!!!  
! !"# ! !! !!! !! ! ! ! !! !! ! !
!! ! !! !!! ! ! !! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!!!! !"!!!
!
!
 
 (3.4) 
To find at, note that the discounted marginal utility of investment in the illiquid asset (in 
the form of future interest payments and returns on divestment) must offset the marginal utility 
sacrificed by investing in the current period. Let the discounted future value of the investment be 
defined by the value function W(xt, At, at). First, consider the stream of income in period t+1 
resulting from investing !! ! ! at time t. The individual will receive interest of ra per unit, and 
can redeem qat at a subsequent date by selling the asset. If she does not sell the asset, she retains 
the incremental investment, less depreciation, in period t+2. The states of selling or not selling 
the asset at t+1 are governed by the realization of her income in period t+1. If income is low 
enough that ! !!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!, she will sell her assets in order to increase 
consumption as much as possible. Let y be the level of income at which ! !!!!!!!!! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!. Then the function W is defined by the following Bellman equation: 
! !! !!! !!! ! ! !! ! !!!!!!!!! !! !!!!! !! ! !! ! !! !!!!!
!
!
!" !  
!! ! ! !! ! !!!!!!!!!
!
!
!" !  (3.5) 
where  !!!! ! !! !! !! ! !
!! ! !! !!! ! !!!!! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!. 
The equilibrium condition is to continue purchasing (or selling) at until the marginal utility 
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of an extra dollar spent (or received from sale) equals the marginal value W found above. Thus, 
 ! !! !!! !!!
!
! !!!! !!!!,    for all  !!
!
! !. (3.6) 
 ! !! !!! !!!
!
! !"!!! !!!!,    for all  !!! ! !!
!
! !. (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) results because the sale of A yields only q dollars per unit, so the marginal utility 
gained from selling a unit of the asset is only qp (xt , At) Thus there is a range of values of W for 
which at
* = 0. This discontinuity arises from the transaction cost associated with disposing of the 
illiquid asset, as discussed by Grossman and Laroque (1990). 
We solve the model by first finding the W function, conditional on a guess for p. The 
optimal amount to be invested in (or divested from) the illiquid asset is then the value at
* that 
solves (3.6) and (3.7). This is a function of xt and At, hence we will write it as a
*(xt , At). The 
equilibrium condition is: 
 !" !! !!! !! !! !!
!!!! !!!!!!! ! ! !! !!! . (3.8) 
We then use the function a*(xt , At) to solve for the function p (xt , At), and then obtain the 
consumption function as f (xt , At) = %
-1[p (xt , At)]. 
The solution for this model can be found by backward induction, starting with 
p0(xt , At) = %(xt , At), solving for a
*, then for p, and iterating until both functions converge 
(similar to the procedure used in Deaton, 1991, p. 1227). In Figure 3.1 we present the 
consumption functions for the utility function ! ! !
!
!!!
!!!
, with " = 2, initial assets At = 0 and 
At = 20, ra = 0.15, rs = 0.05, µ = 100, & = 10, % = 0.05 and q = 0.75. Deaton’s solution (using the 
same utility function and parameters, but with no illiquid asset) is included in the figure for 
comparison.38 
                                                
38 The calculations for Deaton’s model were done by the authors using an independently written program. 
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Figure 3.1:  Consumption functions for autarkic model 
 
 
Note that the individual consumes the entire stock of liquid assets when x falls below the 
mean income level of 100, and saves an increasing fraction of the stock when x is above 100. For 
high levels of income, the marginal propensity to consume becomes very small. Keeping a buffer 
stock of liquid assets also serves to reduce the future variance of consumption. When x is less 
than mean income, however, the individual is better off consuming everything, and absorbs 
income shocks one-to-one by adjusting consumption. This limited ability to smooth consumption 
over time provides scope for gains from coinsurance, whereby individuals with incomes that are 
not perfectly correlated can also smooth consumption interpersonally. The consumption function 
for the model with illiquid assets and A = 0 is essentially identical to the function from Deaton’s 
model, up to x = 210. At this point, the individual in our model starts to purchase the illiquid 
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illiquid assets raise consumption in subsequent periods, a manifestation of the permanent income 
hypothesis. Indeed, unless x is quite large in the next period, the consumer will sell the illiquid 
asset and consume it. Thus when initial illiquid assets are positive (the A = 20 case), the model 
predicts that consumption will shift up almost uniformly, regardless of x. 
Figure 3.2 shows the consumer’s optimal stock of liquid and illiquid assets given xt, for 
initial illiquid asset stocks of 0 and 20. Note that the consumer will only acquire liquid assets 
above x = 100, and illiquid assets only above x = 210. The acquisition of the illiquid asset partly 
displaces savings in liquid form (which appear to level off). For the A = 20 case, note the flat 
section around x = 200. This arises because of the transaction costs in selling the illiquid asset; 
the consumer is indifferent between buying and selling over a small range of x at this point. 
 
Figure 3.2:  Liquid and illiquid asset accumulation for autarkic model 
 
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 
S, A 
x 
Liquid assets 
Illiquid assets 
A = 0 
A = 20 
  87 
What this model illustrates so far is that (i) individuals will rationally purchase illiquid 
assets, even at reasonably low yields and with depreciation and transaction costs; (ii) such 
purchases occur only when buffer stocks of liquid assets are high; (iii) having a greater range of 
choice over asset types gives individuals more scope to smooth consumption; and (iv) the 
marginal propensities to save in liquid and illiquid assets are reasonably constant, except at 
breakpoints. Thus we expect marginal propensities to vary significantly for individuals with 
different initial levels of liquid assets. 
 
3.2.2 Coinsurance 
 We now extend the model by introducing a coinsurance obligation. Households in 
developing countries both save on their own and look to others to assist in times of particular 
need, yet theoretical models incorporating both activities are remarkably scarce in the literature. 
We motivate our discussion with the seminal models of Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion 
(1993), which characterize the set of Pareto optimal transfers between two individuals seeking to 
maximize their ex ante welfare. We extend this model to include an illiquid asset, A, which may 
or may not be productive (in the sense that it increases disposable income, x). We show how the 
model predicts that the social rate of taxation (increase in transfer burden) of consumption and 
investment may vary across individuals depending on their initial wealth. 
The seminal mutual insurance problem (Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993) is for 
two risk-averse, expected utility-maximizing individuals i and j to negotiate an ex ante contract 
wherein some net (positive or negative) amount!!!"
! is transferred from i to j in every state of 
nature ! ! !. Doing so increases their ex ante expected utility. The set of feasible transfers is 
bounded by sustainability constraints, which require that in every state both individuals are better 
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off, in terms of discounted expected lifetime utility, from adhering to the contract rather than 
reneging. We consider a twist to the model, wherein utility depends on liquid and illiquid assets, 
and only the former are transferable. 
Reflecting the consumer’s optimization problem in (3.4), we define 
! !! !!! ! ! ! !! !!!  as the value function of liquid and illiquid assets at the start of period t. 
Inheriting the properties of U, this value function is concave in both arguments and twice 
continuously differentiable in A for all ! ! !!, and in x over the range !!!!!. Recall that there 
is a breakpoint at ! ! !, below which individuals consume all of their cash on hand and save 
nothing. Individuals gain utility from their stock of illiquid assets even though these are not 
directly consumable, since the asset generates interest and can be sold (at a discount). Depending 
on the utility function, the asset may also augment consumption directly in some way, for 
instance by serving as a complement or substitute to consumption goods. Suppose that the 
history of states to time t is ht. Let !!!!!!! be the probability of state & given ht. The optimal 
contract between two individuals i and j is then to find the transfer from liquid assets in each 
state & over an infinite horizon that solves the programming problem: 
 !"#
!!"
! !! !!
!
! !!"
! !!!
!
! !! ! ! !!
!
! !!"
! !!!
!  (3.9) 
 s.t.  !! ! ! !!!! !!!!
!
! !
!"
!
!!
!
!
!!"!
!
!!! ! !!"
!
! !! ! ! !!!! !!!!
!
!!
!
!
!!"!
!
!!!  
 !! ! ! !!!! !!!!
!
! !
!"
!
!!
!
!
!!"!
!
!!! ! !!"
!
! !! ! ! !!!! !!!!
!
!!
!
!
!!"!
!
!!!  
where " is the bargaining weight for person i. The (nonnegative) B terms in the participation 
constraints are sanctions for deviation from the contract. In Coate and Ravallion’s model these 
are zero, but Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) show that introducing such a term expands the 
set of contractible states. 
Letting !! and !! be the Lagrange multipliers on the two participation constraints, it is 
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straightforward to derive the solution for the transfer in any state, !!": 
 ! ! !! !! !! ! !!" !!! ! !!! ! ! !!!!!!!! ! !!" !!!! (3.10) 
where V1 is the first derivative of V with respect to the consumption good. Transfers are bounded 
at the level where the participation constraints bind; on the positive side where !! ! !, and on 
the negative side where !! ! !. 
At an interior solution, (3.10) implies that the transfer is chosen in each state so that the 
ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption of the two individuals equals the ratio of their 
bargaining weights. Note that in this modified version of the standard model, at an interior 
solution with equal bargaining weights, transfers do not necessarily equate post-transfer wealth, 
but only post-transfer marginal utilities of consumption.39 
In the standard one asset model with identical individuals and ! ! !
!
, increases in x (due 
perhaps to good luck) must be shared equally with all members of the network. Everyone 
consumes network mean consumption. No one has an incentive to save or invest unless it 
increases network mean consumption. But in a two asset model, this may not be the case. 
Consider the effect of an increase in the illiquid assets, A, of person i on the interior solution to 
!!". By the Envelope Theorem, we can differentiate (3.10) with respect to Ai to obtain: 
!!!"
!!!
!
!!!!
! !!!!!!"! !!
!!
!
!!!
! !!!!"
! !!!!!!"! !!
!!
!!
! !!!!!!"! !!! !!! !!!
!
!!!!!!"! !!
. (3.11) 
The size of the transfer response depends on the sizes of V11 and V12, the derivatives of the 
marginal utility of consumption with respect to x and A. The sign of the response depends on the 
derivative V12. This captures the response of marginal utility of consumption to an increase in 
                                                
39 Given the discontinuity in the consumption function f in the buffer stock model, there is a boundary case where 
!! ! !!" ! !. Over this range the marginal utility of x is constant and the transfer rule may not be at an interior 
solution. 
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holdings of the investment good. If V12 is positive, increased investment in A raises the marginal 
utility of consumption. In this case, the investment good is a complement to the consumption 
good; increased investment makes consumption more attractive. This might be the case, for 
instance, if the investment good is livestock that requires food and water to survive. If V12 is 
negative, increased investment in A decreases the marginal utility of consumption. In this case, 
the investment good is a substitute to consumption, such as a vehicle which decreases the 
household’s demand for public transport. 
While !!! !!" ! !, there is no transfer response to changes in A. The simulations from the 
two asset buffer stock model, which assume A is neither a complement nor a substitute (V12 = 0), 
show no relationship between A and the marginal utility of x. In that case, the transfer response 
to increased illiquid wealth will be negative and identical for all villagers. As individuals hold 
larger private buffer stocks, those displace coinsurance payments as a means of coping with 
idiosyncratic income shocks. 
If A is a substitute for consumption (V12 < 0), the transfer response is the ratio of two 
negative quantities, and therefore positive. Increased illiquid wealth holdings stimulate transfers. 
If x and A are complements (V12 > 0), V12 may offset V11 and the transfer response may be either 
negative (implying that transfers decrease as A increases) or positive. Differences in the stock of 
illiquid assets across individuals (relative wealth) imply differences in transfer responses across 
individuals. This requires that V be thrice differentiable, as is the case for prudent individuals 
(Kimball, 1988; Carroll, 1997) and provided x lies in the range !!!!!. 
The response of transfers to increases in x is analogous: 
!!!"
!!!
!
!!!!
! !!!!!!"! !!!!!!!"
! !!!!!!"! !!
!!
!
!!!
!!
!!
! !!!!!!"! !!! !!! !!!
!
!!!!!!"! !!
 . 
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This effect is also positive for individuals with concave utility functions, and will vary across 
individuals if A is a substitute or complement. Again, this is an interior solution only; when 
!!! !!" ! !, transfers do not respond to changes in x. By similar reasoning to that above, we can 
sign the derivatives, finding that the rich face a higher rate of taxation than the poor on increases 
in x if A is a complement (V12 > 0), and a lower rate of taxation if it is a substitute (V12 < 0). 
To get an intuitive sense of how illiquid wealth affects the transfer response, consider two 
alternative utility functions of x and A: a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
! !!! ! !!!! 
in which x and A are complements, and the function 
! !!! ! !! ! !!! 
in which x and A are perfect substitutes. We assume !!! ! !. In Figure 3.3, we graph the 
transfer responses for the two functions to changes in x and A, assuming in each case identical 
utility functions for both individuals and equal transfer weights. The monthly return on assets for 
person j is held constant at 50 (which reflects an annual rate of return of 25% on an asset stock of 
200) and the return for i varies along the horizontal axis. We assume x is equal to 100 for both 
individuals.  
In Figure 3.3, it can be seen that the transfer responses to investment in liquid or illiquid 
assets are increasing in wealth when the illiquid asset is a complement to consumption (the solid 
lines), and decreasing in wealth when the illiquid asset is a substitute to consumption (the dotted 
lines). For the relatively poor (in the example, those with A < 200), the net transfer burden 
decreases (i.e., net transfers received increase) as A increases. In this case, raising the assets of 
the relatively poor actually crowds in private transfers. For relatively wealthier individuals, 
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however, an increase in A causes the net transfer burden to increase, as per the usual crowding 
out hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3.3:  Response of transfers to investment 
 
 
This example demonstrates how different the social rates of taxation (the additional 
amount of x shared out of a unit increase in A) are for the two types of illiquid asset, and how 
these change with wealth. The difference between rich and poor is driven by the curvature 
(specifically, the third derivative) of the utility function. For complementary investment goods, 
which increase the marginal utility of consumption for the investor, wealthier individuals are 
taxed for their investments, and the rate of taxation rises as their relative wealth rises. For 
substitute investment goods, which decrease the marginal utility of consumption, poorer 
households are more heavily taxed. This latter result is made stronger by our assumption that x 
and A are perfect substitutes, but even for weaker substitutes an increase in A displaces x so that 
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marginal utility falls; thus the net transfer burden on the investor rises to offset their decreased 
marginal utility. 
The main results from this model are that: (i) investment incentives may be heavily 
distorted by transfer obligations; (ii) these distortions vary depending on the type of investment 
good; and (iii) the distortions depend nontrivially on relative initial wealth. Specifically, if 
individuals are prudent, so that the third derivative of V is positive, then the response of transfers 
will be higher for wealthier individuals with respect to complements, and lower with respect to 
substitutes. 
The above results are weakened if i’s coinsurance participation constraint is binding when 
she makes the investment. In that situation, the change in transfers is bounded by the change in 
the participation constraint stemming from the gain in income. Let !!"
!  be the transfer amount at 
which the constraint is binding. Then by rearranging the first constraint in (3.9) and using EV as 
shorthand notation for the expected utility summations, !!"
!  is defined implicitly as: 
!"!!! ! !!"
! !!!!! !! ! !"!!! !!!! (3.12) 
Taking the derivative of (3.12) with respect to Ai, we have 
!!!"
!
!!!
! !"! !! ! !!"
! !!!
!!
!"! !! ! !!"
! !!! ! !"! !! !!!
!!!
!!!
! !!! !! ! !!"
! !!! ! !"! !! !!! !
!!!
!!!
 , 
and with respect to xi, 
!!!"
!
!!!
! !"! !! ! !!"
! !!!
!!
!"! !! ! !!"
! !!! ! !"! !! !!! !
!!!
!!!
. 
In the case of the investment decision, expected utility must increase as a result of the 
investment for it to be attractive. Since marginal utilities are higher under the coinsurance 
arrangement in states where (3.12) binds, the change in !!"
!  is positive in both equations. 
However, its magnitude may differ across individuals, and the constrained response of transfers 
to investment is likely to be smaller than the unconstrained response. The outcome also depends 
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on factors such as wealth (since the difference in marginal utilities becomes smaller as wealth 
increases), and on whether B increases in response to the shock.40  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the ‘taxation’ effect in a simulation of the buffer stock model with a 
single liquid asset for n = 2 and n = 10 coinsurance network partners, with xi along the horizontal 
axis. The autarky consumption function is included for reference. In this example, there are no 
constraints on participation; all income is pooled and divided, so the rate of taxation is one half 
in the two agent (n = 2) model. We assume that the incomes of the coinsurance partners are 
uncorrelated. The effect of coinsurance is to increase consumption for low realizations of xi, 
since xj is expected to be 100 in this zero correlation case. Note that with one counterpart, an 
individual can on average halve any income shortfall when x is less than µ, but with 10 people  
Figure 3.4:  Consumption functions for transfer rule 
(single-asset model) 
 
                                                
40 Increases in B that are conditional on such events – such as a community sanction for refusing to share a large and 
visible windfall, or for consuming goods (such as clothing) above one’s ‘station’ (Platteau, 2009:680, n.24) – can be 
seen in this framework as an effort on the community’s part to alleviate this constraint. 
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the shortfall is reduced to 10 percent. The cost of this insurance is borne in periods when x is 
above µ. Figure 3.4 shows that expected consumption is a lot lower for high values of x, and 
increasingly so as the number of transfer partners increases. This is because the conditional 
expectation for these other individuals’ incomes is much closer to µ, so that average cash on 
hand for the coinsurance group as a whole is lower than the cash on hand of individual i. 
However, savings in the single asset are much lower under coinsurance (dotted lines in 
Figure 3.5). The investment disincentive effect is increasing in the number of coinsurance 
partners, n, but decreasing in the correlation of incomes of those partners, #. As the number of 
partners increases, or the correlation of incomes within the coinsurance network decreases, 
individuals have less incentive to save. This is partly because they are more able to get help from 
their transfer partners in bad times, but also because they must share the gains of their 
investments with these people. As x becomes large, the ratio of savings to its autarky level 
converges to 0.25 when # = 0.5 and only 0.1 when # = 0. Thus coinsurance works like a  
Figure 3.5:  Savings rates under transfer rule (single-asset model) 
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progressive intertemporal tax: individuals who save their disposable income, rather than 
consuming it, pay a tax on the savings (in expectation) in the next period since part of those 
savings will need to be shared with their friends. This has consequences for the ability of such 
individuals to invest in income-generating opportunities while remaining embedded in the 
village social network. It may help explain Platteau’s (2009) reference to migration or 
disconnection from extended family as often the only strategies available to upwardly mobile 
individuals in such environments. 
 
3.2.3 Hypotheses 
We have shown above how in a two-asset framework, individuals who are richer in terms 
of illiquid assets, A, may face a greater marginal transfer burden in response to a positive shock 
to liquid assets, x. We want to know whether the individual will invest part of this shock in A, 
and how this decision might depend on characteristics of the coinsurance group. We have 
established that the individual’s incentive to invest depends on how A and x are related – 
specifically, whether increasing A increases the individual’s marginal utility of consumption (in 
which case A is a complement), decreases it (in which case A is a substitute) or leaves it 
unchanged. If we define the investment response to a shock to liquid wealth as follows: 
!!!
!!!
! !!!! ! !! ! !! !!!! 
where !! is the mean liquid assets of i’s coinsurance network and ni is the number of members in 
the network, then we are interested in the signs of the first derivatives of g. 
This naturally leads to several empirically testable hypotheses. First, investing is only a 
dominant strategy if agents can raise their utility by doing so. From (3.8), this will be the case if 
x lies above some threshold, thus we expect to find !! ! ! above this threshold and !! ! !  
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below it. 
Second, if investing in A does not change x or otherwise increase the marginal utility of 
consumption, relative wealth and social network size do not affect the optimal investment 
decision. In this case, !! ! !! ! !.  
Third, if A is a complement, relatively richer individuals face a disincentive to invest and 
we expect to find that !! ! !. On the other hand, if A is a substitute, relatively poorer individuals 
face a disincentive to invest, so !! ! !. Both results are strengthened as the size of the 
coinsurance network increases, so that !!" ! ! (! !) for relatively richer (poorer) individuals. 
Finally, we consider the possibility that individuals are driven to store their assets in forms 
that cannot be expropriated by others in the coinsurance network. Since illiquid assets, A, can 
only be liquidated at a cost in our model, these assets are exempt from the redistribution rule in 
(3.10) and are less likely to be claimed by others. Having a greater number of coinsurance 
partners increases the incentive to hide assets in this way, so we expect that !! ! !. 
The model also generates predictions about the response of consumption to shocks to x and 
A. If individuals are credit constrained, we expect to find a discontinuity in the marginal 
propensity to consume where ! ! !. The marginal propensity to consume is also decreasing in x 
and in the size of the coinsurance network, n. The above model generates ambiguous predictions 
for the relationship between the marginal propensity to consume and A, the sign of which 
depends on whether A is a complement, substitute or neither. 
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3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Sample 
The field experiments were conducted between March and October 2009 in conjunction 
with a year-long household survey in four communities in Akwapim South district of Ghana’s 
Eastern Region. This district lies some 40 miles north of the nation’s capital, Accra, but is 
sufficiently far away that only a handful of respondents commute to Accra for work. The survey 
was part of a three-wave panel, the first two waves having been conducted in 1997-98 (Udry and 
Goldstein, 1999) and 2004 (Vanderpuye-Orgle, 2008). The original 1997-98 study was 
concerned with the welfare of farmers in Ghana’s export pineapple industry, and the four 
communities were randomly selected from Akwapim South because of the scale of the district’s 
contribution to Ghana’s pineapple production. 
The sample consists of approximately 70 households from each of the four communities. 
Slightly more than half of these 70 households were part of the initial 1997-98 sample, and the 
rest were recruited in January 2009 using stratified random sampling.41 In the original sample, 
and in the 2009 re-sampling, we selected only from the pool of households headed by a resident 
married couple.42 However, we retained households from the 1997-98 sample even if only one of 
the spouses remained. These ‘single-headed households’ account for between 7 and 12 of the 
households in each community (see Appendix Table 2). Thus the sample of individuals included 
in the experiment was around 150 individuals in each of the four communities (Table 3.1). 
 
 
                                                
41 New sample members were selected randomly from the subset of households in the community headed by a 
married couple. The sample was stratified by age of the head into three categories: 18-29, 30-64 and 65+, so that the 
shares of households whose head was in each of these age categories corresponded to the community’s population 
shares. See the Appendix for further details. 
42 Some men in the sample have two or three wives, all of whom were included. 
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Table 3.1:  Sample size by community and respondent type 
 Community  
  Darmang Pokrom Oboadaka Konkonuru Total 
Husbands 70 68 69 69 276 
Wives 77 69 73 70 289 
Single males 4 3 1 3 11 
Single females 7 7 6 9 29 
Total 158 147 149 151 605 
 
3.3.2 Household and social networks survey 
Each respondent was interviewed five times during 2009, once every two months between 
February and November.43 Each survey round took approximately 3 weeks to complete, with the 
two survey teams each alternating between two villages. The survey covered a wide range of 
subjects including personal income, farming and non-farm business activities, gifts, transfers and 
loans, and household consumption expenditures. Each round, both the husband and wife heading 
each household were interviewed separately on all of these topics. The expenditure module 
obtained detailed information on the quantities and values purchased of a long list of items. 
Referring to the week prior to the interview, we asked each spouse about his or her own 
expenditures, those of their partner, and about expenditures of the household as a whole. In the 
gifts and transfers module, we asked respondents to report any gifts (in cash or in kind) given 
and received during the past two months, obtaining information on the counterparty’s location 
and relationship to the respondent, and the nature and value of the gift. 
In addition, we conducted a detailed survey of respondents’ in-sample social networks. The 
social network survey was conducted in the first round. Each respondent was asked in turn about 
every other respondent in the sample from his or her community. We asked whether they knew 
                                                
43 See the Appendix for an interview schedule, instruments and further details on the survey. 
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the person, by name or personally, how often they saw them, whether they were related, what 
they perceived the strength of the friendship to be, whether they had given or received anything 
of value from the person, and whether they would trust the person to look after a valuable item 
for them. 
 
3.4 Experimental design 
The first round of the survey was designed as a baseline, therefore no lottery took place in 
that round. One week before each subsequent round we visited each village to distribute prizes to 
selected respondents. There were twenty prizes allocated in each community, in each of the four 
lottery rounds, so that in all 320 prizes were given. Over the four lotteries, approximately 42 
percent of individuals and 62 percent of households won at least one prize. Ten of the prizes 
were allocated publicly by lottery, and the other ten (identical in type) were allocated in private, 
by lucky dip. The values of the prizes varied, as described in Table 3.2. By varying the value of 
the prizes, we can test whether behavior differs depending on the size of the exogenous asset 
shock, as might be the case if for instance there were threshold effects for transfers to family 
members. The prizes were of a substantial size. During 2009, mean monthly per capita 
expenditure was around GH¢65.44 
The livestock prizes were purchased by the survey team in Accra on the morning of the 
lottery, and transported to the community. The chickens were of a type intended for eating, and 
were chosen because their price was essentially fixed at GH¢10 throughout the year. The goats 
were bought individually at the large Tema market by direct negotiation with the traders. On our 
first visit we established roughly the size and quality of goats available for the three price 
                                                
44 One Ghana cedi (GH¢) was worth about 70 US cents in mid 2009. 
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Table 3.2:  List of prizes distributed in each lottery and lucky dip 
 
Cash Livestock 
GH¢10 One broiler chicken, worth GH¢10 
GH¢20 Two broiler chickens, worth GH¢10 each 
GH¢35 Small goat, worth GH¢35 
GH¢50 Medium goat, worth GH¢50 
GH¢70 Large goat, worth GH¢70 
Notes: On average during 2009, one Ghana cedi (GH¢) was worth 
approximately 70 US cents. Mean per capita consumption averaged around 
GH¢65 per month in the study communities. 
 
points (GH¢35, GH¢50 and GH¢70), and on every subsequent visit endeavored to obtain goats 
of similar size and quality, subject to market price and supply fluctuations.45 We selected female 
goats where possible because of their utility for breeding. 
The lotteries and lucky dips took place one week before the commencement of the survey 
interviews. We took great care to make clear to participants that the allocation of prizes was 
random, and that each individual had an equal chance of winning in each round. A village 
meeting was held in the community, and all respondents were invited to attend. A small amount 
of free food and drink was provided as an incentive to come. Attendance at the meetings was 
generally around 100 people; roughly half of the respondents appeared for each meeting.46 There 
were usually a number of non-respondents at these meetings as well, including many children. At 
each gathering we thanked the participants for their continued support. We explained that 
respondents had a chance to win one of 20 prizes that day, framing the prizes as a gratuity for 
                                                
45 There was little price movement in the goat market throughout the year, though the price of chickens slowly 
appreciated, rising perhaps 20 percent over 2009. We absorbed the additional cost of chickens to maintain quality. 
The quality of goats varied slightly between rounds in line with supply and climatic conditions, but we made a 
concerted effort to keep the quality (size and type) comparable across rounds. 
46 Around 125 of the 150 respondents in each community appeared for the private lucky dip, some of them arriving 
before or after the public meeting. 
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their participation in the survey.47,48 We then proceeded to draw winners for the ten public prizes 
(without replacement) from a bucket containing the names of the survey respondents. A village 
member not in the sample was chosen by the villagers to do the draw, in order to emphasize that 
the outcomes were random. Each winner was announced to the group, and asked to come 
forward to receive their prize. The prizes were announced and displayed clearly before being 
awarded. Respondents who were absent at the time of drawing were called to pick up their prize 
in person, if possible. We also allowed spouses or close family members to receive the public 
livestock prizes (but not cash prizes) on the winner’s behalf. Unclaimed prizes were delivered in 
person to the winner after the lottery.49 
After the lottery prizes were distributed, we conducted the lucky dip. Respondents were 
asked to identify themselves to a survey worker, who took their thumbprint or signature and 
issued them with a ticket displaying their name and identification number. They then waited to 
enter a closed school room, one at a time, where an enumerator invited them to draw a bottle cap 
without replacement from a bag. Care was taken to shuffle the bottle caps after each draw, and to 
prevent respondents from seeing into the bag. If a respondent drew more than one bottle cap, 
those caps were shuffled and the respondent was asked to blindly select one of them. There was 
one bottle cap for each of the n respondents in the community. Of these, n – 10 were non-
winning tokens (red colored), and ten were winning tokens, marked distinctively to indicate one 
of the ten prizes listed in Table 2.50 Those who drew winning tokens were informed immediately 
that they had won a prize, which was identified to them, and were told that they did not have to 
                                                
47 Respondents signed an informed consent form at the start of the survey, explaining how they would be 
remunerated for their participation in the survey. Entry in the lottery and lucky dip was part of this remuneration. 
48 In addition to the chance of winning a prize, each respondent was given a small amount of cash for their 
participation, which varied across rounds. This gift was used as an endowment in the public goods experiment, 
described in detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
49 We have data on these cases, including the dates on which the prizes were claimed and the identity of the recipient 
(if not the winner). 
50 Respondents were shown a sheet relating the tokens to the prizes; a copy is included in the Appendix. 
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tell anyone else that they had won. We emphasized that the survey team would not divulge the 
identities of the lucky dip prize winners. Cash prizes were given to the winners immediately. 
Livestock prizes were delivered one or two days later to the winner in person, or to another 
household member if they were absent.51,52 At the conclusion of the day, tokens that had not been 
drawn were counted and the remaining prizes allocated randomly among the non-attending 
respondents using a computer. There were usually 25-30 non-attendees and less than three prizes 
remaining. 
All of the winners collected or received their prizes within one month of the lottery, and in 
all but one case at least a week before the household survey interview. The interviews 
commenced one week after the lottery, deliberately delayed to allow winners to receive their 
prize and do something with it. The interviews took place in no specified order throughout the 
following three weeks, so that some winners were interviewed a week after receiving their prize, 
and others up to four weeks afterwards. 
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics on key variables for treated and untreated 
individuals, verifying that the treatment was random. The only statistically significant difference 
ex ante between the treatment groups is for gifts received; this seems to be driven by an outlier, 
since the standard error also increases dramatically. 
 
 
 
                                                
51 If anyone received the prize on behalf of the winner, we made it clear who the animal was intended for. In our 
follow-up survey, we interviewed each winner about their prize, and established that all of them ultimately received 
their prizes. 
52 Clearly, there was no way of keeping the livestock prizes completely secret. It should be assumed that members of 
the winner’s household were all aware of those prizes. However, we tried to keep the delivery of the lucky dip 
livestock prizes as low-profile as possible. Thus there is a distinct difference in publicity between the lottery and 
lucky dip prizes, at least with respect to non-household members. 
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3.5 An overview of the results of the experiment 
At the end of each survey round, one month after the lottery, we administered an 
additional, short follow-up survey just to prize winners. The follow-up survey asked for 
confirmation about the type of prize the respondent won, and the date on which it was received. 
If the prize was not received by the respondent on the day of the lottery, we noted who had 
collected it and when the respondent had received it from them. We then asked for a detailed 
description of what the respondent had done with the prize. The results of the follow-up survey 
should be interpreted conservatively, because in addition to the potential for reports to be 
inaccurate or deliberately misleading, the impact of winning a prize may influence other aspects 
of the household’s behavior or expenditure (such as effort and time allocation). Individuals may 
also report only direct results of their prize-winning, such as increased gifts to others, but ignore 
indirect outcomes, such as reduced transfers received from others. 
 
3.5.1 Cash prizes 
For each winner of a cash prize, we obtained a detailed breakdown of what was done with 
the prize money. Respondents were asked to list items, including assets, purchased with the 
winnings, and any amounts invested, saved, given away or lent to others. The results are 
summarized in Table 3.4a. One month after the lottery, cash prize winners had spent on average 
between 65 and 80 percent of their prize, with the percentage declining as the value of the prize 
increased. For the smaller prizes, the majority of this expenditure was on consumption goods, 
whereas for larger prizes more was spent on investment goods or business expenses. The most 
common purchase was farm inputs such as chemicals or seeds, followed by stock for sale (e.g., at 
a stall) and then farm services (such as weeding or water fetching). A very small share of the  
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prize was reported as having been saved, especially for the smaller prizes, which might suggest 
that households face credit constraints and have clear and immediate needs for the money.
53
 
Furthermore, the average amount given away to others did not exceed 15 percent of the prize 
value, across all categories. This suggests that the redistribution of cash transfers may not be 
substantial, and that claims from others are not a significant factor in determining how cash 
transfers might be spent. Below we discuss how often such claims were made, and how often 
they were honored. 
 
3.5.2 Livestock prizes 
Respondents who won livestock prizes were asked whether they had kept, eaten, sold, 
given away or lost their animal. We obtained details on the dates of these actions and the value 
of the parts of the animal to which the action applied. For animals (or animal parts) which were 
sold or given away we asked for the identity of the person(s) who received them, and how much 
money was received for the animal if it was sold. If the respondent still had the animal, we asked 
what they intended to do with it. A summary of the results for livestock prizes is presented in 
Table 3.4b. The treatment of animal prizes depended strongly on the type of animal won. 
Although we tried to standardize the gifts, there is a clear distinction between the results for 
chickens (GH¢10 and GH¢20) and for goats (GH¢35, GH¢50 and GH¢70). Respondents treated 
the chickens essentially as a food prize; such animals are not kept for breeding, but rather eaten 
on special occasions. In contrast, the goats can be bred quite profitably and were more often kept 
than eaten. Table 3.5 reports the intended uses of the kept animals, confirming how differently 
chickens and goats were treated. 
                                                
53
 It might also imply that individuals lack self-control with respect to saving, as has been documented widely in the 
behavioral economics literature (since at least Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). Another explanation is that by spending 
their prize quickly, they could shield the money from the claims of others. 
 109 
Table 3.5:  Intended uses of animals kept (at time of follow-up survey) 
 
 
Prize value 
(GH¢) 
 Plan for use 
Prize 
Type Eat Breed Sell 
Give 
away 
10 Chicken 3 0 0 0 
20 Chicken 7 0 1 1 
35 Goat 1 15 1 0 
50 Goat 1 16 0 0 
70 Goat 0 13 3 0 
 
Of those winners who kept their chickens, most were saving them to eat later. The vast 
majority who won one chicken ate it within the month, while winners of two chickens were more 
likely to keep or sell at least one of them. People who won goats, meanwhile, were substantially 
more likely to keep them. Respondents who kept their goat overwhelmingly intended to use it for 
breeding. Around 20 percent of livestock recipients sold their animal(s). Particularly for the 
goats, it is apparent that they did not obtain the full market price for their animal. This may have 
been due to a lack of market depth or an appearance of distressed selling. Some individuals sold 
to family members, thus the markdown may have been essentially a gift. Interestingly, the 
money the sellers received for their animals was spent in roughly the same pattern as the money 
of cash prize winners. This contradicts the mental accounting hypothesis, which states that 
money is treated differently depending on how it was obtained. For those who ate their animal, 
we recorded whether non-household members shared the meal. On average, this and the 
proportion of animals given away were very small. 
 
3.5.3 Requests 
As discussed in the introduction, social norms in many societies oblige individuals to share 
windfalls with others. Given that the prizes we allocated were clearly won by luck alone, one 
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might expect from the above discussion that requests from others would be especially prevalent. 
We asked respondents in the follow-up survey whether anyone had requested something from 
them as a result of them having won. This was not limited to sharing the prize – any request 
coming from others “because you won a prize” was to be noted. Respondents were asked to 
identify any requesters, the item (or amount of money) requested, and whether the request was 
granted. First, the rate of requests was very low. Less than 10 percent of cash prize winners 
overall received requests, and this proportion did not increase with the size of the prize. Even 
more surprisingly, only 45 percent of these requests were honored. The lack of requests was not 
due to non-winners expecting to win later, since the rate of requests was actually highest in the 
first round of the lottery, and fell in later rounds. Nor was this due to saturation, since 58 percent 
of individuals and 39 percent of households never won a prize in any of the four lotteries. 
Tables 3.4a and 3.4b illustrate how uncommon sharing of the prizes was (at least, in direct 
terms). Less than 15 percent of cash prizes and less than 10 percent of animal prizes was shared. 
Neither was the sharing done implicitly through loans; lending of prize money was almost non-
existent. This is a perplexing result in light of the emphasis placed on sharing norms in sub-
Saharan Africa (of which Ghana is no exception). Below we consider the econometric evidence 
on this point, in case there is underreporting or some evasion in responses to the direct 
questioning of the follow-up survey. However, our econometric evidence is no more indicative 
of broad sharing behavior. The result is actually consistent with recent evidence from Fafchamps 
et al. (2010), who find low rates of sharing of cash grants among small-business owners in urban 
areas of Ghana.
54
 It is also consistent with econometric evidence from observational data on 
Ethiopian pastoralists (Lybbert et al., 2004) and Kenyan pastoralists (McPeak, 2006). 
                                                
54
 Although they describe recipients as spending their grants on consumption or transfers, their results suggest the 
degree of sharing is similarly small; men do not transfer significantly in response to receiving a grant, while women 
gave away on average only GH¢8 of their GH¢150 grant. (See Table 4, p. 30 of Fafchamps et al., 2010). 
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3.6 Econometric analysis 
3.6.1 Variables 
We now turn to econometric analysis of the household survey data collected in the month 
following the lottery. The lottery prizes were unanticipated shocks to cash-on-hand (or St in the 
notation of Section 3.2) in the case of cash prizes, and to the stock of illiquid assets (or At in 
Section 3.2’s notation) in the case of animal prizes. Given their randomness, we are able to 
directly estimate the effect of these shocks on recipients’ consumption, investment and transfers 
and test the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2.3. 
We first describe the construction of the independent variables to be used in the estimation. 
An integral part of the econometric model is estimating the effect on behavior of an individual’s 
involvement in the village social network. The social networks module provides a wealth of data 
on respondents’ friendships with every other survey respondent in their village.
55
 These data 
come from the first round of the household survey, before the lotteries began, and therefore refer 
to the individual’s history of interactions before our arrival in the villages and, most importantly, 
before the lotteries experiment began. 
We define the size of an individual’s coinsurance network (or ni, from Section 3.2) by the 
number of sample individuals to whom the respondent reported having ever given a gift prior to 
the social networks survey.
56
 By doing so, we count only close friends who are more likely to be 
                                                
55
 While the survey did not cover the entire village network, the survey sample was randomly selected and therefore 
the data are a random sample of nodes in that network. Describing the sampled network is thus tantamount to 
randomly partitioning the village into two smaller sub-villages and describing the relationships at the sub-village 
level. Summary statistics on the sampled network are asymptotically equivalent to those of!the village network as a 
whole. Nevertheless, we collected data on transfers between respondents and all other individuals, both village 
members and those outside the village. 
56
 The number of friends from whom the individual reported receiving a gift was almost identical to the number 
given a gift; the correlation is not statistically significantly different from one (p = 0.44). 
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coinsurance partners.
57
 Thus defined, the size of coinsurance networks varies widely; some 
individuals exchanged gifts with almost everyone in the village sample, and others reported no 
gift exchanges (Table 3.3). In order to distinguish those individuals with larger coinsurance 
networks, we split the sample into two equal-sized groups based on this variable, defining a 
dummy variable ! ! ! for those individuals with a value above the median for their village, and 
! ! ! otherwise.
58
 We choose to discretize this measure, rather than using levels, since the 
distributions of social network sizes vary substantially across communities and are highly non-
normal. At the household level, we define an analogous dummy variable that takes the value one 
if any spouse is coinsured. Having fewer friends with whom one has exchanged gifts is an 
indicator of a smaller coinsurance network, and therefore less sharing obligations ceteris 
paribus.
59
 
An essential component of the model presented in Section 3.2 is the value of liquid assets, 
x. This is the sum of self-reported Ghana cedi values of local and foreign currency, bank account 
balances, stores of food and farm output, and net receivables. It would be desirable to have a 
measure of liquid assets from just prior to the lottery, but our report comes from the survey data 
collected in the month following the lottery. Therefore, we use liquid assets from the previous 
round (about 3-6 weeks prior to the lottery), which we have for all lottery rounds because the 
lotteries started only in round 2. 
We define illiquid assets as the self-reported sum of equipment, durable goods, livestock, 
                                                
57
 For example, Table 3.3 shows that respondents, on average, knew 95 of the roughly 150 other respondents in each 
village, but reported having given gifts to only 31 of these, on average. 
58
 The medians were 25 in Darmang, 19 in Pokrom, 20 in Oboadaka and 39 in Konkonuru. 
59
 We also tried alternative definitions of coinsurance, such as the number of friends reporting having given the 
respondent a gift, the number of friends from whom the individual reported receiving a gift, and the number of 
friends reported as trusted. The results do not differ substantially under these alternative definitions. We favor the 
above definition as most closely capturing the extent of the individual’s gift obligations to other sample members. 
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jewelry, cloth and stocks for sale.
60
 We exclude land from our measure, because land values 
could not be computed for specific plots due to the shallow market for land in the survey area. 
The data on gifts and receipts come from a specialized module which asked respondents to 
report all gifts and receipts in the preceding month. Enumerators probed for all gifts, no matter 
how small, including in-kind transfers like meals. The vast majority of reported gifts are for very 
small amounts (less than GH¢10), suggesting the enumerators were successful in this respect. 
We generate a separate measure of gifts and receipts exchanged between village members, based 
on the reported location of the counterparty. This does not guarantee the counterparty was in our 
sample, however. 
Consumption is reported by individual, broken down into self expenses and reported 
expenses of other household members. It is defined as the total value of household non-business 
purchases during the previous month, plus the value of consumption from family farms, 
livestock and stores, and other expenses (such as school fees, health care and ceremonial 
contributions), but excluding rent. Our measure includes durable asset purchases, though we also 
present results for consumption excluding asset purchases. Since the consumption questionnaire 
was given to both husbands and wives, we take the maximum of the sum of the self-reports of 
individual expenses and the maximum reported total for the household. In practice these differed 
by only a small amount, but this approach was necessary because some husbands did not 
participate in purchases, or refused to answer the section, based on a cultural attitude in Ghana 
that purchasing food is ‘women’s business’. 
In the analysis below, we exclude 31 individuals (9 households) from the analysis because 
they were either outliers in terms of assets, or lacked social network survey data. 
                                                
60
 We explored using factor analysis to generate an asset index, as in Sahn and Stifel (2003), however there was 
insufficient correlation between these items, and other indicators such as land area and building characteristics, to 
generate a single explanatory factor. 
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3.6.2 Consumption 
We estimate the effect of prize-winning on consumption using a household fixed effects 
estimator. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the marginal propensity to consume out of liquid assets 
depends on the presence of credit constraints and the size of the coinsurance network. The 
marginal propensity to consume out of illiquid asset windfalls depends on whether the latter are 
complements or substitutes to consumption, or neither. We are also interested in testing whether 
the publicity of the prize affects the consumption response. Specifically, we test the hypothesis 
that public winnings are consumed faster (less likely to be saved) than private winnings, if being 
known to have liquid assets increases the chance of being asked for assistance by others. 
We first regress log per capita household consumption on prizes – separated into 
public/private and cash/livestock groups – and household (!!) and round (!!) fixed effects: 
!"!"#!" ! ! ! !!!"#!!"
!"#
! !!!"#!!"
!"#
!!!!"#$!"
!"#
! !!!"#$!"
!"#
! !! ! !! ! !!". (3.13) 
where pcxit is per capita consumption of household i in round t, cashit is the value of cash prizes 
won by the household i in round t, liveit is the value of livestock prizes won by the household i in 
round t, with the superscripts pub and pri distinguishing between public and privately won 
prizes. The !!!!!!! iid error term, !!", is orthogonal to these independent variables by the 
experimental design. 
Estimates of Equation 3.13 are reported for both total and food expenditure in the first two 
columns of Table 3.6. In columns 3 and 4, we present results including one-period lags of the 
prizes (restricting the sample to rounds 3 to 5). With median per capita consumption around 
GH¢114 during the year, the coefficient estimates imply that about 40 percent of prize money,  
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Table 3.6:  Response of consumption to prize winning 
Sample 
            Coinsured 
Not 
coinsured 
Dep. variable Total Food Total Food Total Food Total Total 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Contemporaneous prizes (GH¢) 
Cash - public 0.0029** 0.0020* 0.0032*** 0.0023** 0.0034*** 0.0025** 0.0053*** 0.0008 
  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0023) 
Cash - private 0.0028** 0.0022** 0.0031** 0.0026** 0.0031** 0.0026** 0.0038*** 0.0008 
  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0027) 
Livestock - 
public 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0014 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0020) 
Livestock - 
private -0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0024 -0.0030 
  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0020) 
Lagged prizes (GH¢) 
Cash - public     0.0018 0.0014 0.0020 0.0015 0.0037** -0.0015 
      (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0025) 
Cash - private     0.0024* 0.0029** 0.0025* 0.0028** 0.0027* 0.0013 
      (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0029) 
Livestock -      -0.0032** -0.0028** -0.0031** -0.0027** -0.0039** -0.0024 
public      (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0024) 
Livestock - 
private     0.0016 0.0011 0.0017 0.0010 0.0016 0.0023 
      (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0028) 
Contemporaneous prizes won by friends^ 
Cash - public         0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0006** 0.0000 
          (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Cash - private         0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 
          (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Livestock -          -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
public          (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008) 
Livestock -          -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005 
private         (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Lagged prizes won by friends^ 
Cash - public         0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 
          (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Cash - private         0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 
          (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Livestock -          0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0007 
public         (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Livestock -          -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0008 
private         (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Number of obs. 1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,007  474  
Households 302 302 302 302 302 302 202 100 
Adjusted R
2
 0.113 0.080 0.121 0.089 0.126 0.946 0.176 0.078 
Dependent variable: Household log per capita expenditure during past month. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1  
^ Sum of all prizes (in GH¢) won by other villagers whom members of the household reported having ever given a gift. 
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on average, was spent on household consumption within a month.
61
 Taking into account that 
food consumption is just over half of total consumption (Table 3.3), just less than one fifth of the 
prize money on average was spent was on nonfood items, an aggregate luxury good in these 
villages. Private cash prizes appear to have had an additional effect on consumption in the 
subsequent two-month period, suggesting some of the prize may have been saved initially. 
The results are very different for livestock prizes, which do not increase consumption at 
all, and actually reduce it in the case of lagged public livestock prizes. At the very least, we 
should see some effect from the large number of chickens reported eaten in the few weeks after 
they were won.
62
 One possible explanation for this result is that some individuals failed to report 
the chickens in the consumption module, although we explicitly asked about livestock consumed 
from own stocks and counted this in the consumption measure. It is also possible that eating the 
chickens ‘crowded out’ usual household expenditure, and that this offset the value of the 
livestock consumed. 
One striking result here is how similar were the consumption responses to public and 
private prizes. Goldberg (2010) argues that if coinsurance obligations are involuntary, driven by 
demands from others, one might expect to see individuals consume publicly-won prizes faster 
than privately-won prizes, in order to avoid obligations to share their windfall. In contrast to 
Goldberg’s findings, we are unable to find any difference in consumption behavior resulting 
from the publicity of prize winning. None of the pairs of public/private coefficients in Table 3.6 
are statistically different at conventional significance levels. This indicates that people’s 
consumption decisions were not influenced by fears of being asked to share publicly won prizes. 
                                                
61 
Since the coefficient estimates are very small, the treatment effect can be roughly approximated by the result that 
!"!!! ! !! ! !. Multiplying the coefficient estimate by mean per capita consumption gives the approximate increase 
in spending per Ghana cedi won. 
62
 Coefficient estimates for chickens and goats specified separately were statistically insignificant and are not 
reported. 
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One explanation for this is that sharing is voluntary, rather than coerced, with transfers made in 
response to some internal motivation (such as status building motives, altruism, or fear of 
retribution for being discovered to have concealed winnings). Individuals would then make the 
same transfer whether the prize was public or private, and spend the balance identically. It is also 
possible that sharing obligations did not apply to these windfalls (though this conflicts with the 
notion that such obligations exist to smooth income shocks and redistribute wealth). Indeed, in 
the following section we observe that transfers were negligible in response to all types of prizes. 
Thus sharing obligations do not appear to have been much of a concern at all in determining how 
prizes were spent. 
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.6, we report specifications including total current and lagged 
prizes won by members of the household’s coinsurance network.
63
 The estimated effect of 
friends’ prizes (defined as the sum of all prizes won by close friends of the household members) 
is quite small, and only statistically significant for cash prizes. In part, this can be attributed to 
the fact that the median network has 24 members, and those in the top decile have over 70. Any 
sharing that took place was divided, on average, across many of those members. 
However, it is instructive to examine the results of the model for coinsured and non-
coinsured households separately. As mentioned above, this measure breaks the sample into two 
equal-sized groups based on the number of close friends of each respondent. These results, in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 3.6, show quite strikingly how those with smaller social networks 
differ in their behavior.
64
 Among the non-coinsured group, prize-winning by the household or 
                                                
63
 As described in Section 3.6.1, each individual’s coinsurance network is defined as the set of other respondents in 
the village whom the individual reported having given gifts at any time prior to round 1. The household measure is 
the mean of the individual measures for members of that household. 
64
 Since we define a coinsured household as one in which any member is coinsured, two-thirds of households fit the 
definition. The model results are not substantially different if we use the household head’s coinsurance status 
instead. 
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friends has no significant effect on consumption. Thus, it appears that households with smaller 
networks do not receive more focused assistance from their friends, but rather self-insure in 
order to smooth their consumption in line with the predictions of the permanent income 
hypothesis. This echoes the findings of Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett (2009), who studied data 
from the same sample in 2004, that certain individuals in these villages are essentially excluded 
from the village coinsurance network. For coinsured households, the patterns are the same as for 
the aggregate, except with larger estimated consumption effects. The coinsured do not treat 
transitory income or asset shocks as the permanent income hypothesis would predict. Rather, 
their behavior is more in line with the predictions of the model we developed earlier. 
 
3.6.3 Consumption smoothing 
It appears that only part of the prize money was spent in the month following the lottery, 
and that the indirect effect of friends’ prizes on consumption is at most very small. To what 
extent does coinsurance (and, among the non-coinsured, buffer stock saving) smooth 
consumption? Separating income into permanent and transitory components following Paxson 
(1992) is not really feasible with only four villages. However, we can get some sense of how 
individuals smooth their consumption by using the panel nature of our data to extract the village–
round common component from household log per capita income, and then separate the residual 
into a ‘permanent’ household income measure (reflecting other invariant household 
characteristics) and a ‘transitory’ component capturing shocks and measurement error. We can 
then regress log per capita consumption on these three components to measure its responsiveness 
to the different sources of variation in income. We do this in two stages. First, we regress log per 
capita income for household i on a village-round fixed effect vector (where k is the village of 
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household i, and t is the round): 
!"!!" ! !!" ! !!". (3.14) 
The fitted values of Equation 3.14 are the village common components of consumption as they 
evolved over 2009. We then take the residuals from this regression and regress them on 
household fixed effects: 
!!" ! !! ! !!" 
The fitted values !! from this regression are the household permanent income components, while 
the predicted residuals !!" are the transitory income components (along with measurement error). 
We then regress log household per capita consumption on a constant and the three components 
of income, adding interactions of each with the indicator variable, !!, of whether the household is 
locally coinsured: 
 !"!"#!" ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!!" ! !!!!!!" ! !!!! ! !!!!!! 
!!!!!" ! !!!!!!" ! !!". (3.15) 
The coefficient estimates from (3.15) capture the responsiveness of consumption to 
common, permanent and transitory income shocks. This procedure is a rough-and-ready check of 
households’ consumption smoothing abilities, since consumption smoothing of transitory shocks 
will be overstated by any measurement error in income. However, we expect that this 
measurement error should be identically distributed for coinsured and non-coinsured households, 
and constant over time and across villages, so the relative comparison of consumption smoothing 
behavior remains valid. 
Perfect coinsurance at the village level would imply that !! ! !! ! !. We expect 
coinsured households to be more capable of smoothing transitory income shocks than non-
coinsured households, thus we test the null hypothesis that !! ! ! against the alternative 
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hypothesis that !! ! !. Coinsured households, which derive greater insurance from other 
households in the village, are likely to be equally (or more) exposed to village-level common 
shocks. Accordingly, we anticipate being unable to reject the null hypothesis that !! ! ! in favor 
of the alternative that !! ! !.  
The results of this exercise are presented, for all households and separately by coinsurance 
level, in Table 3.7. Results using total, non-asset and food expenditure are presented in columns 
1, 2 and 3 respectively. Idiosyncratic fluctuations affect total and non-asset expenditure but not 
food expenditure, suggesting individuals were able to effectively smooth their food consumption 
during the year. 
The coinsured and non-coinsured groups are quite similar in terms of their ability to 
smooth transitory shocks to income. Despite having a smaller village coinsurance network, there 
is no statistically significant difference in the response of coinsured and non-coinsured 
households to transitory shocks. We can infer from this that the latter obtain an equal degree of 
consumption smoothing from another source – either from self-insurance through buffer stock 
saving, or coinsurance with people outside the village. They are not accessing formal insurance 
systems, however. The liquid asset stocks of the non-coinsured are, on average, 34 percent lower 
than those of the coinsured group. Reflecting their reduced dependence on village coinsurance, 
the response of consumption to the village common income component is slightly lower among 
the non-coinsured group; the difference of the coefficients for the two groups is significant at the 
ten percent level for non-asset and food expenditure. 
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Table 3.7:  Tests of consumption smoothing by coinsurance level 
  
Total 
expenditure 
Non-asset 
expenditure 
Food 
expenditure 
   Log 
per capita 
 Log 
per capita 
Log 
per capita 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Constant 3.299*** 3.092*** 2.655*** 
  (0.327) (0.299) (0.298) 
Coinsured -0.502 -0.657* -0.683* 
  (0.385) (0.351) (0.361) 
Village income component       
Not coinsured 0.320*** 0.327*** 0.348*** 
  (0.091) (0.084) (0.083) 
Coinsured 0.469*** 0.511*** 0.538*** 
  (0.054) (0.049) (0.053) 
Permanent HH income component       
Not coinsured 0.357*** 0.316*** 0.237*** 
  (0.045) (0.036) (0.034) 
Coinsured 0.271*** 0.224*** 0.168*** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) 
Transitory HH income component       
Not coinsured 0.087* 0.089** 0.035 
  (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) 
Coinsured 0.073** 0.066** 0.057* 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) 
        
Number of obs. 892  892  892  
Adjusted R
2
 0.275 0.275 0.212 
Tests that coinsured and not coinsured coefficients are equivalent (F statistics): 
Village 2.00 3.62* 3.65* 
Permanent 2.90* 5.17** 2.93* 
Transitory 0.06 0.19 0.20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1 
 
3.6.4 Transfers 
We now turn to the effect of prize-winning on gifts and transfers. Table 3.8 reports results 
from individual-level probit regression models of giving and receiving gifts, with others in the 
village and overall. In addition to prizes won (by the individual, in columns 1 to 8, and by the  
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individual’s close friends, in columns 9 and 10), we include gender, coinsurance network status, 
age of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the individual was a member of a 
community group, lagged illiquid assets, household size, round and village dummies on the 
right-hand side. 
Considering the size of the prizes awarded, it is remarkable that the incidence of gift-
giving, within the village or with outsiders, does not appear to have increased in response to 
winning a public cash prize. We have already discussed above how, if social norms (or the 
informal contracts underpinning social insurance) dictate that individuals must share windfall 
resources with their social network, they may be inclined to spend their money quickly rather 
than share it with others. However, we would expect this effect to be more pronounced for cash 
prizes won publicly, since even if the identities of the winners of private prizes became public 
knowledge eventually, the number of individuals knowing them at any time cannot be larger than 
for public prizes. 
Conversely, we only see evidence of gifts increasing as a result of private cash prize-
winning, and these gifts are from individuals with a smaller social network. With respect to this 
private cash prize result, however, it is notable that the lagged effect of prize-winning on receipts 
is positive for the same group, which seems counterintuitive. This could be explained by a few 
winners lending their prize money to another household on a short-term basis, and calling it a 
‘gift’ even though it was eventually repaid (in line with the flexible loan arrangements discussed 
in Udry, 1990 and Udry, 1994). Aside from this seemingly artifactual result, the incidence of 
receipts does not respond to prize-winning. In contrast to the results of Cox and Jimenez (1992, 
1995) and Jensen (2004), we find no evidence that recipients of transfers have their receipts 
‘crowded out’ by the prizes. Consistent with the unconditional descriptive statistics reported 
 124 
earlier, we conclude that there was little if any effect of prize-winning on the incidence of 
transfers, either given or received. Likewise, the effect of friends’ prize-winning on an 
individual’s receipts is negligible (column 10), and seems to have the wrong sign in terms of its 
effect on gifts. 
Prizes might still have an effect at the intensive margin, even if not at the extensive margin. 
To test this, we estimate a Heckman regression model. Having established that prizes don’t 
explain gift giving or receipt decisions, we exclude them from the first stage regression. We 
specify the first stage (the selection equation for transfer giver or recipient status) as a function of 
the individual’s gender, whether she is coinsured, whether she holds an office, age, age squared 
and lagged liquid assets. The second stage regression includes only the values of prizes won by 
the household (divided into the four groups cash and in kind, public and private as above) and 
round controls. The results are reported in Tables 3.9a and 3.9b. The inverse Mills ratio and 
correlation of error terms between the two stages, reported in Table 3.9a, suggest that selection is 
not a major issue in these data. 
We find that log gifts barely change with prizes won, and when they do, they 
counterintuitively fall rather than rise. Log receipts are likewise broadly unchanged. Indeed, the 
only statistically significant result is that receipts increased in response to prize-winning, which 
is counter-intuitive. The sum of close friends’ prize winnings has no significant effect on the log 
of transfers, given or received. This is reinforced by our consumption model estimates, which 
showed a negligible effect of friends’ prize-winning on current consumption. While this might 
not be surprising, given the aforementioned results and the fact that each winner has many 
friends across whom sharing is spread, it does reinforce our conclusion that redistribution of 
prizes was at best marginal in this experiment. 
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If the canonical transfer rule were applicable in these villages, we would expect receipts to 
fall and gifts to rise, at the very least for public cash prize-winners and those with larger social 
networks. We do not see this. This suggests that transfers are not very responsive to 
unanticipated windfalls, and therefore that any coinsurance arrangement among villagers in our 
sample (even one constrained by limited commitment) may not be effective in redistributing 
fluctuations in income in these communities. Of course, this also suggests that in this setting 
there are no grounds for concern about external transfers (like we gave) crowding out private 
intra-network transfers, at either the extensive or intensive margins. 
Our results might be attenuated by measurement error in the transfer data, though as 
mentioned before we were extremely careful in collecting this variable. It is also possible that 
villagers mutually agreed that the prizes were ‘outside the scope’ of their coinsurance contract, 
and that (perhaps because the winnings weren’t earned) winners were not obliged to share 
them.
65
 However, if all earnings are ultimately fungible in a household budget, this assertion 
would be an admission that individuals in these communities explicitly do not smooth certain 
types of income shocks. 
Having said this does not rule out the possibility that individuals only make requests for 
assistance in times of demonstrable need, requests that are honored provided the donors can 
afford to help. This is consistent with the loans-with-forgiveness model, discussed in Udry 
(1990, 1994), Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), wherein windfalls 
would only invoke a transfer if the recipient is indebted to someone else for recent assistance. It 
is also consistent with a model of ‘risk layering’, in which there is effectively a deductible in the 
insurance arrangement that sets a lower bound on the size of the shock for which assistance is 
                                                
65
 Since the lotteries were a repeated game, non-winners may also have expected to win later and therefore held off 
requesting winners to share. Since only 40% of households were winners at all during the lotteries, this seems 
unlikely. Limiting the sample to the last round (when all knew the game was over) does not change the results. 
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provided (Chantarat et al., 2008). In future research, it may be possible to formally model such 
an arrangement with these data.  
 
3.6.5 Investment 
Thus far we have noted that on average about 40 percent of the cash prize money appears 
to have been spent on consumption, and that little of the prizes was transferred. However, the 
follow-up survey results presented in Section 3.5 suggest many individuals bought items for 
business, and durable goods, with their prize winnings. In Section 3.2 we discussed how 
coinsurance obligations and buffer stock smoothing behavior generate a prediction that the 
attractiveness of investment may be distorted by one’s future obligations to others, and that this 
distortion varies with the size and composition of an individual’s social network. We showed 
how under a standard Coate–Ravallion transfer arrangement where individuals are prudent, those 
who are relatively richer than their friends may face a higher social rate of taxation on certain 
types of consumption or investment. In this section we test this hypothesis, using the household’s 
stock of illiquid assets as our measure of investment capital.  
We can test these predictions by estimating the effect of prize-winning on log illiquid 
assets. While this measure does not include buildings or land, it contains all other household 
assets that would be costly to liquidate and therefore represent a form of irreversible investment 
as motivated in our model and discussed by Fafchamps and Pender (1997) and Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1993). Furthermore, over the nine months spanned by the surveys, little construction or 
land exchange took place in any of these villages, so omitted investment is likely to be 
negligible. 
We control for household wealth and interact the value of prizes won with dummies for (i) 
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whether the individual is coinsured, as defined earlier, and (ii) whether the individual is 
relatively richer or poorer than her friends. The most intuitive measure of welfare is log 
household per capita expenditure, which should, according to the permanent income hypothesis, 
best approximate a household’s permanent income. Consumption is also visible enough to be 
useful for social comparisons, and in our model individuals’ perceptions of their relative wealth 
are important to their investment decision. 
We use as the basis for comparison the median of the individuals’ close friends’ per capita 
consumption. We generate a variable taking the value one if the individual’s household 
consumption exceeds the median of their close friends’ consumption levels, and zero otherwise. 
Since expenditure fluctuates during the year (due to seasonality and measurement error), around 
48 percent of individuals have reversals during the five rounds, becoming relatively richer or 
poorer than their friends as the year progresses. Therefore, we define an individual as ‘relatively 
rich’ only if their household consumption exceeds the median of their friends’ consumption more 
than half the time (i.e., in three rounds or more, for those households with observations for all 
five rounds). About 44 percent of individuals in our sample are defined as ‘relatively rich’ 
according to this measure. Since asset and transfer decisions are likely to be taken at the 
household level, we then define a household-level analog for this variable by calling a household 
relatively rich if any member is relatively rich. According to this measure, 53 percent of 
households are relatively richer than their social network.
66
 
From the model in Section 3.2, we hypothesize that the household’s stock of illiquid assets 
is an autoregressive process, subject to innovations from round-specific events and the effects of 
prize-winning (of the individual or household, and of friends). We allow the coefficients on all of 
                                                
66
 The social networks of individual household members are likely to overlap, so this measure seems more 
appropriate than simply averaging the individual measures. 
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the variables except the round controls to vary according to the household’s relative wealth and 
degree of coinsurance (using the ‘coinsured’ dummy variable defined in Section 6.1). 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.10 report results from OLS regressions with log assets as the 
dependent variable, and lagged log assets and prizes (both interacted with the coinsured dummy) 
on the right-hand side. The first column uses the entire sample and does not control for a 
household’s relative wealth in the social network. It shows that all types of prize induced 
investment changes, and except for public cash prizes all of these changes were among coinsured 
households, though the difference between coinsured and non-coinsured is not statistically 
significant. 
Columns 2 and 3 break the sample into relatively rich and relatively poor households, as 
defined by our relative wealth measure. When we partition the sample in this way, we see 
immediately how concentrated the investment response to prize winning is among relatively poor 
households. The significant results in column 1 are driven by households whose members are 
relatively poorer than their median friend (column 2). Relatively rich households display almost 
no investment response to prize-winning. If the partition simply picked up the correlation of the 
relative wealth measure with overall wealth (as we would expect, since richer individuals hold 
and buy more assets, on average) then we would expect all of the responses to be concentrated 
among the rich. Standard models of preferences would predict that the marginal propensity to 
invest is higher among the rich than among the poor. Our results suggest the opposite, supporting 
the hypothesis that investment incentives are eroded by a social rate of taxation stemming from 
sharing norms. These obligations weigh more heavily on the relatively rich than the relatively 
poor, as predicted by our model where liquid and illiquid assets are complements. 
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The effect is also reinforced by the size of the coinsurance network; other than for public 
cash prizes, investment among the relatively poor is again concentrated among coinsured 
households. This supports our earlier hypothesis since, controlling for social network position, 
individuals with more friends have greater security on the downside (if they are relatively poor), 
and more obligations on the upside (if they are relatively rich). Though the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, these results are reversed among the relatively rich, where the response 
of investment to prize-winning is greater for those with smaller social networks. 
As a robustness test that the relative wealth findings do not simply reflect absolute wealth 
effects, we consider a household fixed effects specification. This absorbs any persistent 
differences in wealth and other unobservables across households. Since lagged log assets are 
highly correlated with the household fixed effect (varying only intra-year), we exclude them 
from this specification. The results are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.10. They mirror 
the previous regression results, with investment responding positively only for relatively poor 
households, except for the coefficient on private cash prizes (which has a similar magnitude, but 
whose standard error increases). 
Finally, we consider an alternative classification of relative wealth. Since around one third 
of household members changed position in the social network during the year – from  relatively 
rich to relatively poor, or vice versa – we account for this by defining an alternative measure that 
takes three values: ‘poor’, if the household member was relatively poor all of the year; ‘middle’, 
if they changed position; and ‘rich’, if the they were relatively rich throughout the year. Most of 
the ‘middle’ households are likely to be similar to their median friends, with measurement error 
generating fluctuations between categories. The results from this decomposition are presented in 
columns 6 to 8 of Table 3.10. The estimates become less stable because of the smaller sample 
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sizes, so should be interpreted with caution. Among the relatively poor and middle households, 
investment responds significantly to public cash and livestock prizes. The relatively rich register 
no investment response to prize-winning of any sort, consistent with our prior results. 
The result that households whose members are well-integrated into the village social 
network and relatively poorer than their peers are more likely to invest a positive income shock 
supports the hypothesis that sharing norms distort investment incentives. We find no evidence 
that individuals invest money to ‘keep it out of the hands of others’, because such investment 
would be stronger for public cash prizes, and most pronounced for those with the greatest sharing 
burden – to wit, the relatively rich. 
Our model explains how investment may be less attractive among individuals who are 
richer than their peers because their anticipated gains from investment are subject to a social rate 
of taxation through future claims from others. This rate of taxation is increasing in the relative 
position of an individual vis-à-vis her coinsurance network peers. It is also increasing in the size 
of that network, since having more friends increases the amount of money that must be shared. 
 
3.7 Policy implications 
Our experiment highlights the areas in which individuals’ budget constraints are truly 
binding. The nature of the prize – cash or livestock – made a large difference to its use. Goat 
prizes were much more likely to be kept as an ‘investment’ than was cash, which is perhaps not 
surprising given the high transaction costs of selling livestock in the village. This lends support 
to the strategies of some NGOs to provide livestock to the poor as a source of livelihood. Such 
transfers are not fungible injections of capital, but guided interventions. Aside from transaction 
costs, the result could also be explained by theories from behavioral economics such as the 
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endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990). 
The strong response of household consumption and illiquid asset investment to cash prizes 
(both public and private) may also reflect individuals’ inability to save their money securely. 
Some have argued that claims from others erode savings, encouraging individuals to spend their 
winnings quickly. Our results on consumption suggest that while a large part of cash prizes is 
spent within the first month, this does not appear to be due to fear of requests from others. In the 
follow-up survey, winners reported that requests from friends to share their prizes were 
uncommon. By controlling the publicity of the prizes, so that some were public information and 
others private information, we find little evidence that individuals spent publicly-won cash prizes 
faster than privately-won prizes in order to evade claims from others. Our estimates of the 
transfer response to public prize-winning are negligible, and actually more significant out of 
private prizes. There is also no evidence of prizes crowding out transfers. 
The experiment provides a novel insight into the effects of village social network 
characteristics on individual and household consumption, transfer and investment behavior in 
response to a positive income or wealth shock. The notion of a social rate of taxation on 
investment parallels company tax arrangements in the formal economy. Insurance is provided on 
the downside, in the sense that losses are compensated by tax credits, and is paid for on the 
upside by taxation of profits. However, in the village coinsurance system this taxation is 
asymmetric by social position, generating an inverse relationship between relative wealth and 
investment incentives. If rates of return on investment are constant with respect to wealth, and 
wealth can only be increased through investment in complementary goods, then our model 
illustrates that individuals in relatively ‘democratic’ social networks (i.e., where the average 
wealth of a person’s friends does not vary much with her own wealth) may be prone to an 
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‘investment trap’. In such a scenario, the disincentive to invest (through social taxation of gains) 
may constrain richer households’ wealth trajectories as long as they remain embedded in the 
village social network.  
This is an interesting consequence of a system that ostensibly provides redistribution and 
social support in lieu of formal institutions, and might partly explain the inability of small 
businesses in developing countries to invest and grow. Increasing formal support for the poor (by 
providing a formal safety net, for example) could weaken the demands on the relatively rich to 
share their gains, and possibly have the indirect result of increasing their appetite for investment. 
If social norms do not change, social networks would need to become more concentrated over 
time, in wealth terms, in order for the returns on investment to outweigh taxation due to sharing 
norms. Exploring this hypothesis further, through experiments and comparative studies of social 
networks in village and urban areas, is a promising avenue for future research. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
In this paper we developed a dynamic two-asset model of the interaction between a buffer 
stock savings strategy and a coinsurance arrangement, and derived hypotheses on how 
coinsurance arrangements and the structure of the village social network affect consumption, 
investment and transfers. Our model incorporates two commonly-observed features of 
households in rural communities of developing countries: an inability to borrow, and an 
obligation to share resources with others in the community. The model is one of the first to 
formally characterize the interaction between these features, and the first to evaluate their impact 
on behavior using experimental data. 
We tested the model’s hypotheses using data from a unique field experiment in Ghana. 
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Three hundred and twenty cash and livestock prizes of various amounts, the largest exceeding 
one month’s mean per capita consumption, were distributed by lottery among survey respondents 
throughout 2009. Prizes varied in value, type (cash or livestock) and in whether they were 
awarded at a public ceremony or privately to the recipient. We used a household survey to track 
the effect of these prizes on consumption, investment and transfers. We find little evidence of 
transfers responding to prize-winning, and no evidence that publicly-given prizes were subject to 
more requests for sharing than were private prizes. Rather, we found that the bulk of cash prizes 
were spent within the first month following the lottery, partly as investment in illiquid assets. 
Our findings contribute to the literature on the complexities and implications of informal 
insurance arrangements in developing countries. They link back to the work of Cox and others  
on crowding out, illustrating how policy makers need to bear in mind existing social norms and 
arrangements when designing interventionist policies (Cox and Jimenez, 1992; Cox and 
Jakubson, 1995; Cox and Jimenez, 1995; Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 2004). We find support for 
the claims of Platteau (2009) about the ‘social rate of taxation’ of individual gains by those in 
their immediate community, but in a nuanced way. Rather than encouraging investment in 
illiquid assets as a means of avoiding obligations, sharing norms impose a social rate of taxation 
on prospective returns from investment. 
We find robust evidence of an ‘investment trap’ due to social obligations. Those who are 
richer in their social network expect their investment returns to be more heavily taxed by social 
obligations than those of relatively poorer individuals. Controlling for wealth, we show that 
individuals who are relatively richer than their friends are significantly less likely to invest their 
prize winnings. This result is more pronounced for individuals with a larger village social 
network, suggesting that larger coinsurance networks provide the relatively poor with greater 
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certainty over future consumption, and therefore more incentive to invest, while imposing a 
greater claim on the relatively rich, and thereby reducing their prospective returns from 
investment. Our findings also call into question the appropriateness of the standard one-asset 
Coate–Ravallion limited commitment model as a representation of real-world coinsurance 
arrangements, since that model does not predict asymmetry in the social rate of taxation across 
individuals. Instead, the findings are consistent with a two-asset model, in which one asset is 
non-transferable or outside the scope of the arrangement. 
In interpreting our findings, it is important to note that while the shocks used here to study 
individual and household behavior are random, the nature of the shock may play a role. We 
cannot conclude from this study that gifts and transfers do not respond to any type of positive 
income shock; it may be the case that ‘lottery prizes’ do not fall under an otherwise very 
extensive coinsurance contract among villagers. However, interpreting the findings about 
expenditure and investment depends on one’s point of view about fungibility. To the extent that 
cash prizes are simply cash, the measured effects should be identical to those stemming from any 
other shock. If some sort of mental accounting is practiced, whereby for instance individuals 
‘treat themselves’ with unearned winnings, one would need to be more circumspect in 
extrapolating our conclusions to behavior in general. Finally, the usual caveat about external 
validity applies here; the study describes behavior in four villages in southern Ghana, and the 
results may not be predictive of behavior elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the evidence 
presented here inspires further research in other settings into the potential adverse impact of 
social obligations on consumption and savings behavior in rural communities.  
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 APPENDICES 
 
Technical Details on the 2009 Household Survey 
 
1 Survey design 
1.1 Introduction 
The household survey is part of a USAID project called the Assets and Markets Access 
Collaborative Research Support Program (AMA CRSP), a long-term empirical study of 
idiosyncratic shocks and welfare dynamics in Ghana, Bangladesh and Ethiopia. 
The survey was conducted in four villages in Akwapim South district, Eastern Region, Ghana in 
2009. Questionnaires were administered in five rounds from February to November 2009, with 
each household interviewed once every two months. 
 
1.2 Organization of the survey 
The survey villages were initially selected because the district was the site of rapid growth 
in the export agriculture industry (specifically, of pineapple) in the late 1990s. Four villages were 
selected non-randomly from those in the district. The villages are Konkonuru, Oboadaka, 
Pokrom and Darmang-Ahweriase. 
Within each village, around 60 households were randomly selected for participation in the 
first wave in 1997-98. In Darmang, given its population was barely more than 60 households, all 
households were selected. Table 1 shows the actual number of households remaining after 
refusals etc. The second wave in 2004 was based on the same sample, but due to attrition the 
sample was smaller. The 2009 sample was rebuilt by random resampling, to obtain a targeted 70 
 households in each village. The existing sample was retained, but those households which had 
disappeared or chosen not to take part were replaced by new households selected at random from 
that village. In a small number of cases, only one of the spouses from a former sample household 
remained in the village (because of death, divorce or migration). We included these remaining 
‘single spouses’ in the sample but did not count them towards the 70-household target. 
 
Table 1:  Survey samples in the Akwapim South study 
Wave  Konkonuru Oboadaka Pokrom Darmang Total 
1997-98 Households 54 51 51 51 213 
  Individuals 112 102 111 106 429 
2004  Households 44 38 38 39 159 
 Individuals 90 89 81 90 350 
2009  Households
*
 81 76 78 81 316 
  Individuals 151 149 147 158 605 
*
 Includes single-headed households. 
 
The survey is unusual in that almost all of the questions are posed to both the household 
head and spouse(s). A full breakdown of the number of participants in each wave is given in 
Table 1. The district is patrilineal, so the head is usually male and the spouse(s) female. A small 
number of households had multiple wives; in these cases all wives were interviewed. The 1997-
98 and 2004 survey instruments comprised sections on assets, consumption, land assets, farm 
business activity, non-farm business and income, gifts and transfers, loans, family background 
and marital attitudes. All of these sections (effectively unchanged) were fielded again in 2009 to 
generate consistent panel data. In addition, we added modules on social networks, long-term 
shocks and perceptions of poverty, membership of organizations and cooperatives, education and 
 household characteristics. The questionnaires follow in this appendix. We also conducted two 
field experiments designed to study the effects of financial and non-financial windfalls on 
savings, consumption and sharing behavior, and the willingness of individuals to contribute to 
local public goods. Details on these experiments can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
dissertation. 
 
1.3 Sample issues 
The initial sample in 1997-98 was 60 households selected at random in each village. Due 
to attrition, we were able to identify just over half of these households willing to participate in 
2009. To reach a target sample size of 70 households in each village, we augmented these 
remaining households with additional households from each village, using random sampling 
stratified by age group. Details on attrition and the resampling are presented in Table 2. 
The resampling was conducted as follows. We visited the villages in the fourth week of 
January and interviewed someone from every household in the village with a brief demographic 
survey. We asked the household head (or designated alternate) for the names and ages of the 
head and spouse(s), household size, the household’s location and the residential history of its 
occupants. From this listing we identified households in the existing sample and asked whether 
they wished to participate in the survey again in 2009. Of the non-sample households, those with 
both a head and spouse present were retained for the resampling. We divided this subset into 
three groups based on the age of the head (under 30, 30-64, and 65+). These age categories were 
chosen because households with heads under 30 could not have been selected for the first wave 
in 1997, and older-headed households in the original sample were subject to greater attrition. We 
then selected enough households so that, combined with the existing sample households who 
 agree to participate, we had 70 households in each village with proportions of each age group 
close to those of the village. Newly selected households which refused to participate were 
replaced by the next household from that age category on a randomized list. 
 
Table 2:  Attrition and resampling 
  Konkonuru Oboadaka Pokrom Darmang Total 
Original sample 
     1997-98 54 51 51 51 207 
2004 44 38 38 39 159 
Located in 2009 44 40 43 48 175 
Dropped/Refused 1 1 0 0 2 
Remaining 43 39 43 48 173 
Single-headed 12 7 10 11 40 
Dual-headed 31 32 33 37 133 
Resampling 
     Young 11 14 12 12 49 
Middle 28 23 20 14 85 
Old 0 1 5 7 13 
Total 39 38 37 33 147 
Total sample 2009 
    Dual-headed 70 70 70 70 280 
Single-headed 12 7 10 11 40 
Total 82 77 80 81 320 
 
1.4 Definition of a household 
We adopt the standard LSMS definition of a household as “a group of individuals which 
normally eat from the same pot”. However, this was augmented by a condition that to be a 
member of the household, an individual must have satisfied the LSMS definition for at least one 
month (30 days) in the past year. This was done to rule out the inclusion of itinerant members or 
children living elsewhere. 
 The household head was defined as the most senior member of the household. This 
designation was usually unambiguous, but if not, the head was to be the person who would 
normally represent the household in its dealings with other households. The head and his/her 
spouse(s) were the only people interviewed from each household. 
 
1.5 Timetable 
The survey ran from January to November 2009. In January we recruited and trained the 
enumerators. We conducted the listing in the second-last week of January, then conducted the 
resampling and selected a pretest group to test the instruments. Pretesting and revision of the 
survey instrument took place in the last week of January. The survey rounds began in the first 
week of February. Each of the five rounds lasted two months; the full timetable is set out below. 
There were two teams of enumerators in the field, four in each village (one of whom was 
designated a supervisor). All of the sample households in a village were interviewed over the 
course of the month, with two villages being surveyed concurrently. At the end of the month, the 
enumerators will move to the second two villages to spend a month there conducting the second 
half of the round. The social networks module will be administered by a separate team of 
enumerators in February and March, running on the same schedule as the general survey team 
but interviewing each household four times over the course of the month. 
In each round, respondents answered a standard questionnaire on income, farming, 
business activity, assets, consumption and transfers/loans. This was augmented by a full social 
network survey in the first round, and some short one-round modules on other issues in 
subsequent rounds. Each household was visited once in each round for the general survey, and an 
additional four times in February/March for the social networks module.  
 The following table lists the commencement and completion dates for each activity in the 
survey. Data collection rounds and experiments took place two villages at a time. Group A 
contains Konkonuru and Oboadaka. Group B contains Pokrom and Darmang, whose data 
collection and experiments occur one month after Group A. 
 
Table 3:  Calendar of household survey interviews 
Round or Activity Date Commenced Date Completed 
Listing 22 January 26 January 
Pretest 28 January 30 January 
Round 1, Group A 7 February 2 March 
Round 1, Group B 9 March 6 April 
Round 2, Group A 20 April 15 May 
Round 2, Group B 18 May 10 June 
Round 3, Group A 17 June 8 July 
Round 3, Group B 15 July 5 August 
Round 4, Group A 12 August 2 September 
Round 4, Group B 9 September 30 September 
Round 5, Group A 7 October 28 October 
Round 5, Group B 4 November 25 November 
 
1.6 Social networks module 
The social networks module was designed to map the entire in-sample social network in 
each of the four study villages. We collected detailed information on each friendship between 
sample members. 
The social networks module was conducted during Round 1, in parallel with the standard 
household survey. This was achieved by having a second enumerator team in the village during 
 the first round, specifically conducting the social networks survey. Each respondent was 
therefore interviewed twice during this round. 
The questionnaire (a blank copy of which is included following the household survey 
questionnaire below) was customized for each respondent. The names of all 150 sample 
members in the village (excluding the respondent) were listed in column 1 (over multiple pages). 
Due to concern about respondent fatigue (since each respondent was being asked about their 
friendships with 150 other villagers), we randomized the list of names on each individual’s 
questionnaire. This enabled us to test whether responses varied systematically as the enumerator 
progressed down the list. There was no evidence of a systematic relationship between responses 
and name order. 
Early in the listing, we discovered that names are very fluid in the survey area. Many 
individuals have a formal name and (possibly more than one) nickname, and are only known in 
the village by their nickname. However, they had provided us with their formal names. We 
therefore returned to each household and asked each respondent to tell us all the names by which 
they were known. For each individual, all of their names were listed on the social networks 
questionnaire and the respondent quizzed about each one. If the respondent said they did not 
know of the person, the enumerators were directed to probe further by mentioning the name of 
the person’s spouse. This occasionally elicited a different response. 
 
 Instructions to Enumerators 
 
1.1 Tasks of the interviewers 
Your role as an interviewer is crucial to the survey. The quality of the data will depend on 
the quality of your work. You should keep in constant touch with your supervisor and inform 
him of any problems you encounter in your work in the field. The supervisor will provide you 
with all the necessary materials and instructions and will collect and check your work, helping 
you solve any problems that arise. 
Your principal task is to conduct at least 2 interviews per day during the survey period. 
Each enumerator will be assigned 35-40 individuals to interview each month, and it is imperative 
that these interviews take place before the end of the month because at that time the survey team 
will move to the other village. 
You must follow strictly all instructions in this manual. Read all questions exactly as they 
appear on the questionnaire. You will be provided with the following materials for use in the 
interviews: 
• Questionnaires 
• Instruction manual 
• Briefcase/satchel 
• Note pad 
• Pencils/erasers 
In addition, your supervisor will be equipped with: 
• 2 GPS units (for plot mapping) 
• Cell phone credit (for communication with ISSER). 
 1.2 Relations with the supervisor 
You should always follow the advice given to you by your supervisor, who is the 
representative of the Project Directorate in the field. He will assign you work at the beginning of 
each survey round. In order to satisfy himself that your work is up to standard, your supervisor 
will carry out the following checks in the field: 
• He will examine in detail all questionnaires you complete, to verify that each interview has 
been fully and properly carried out. 
• He will make random visits to some of the households that you have already interviewed to 
make sure that you went to the correct addresses. 
• He will observe three more of our interviews in a cycle to evaluate your method of 
interviewing. You will not be informed in advance. 
• Each day he will discuss your work with you and make regular reports to the Project 
Directorate on your performance in the field. 
Your supervisor is the link between you and the survey organization. Just as you will 
receive instructions from him, you must inform him of any difficulties or problems that you 
encounter. For instance, if you do not understand a procedure or the meaning of a question in the 
questionnaire, you should ask your supervisor for an explanation. 
 
1.3 Checking the completed questionnaire 
After finishing each interview, you must verify that all the sections have been filled out 
correctly and legibly. You must make sure that you have asked all of the relevant questions and 
recorded the answers on the questionnaire. Finally, you must complete the observations sheet, 
and record the completion of the section on the household’s survey cover sheet. 
 This must be done immediately after the interview, before you hand in the questionnaires 
to your supervisor, and most importantly, before moving on to another household or leaving the 
village. 
Although you may correct minor errors due to having written down the answers badly, you 
must never under any circumstance make any other changes to the completed questionnaire 
without asking the respondent the same question again. Do not copy the information you have 
collected into a new questionnaire. At the end of each day’s work, all filled questionnaires must 
be submitted to your supervisor for editing. Errors detected must be corrected before the end of 
the month, by re-visiting the relevant household. 
 
1.4 Questions rejected by the data entry system 
Your work will also be reviewed by the data entry applications, which will carry out 
checks on the answers to various questions, parts and sections of the questionnaire. After 
reviewing the data entry print-outs, your supervisor will circle in red ink all the answers in the 
questionnaire that were rejected by the data entry program, and return the questionnaire (if 
necessary) to you. You should resolve the highlighted problems in consultation with your 
supervisor immediately. 
 
1.5 Arrival in the community 
The team will arrive in the community a day before the start of the survey. Accompanied 
by the interviewers, the supervisor will visit the chief, assemblymen, unit committee members 
and other prominent individuals to introduce the team and discuss the survey program. 
 
 2.5.1 Finding the address 
First you should look for the address written on the first page of the questionnaire and 
make sure that it is the household of the head indicated. Sometimes you might have difficulties 
finding a household. If this happens, you should stop and ask advice from your supervisor. 
 
2.5.2 Explanation of the survey 
The first step after meeting village formalities and constructing the sampling frame will be 
to approach the selected households about participating. On the first visit to a household, the first 
thing you should do is greet everyone, introduce yourself and say that you are working for 
ISSER/Cornell University. You should show your interviewer’s card in all cases. You must 
explain that: 
• You are conducting a survey designed to learn how households cope with unexpected 
events. The purpose is to find out about patterns of income, consumption, assets, gift 
giving, loans and social networks in four villages in Akuapim South region. The survey is 
very important for planners to learn how to help villagers cope with unexpected events, and 
to improve the effectiveness of government programs. 
• Their household has been randomly selected to participate in the survey. 
 
2.5.3 Obtaining consent 
You must then provide each potential participant (head and spouse(s)) with a copy of the 
consent form, which describes the survey, outlines the requirements for and consequences of 
participation, and gives them a chance to decide freely whether to participate. Offer them either 
the English or Twi version, as they desire. If they cannot read it personally, another person or 
 you must read it aloud in full to the respondent. You must spend time with the individual 
explaining the details of the form: the nature of the survey, requirements of participation, 
anticipated risks and benefits from participating, indirect benefits, and the terms of the 
commitment to participate. 
Stress that although there are parts of the survey which ask about sensitive and potentially 
embarrassing information, this information will be used for research purposes only, kept 
confidential at all times, and not published in a form which allows anyone to link respondents 
and their information. The survey is being conducted by researchers at universities who wish to 
learn more about village behavior, and not by a government or for tax purposes. The survey team 
will keep the surveys secure after they are completed, and the data will always be kept private. 
Only a few individuals will be authorized to see their answers in connection with their name or 
identifying details. 
Some individuals may nevertheless not wish to answer certain questions in the survey. Be 
frank with them that there are some sensitive questions. They have the right to refuse to answer 
any question. Discourage them from refusing to participate in the survey simply because some 
questions might be sensitive. They can choose which questions to answer, and will not be 
punished or lose compensation for refusing to answer a question. Although we would strongly 
encourage all participants to commit to participating for the full year, they have the right to leave 
the survey at any time. 
The ethics guidelines specify that individuals must be given time to consider their 
participation before deciding to consent. If an individual chooses to consent on the spot, 
however, this is okay. Otherwise, arrange to return the next day to get their decision, and to 
schedule an interview if they agree. 
 2.5.4 Scheduling an interview 
Once your supervisor has obtained signed consent forms from both head and spouse(s), 
you must arrange a time to return for the first interview with your respondent. There is no pre-
defined order of interviews; it will be your responsibility to schedule interviews so that all of 
them can be completed within the month. You should try to accommodate the respondents’ 
schedules and avoid disrupting their activities or those of other family members, but emphasize 
the importance of their keeping the appointment so as not to disrupt your appointments with 
other households. 
 
2.5.5 Confirming the interview 
You should contact each respondent at least a day before the interview. The purpose of this 
visit is to introduce yourself and confirm that the interview will take place the next day. 
 
2.6 The interview 
You must be careful to follow all the instructions set out in this manual, the most important 
of which is to ask the questions exactly as they are printed in the questionnaire. You must record 
the responses directly into the respective answer boxes on the questionnaire during the interview. 
Do not record answers on scraps of paper, in your notebook, or in the margin of the 
questionnaire. Neither should you count on your memory to fill in the answers after you have left 
the household. 
 
 
 
 2.6.1 Tempo of the interview 
You must maintain the tempo of the interview. In particular, avoid long discussions of the 
questions with respondents. If the respondent gives you irrelevant or complicated answers, do 
not break in too suddenly, but listen to what they are saying and then lead him/her back to the 
original question. Remember that you are running the interview, and therefore you must be in 
control of the situation at all times. 
 
2.6.2 Objectivity of the interviewer 
It is extremely important that you remain absolutely neutral about the subjects of the 
interview. Most people are naturally polite, particularly with visitors, and they tend to give 
answers and adopt attitudes that they think will please the visitor. You must not express surprise, 
approval or disapproval about the answers given by the respondent, nor must you tell him/her 
what you think about these things yourself. 
You must also avoid any preconceived ideas about the respondent’s ability to answer 
certain questions or about the kind of answer s/he is likely to give. Your most important task is to 
read the questions exactly as they are written on the questionnaire. 
 
2.6.3 Privacy of the interview 
All of the data collected are strictly confidential. Any breach of confidentiality is forbidden 
by law. In principle all the questions should be asked in complete privacy to ensure that the 
answers remain confidential. The presence of other people may cause embarrassment to the 
respondent and influence his/her answers. 
The following sections of the survey may be particularly sensitive: 
 • Assets 
• Gifts and loans 
• Education 
• Marital attitudes 
• Social networks 
At the start of these sections you should warn the respondent that the questions may be sensitive, 
reiterate the privacy of the interview, and politely ask any other individuals watching to respect 
the privacy of the respondent. 
 
2.6.4 Setting of the interview 
This survey is concerned with the different responses and attitudes of husbands and wives. 
It is therefore very important that each spouse be interviewed apart from his/her partner. Under 
no circumstances are you to interview someone with their spouse present. Some questions ask 
the wife, for example, what her husband has sold. We do not want to know the truth about what 
he has sold from her, we want to know what she thinks. For this reason, it is essential that she be 
interviewed apart from her husband. If the respondent does not wish to be interviewed alone, 
they may have someone else present, but insist that it not be their spouse. 
 
2.6.5 Conclusion and plans for next visit 
Before leaving, you must thank the respondent for their time. Explain that a team member 
will return in two months for another interview, and that it is important that they participate 
again at that time. 
 
 2.7 Completing the questionnaire 
Every round, each household will be visited two or three times. One enumerator will 
interview the head, and another will interview the head’s spouse(s). After each visit, each 
enumerator must record the interview in the completion checklist on the cover sheet for that 
household. Code the result of the survey COMPLETED if all sections were done; PARTIALLY 
COMPLETED if the respondent refused to complete some sections, or if you were interrupted 
and must return to that household this round; RESPONDENT NOT AVAILABLE only if the 
respondent is definitely uncontactable for the month (eg travelling); REFUSED if they would not 
be interviewed. If there is any other reason, write 6 for OTHER along with a note in the 
‘Observations’ section of the sheet. If the survey took place, fill out the other details. Whether or 
not the survey was completed, return the questionnaire to your supervisor for storage and 
review. 
 
2.7.1 Observation sheet 
You must also fill out the observation sheet. You should indicate on this page how much 
the respondent was willing to cooperate, any problems they had in answering any of the 
questions (including any which were refused because of privacy concerns), any unfavorable 
circumstances, and any comments you wish to make for the benefit of the supervisor. You 
should fill out this section immediately after the interview, but never in the presence of the 
respondent. 
 
2.7.2 Conduct of the interviewer 
The interviewer must observe the following rules: 
 • You must be courteous towards everyone (the respondent, his/her family and friends, the 
supervisor, other members of the team and everyone else involved). Your behavior can 
have an enormous impact on people’s opinions in the survey villages. 
• You must avoid disturbing or upsetting anyone by your behavior. 
• You must be properly dressed, so that the respondent will be inclined to trust you as a 
reliable and responsible person. 
• You must arrive punctually for interview appointments, and never keep a respondent 
waiting. 
• You must exercise patience and tact in conducting the interview, to avoid antagonizing the 
respondent or leading him/her to give answers that are not in conformity with the facts. 
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COMPLETE THIS MODULE FOR EACH SPOUSE
NOTE: CODE REFUSALS AS 999
1. Where does your spouse live? 12.
2. How often do you see your spouse? 13. Are there certain things in the house that you always buy?
If yes, what are they?
3. Overall, how well do you get along with your spouse?
14. Are there certain things in the house that your spouse always buys?
For questions 4 and 5, use the following codes: If yes, what are they?
4.
15. Are there certain expenses (e.g. school fees, funeral expenses) 
that you always pay for?
5. If yes, what are they?
Now I would like to ask you about how you both manage the house and farm.
6. Do you think your spouse does his/her fair share of 
work on the farm?
16. Are there certain expenses (e.g. school fees, funeral expenses) 
that your spouse always pays for?
If yes, what are they?
7.
17. a.  Do you lend money to your spouse?
8. Do you think your spouse does enough work 
around the house?
b.  How much have you lent in the past 6 months?
9.
c.                   "                        in the past month?
d.  What were the amounts for?
10. Does your spouse contribute to the household 
finances?
11. a. Does s/he contribute enough? e.  Do you have trouble getting it back?
b. Why not?
f.  Does this lead to quarrels?
MARITAL ATTITUDES
In this section we would like to ask you some questions about relationships in your household. Please remember that this survey is entirely confidential and your responses will not be 
shared with anyone. All the same, you do not have to answer any question if you do not want to. 
On a scale of one to five, how much do you trust your spouse?
On a scale of one to five, how fairly does your spouse treat you?
What would you do if s/he does not do enough?
What would you do if s/he does not do enough?
What would you do if it is not enough?
SAME HOUSE.........1 (>>Q3) 
DIFFERENT HOUSE IN 
  THIS VILLAGE.....2 (>>Q3) 
ELSEWHERE..........3 
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   HHN    Respondent's name    ID Code    Round    Village   Date 
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MOSTLY.............2 
SOMEWHAT...........3 
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Script for Public Goods Experiment 
 
Dialogue 
As we promised, today we are going to pay you GHC2 for your participation in the survey in 
April. The payment is to compensate you for the time you spent helping us with our research. 
  
Give the person GHC2 (10x 20p coins). 
 
As we discussed at a village meeting recently, you have the choice to donate some or all of this 
money to a fund which will be used to purchase a [public good] for [your village]. This was the 
item the people at that meeting decided would be most useful for [your village]. The money we 
collect will be kept in a bank account until the end of the year and then used to buy the [public 
good]. 
 
In order to assist your village to buy the [public good], we will match the donations of a certain 
number of people. Please take a bottle top from this bag to find out whether your donation will 
be matched. Show the ratio card to the person and explain which number they drew based on the 
colour of the bottle top. 
 
• If the number drawn was !, 1, 1! or 2: You have drawn the number [X]. Show card with 
numbers and matching amounts for the ratio drawn. That means that for any donation you 
make to the fund, we will make an additional donation of [X] times what you donate. For 
example, if you donate c1, we will donate an additional [X times c1]. Answer any questions 
and ensure the person understands this concept before continuing. 
 
• If the number drawn was 0: You have drawn the number 0. That means we will not be able 
to match your donation. However, you are still welcome to donate to the fund if you like. 
 
You can choose to donate any amount. You do not have to donate unless you want to. What you 
choose to do is entirely your decision, and will be kept private. We will not tell anyone outside 
this room whether you donated, and it will not affect your status in the survey or your chance of 
winning prizes in the lottery. Your donations are important, however. The village will only get as 
much money to buy the [public good] as is raised through respondents’ donations and the 
matching contributions. 
 
Would you like to donate, and if so, how much will you donate? 
 
Take donation (if offered) and place in the susu box. Count out the matching donation and 
explain the calculation. Place the matching donation in the box as well. Thank the person for 
their time and kind donation, and show them to the door. Once they have left, record the amount 
they donated on the form. 
 
Actions after donations 
After the donations are complete, we will open the box and count the money in the presence of 
the village chiefs. We will record the amount raised and announce it to them. We will explain 
that the money will be kept in a bank account until the end of the year, and then the total raised 
will be spent on the item they chose. 
Script for possible questions, complaints 
 
1. Difficult villagers. Give pretest participants a c1 note if they ask for it (provided they are 
identified). They must sign in as respondents do. They are not to continue to the experiment, 
however. Those who were neither in the sample nor the pretest are not to be paid under any 
circumstances. 
 
2. Proxy recipients: The money is to be given only to the respondent him/herself. Respondents 
may not accept the money on behalf of their spouse. We will revisit absentees when they return. 
 
3. Dropped households. Individuals whose households were dropped (in Konkonuru and 
Darmang) are only to be paid if they completed both the household questionnaire and social 
network questionnaire. In that case, give them a c1 note and ask them to leave. Don’t continue 
with the experiment. Those who did not complete both questionnaires have not earned payment 
and are not to be paid. If the wife completed the questionnaires but the husband didn’t, pay her 
but not him. In all cases, explain that because their household is no longer in the survey, they 
will not be paid again and will not take part in the lottery. 
 
4. I don’t want the money. If anyone refuses payment, it constitutes a full donation. Make this 
known to the respondent too. Continue with the experiment to determine the matching donation. 
 
5. Respondent refuses to take part in experiment. The respondent has the right to leave at any 
time. Pay them their money and ensure they have signed for its receipt. Record the donation as 
zero in such circumstances. 
 
6. You didn’t give me enough compensation for my time. Paying respondents for surveys is not 
common. We are giving you a small amount of money in gratitude for your time, but are 
operating on a limited budget and this is the most we can offer. 
 
7. I don’t like the match, I want to draw again. Sorry, you cannot. The matching draw is final. If 
you were offered a different match ratio to a friend or spouse; this is intentional. You should 
make your own decision about donating based on the match we have offered. 
 
8. I want to donate more than c1. We will accept larger donations, but can only afford to match 
up to [X] cedis (where X is the match proportion offered). Take the larger donation, record it on 
the form and put it in the box along with X cedis. Record X cedis on the form as the matched 
donation, and X as the match proportion. 
 
9. What happens to the money? It will be counted in front of the assemblyman or chief, and kept 
in a bank account until December, when we will use it to pay for the village public good. 
 
10. I don’t agree with the public good chosen. The public good was decided by a village meeting 
with the leaders of the village present. As a village you may change your mind about the good 
later in the year, but only if everyone agrees. We are trying to offer your village something that is 
needed, and that a majority of people want. It is impossible to satisfy everyone, or buy 
everything that is needed. 
 
11. Any other questions? Do not improvise. Call Thomas on 0245 927 606 for directions. 
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